Submission to WA Law Reform Commission Inquiry into Recognition of a Person’s Sex, Change of Sex or Intersex Status

The following is my personal submission to the Law Reform Commission of WA’s Review of Western Australian legislation in relation to the recognition of a person’s sex, change of sex or intersex status. For more information on this inquiry, click here.

**********

Law Reform Commission of Western Australia

Level 23, David Malcolm Justice Centre

28 Barrack St

Perth WA 6000

lrcwa@justice.wa.gov.au

 

Friday 19 October 2018

 

To whom it may concern

 

Submission in relation to recognition of a person’s sex, change of sex or intersex status

 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a submission to this important inquiry.

 

As noted in the Discussion Paper, Western Australia’s current legislation in relation to recognition of a person’s sex, change of sex (or gender) or intersex status is inadequate and out-dated, with negative consequences for trans, gender diverse and intersex individuals.

 

The model for reform proposed by the Commission would address a number of these short-comings, although I believe there could be further improvements as discussed below.

 

I write this submission as a cisgender gay member of the LGBTI community, and as an ally of the intersex, trans and gender diverse communities. Where there may be inconsistencies between this submission and the positions supported by those communities, I defer to their views.

 

Question 1. Will the Commission’s proposed model cause any difficulties if implemented?

 

I believe the Commission’s proposed model will remove some of the regulatory barriers currently experienced by trans and gender diverse people in having their gender identities recognised in Western Australia.

 

The removal of sex from birth certificates will also have particular benefits for people born with variations in sex characteristics, reducing pressure for involuntary and unnecessary medical treatments and/or surgeries to be performed.

 

However, as indicated above, I believe there could nevertheless be some improvements made to the model to ensure it better addresses the needs of these diverse communities.

 

Question 2. Is the ‘indeterminate’ category sufficient or should additional categories be added to the forms that are used for the First Report and the Second Report, which will then be used to record the sex of the child?

 

In principle, I do not object to the recording of ‘indeterminate’ sex in the First or Second Reports, provided other aspects of the model – and especially the removal of sex from birth certificates – are also implemented. This appears to ensure statistical data is collected while also reducing the stigmatisation of children born with intersex variations.

 

However, if the collection of ‘indeterminate’ sex is to continue through this process, it would be useful for the WA Government to indicate the numbers of births that have been recorded using this category – and also to actively monitor the number of children with intersex variations who undergo medical interventions to modify their sex characteristics each year (in an effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate human rights abuses in this area).

 

Question 3. Should sex classification be mandatory on birth certificates?

 

No.

 

I can see no proper purpose for recording sex classification in this way. In contrast, there are multiple benefits to be gained by removing this category from this form.

 

For trans and gender diverse people, and especially trans and gender diverse young people, it means they will be able to determine their own gender identity (which is much more relevant) when they are ready – and have that identity reflected in official documentation more easily (under other parts of the model),

 

For people born with variations of sex characteristics, it will help to reduce pressures for involuntary and unnecessary treatments and/or surgeries to alter their sex characteristics to conform to medical, parental and/or societal expectations.

 

The removal of sex and gender from birth certificates has also been called for in the March 2017 Darlington Statement of Australian and New Zealand intersex advocates and as part of the Yogyakarta Principles plus 10.

 

Question 4. Should alternative markers be available, such as ‘other/indeterminate’ or ‘not specified’, if sex classification is required on birth certificates?

 

I would defer to the views of intersex, trans and gender diverse organisations on this issue.

 

However, for the reasons outlined above, I would strongly urge the Commission – and the Western Australian Parliament – to ensure that sex classification be removed, avoiding the potential for adverse consequences in this area.

 

Question 5. Are there circumstances in which it will be necessary or desirable to prove sex through a birth certificate, where proof of gender by a Gender Identity Certificate or proof of sex by medical documentation is not appropriate or sufficient?

 

No. I can think of no circumstances in which proof of sex through birth certificate would be necessary, or preferable instead of proof of gender by Gender Identity Certificate.

 

Question 6. If yes for the above, would certification by the Registrar alleviate this issue?

 

Not applicable.

 

Other comments on the proposed model

 

There are other aspects of the Commission’s proposed model that are welcome, including the recommended abolition of the Gender Reassignment Board (with the simplified functions under the model performed by the Registrar instead).

 

I also welcome the proposed ability of minors to apply for a Gender Identity Certificate from the age of 12, with parental consent.

 

However, I question the age at which parental consent should no longer be required. Rather than the age of 18, which appears to be the position of the Discussion Paper, I believe consideration should be given to adopting an age of 16, as recommended by the February 2016 options paper from the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Commissioner.

 

In terms of which categories should be available on Gender Identity Certificates, I suggest that all of Male, Female, Non-Binary and Other (Please Specify) should be options, to recognise the complexity of gender identity, and that simply adding ‘non-binary’ may not accurately capture all of the possible identities of trans and gender diverse people.

 

However, as expressed earlier in the submission, if the consensus view of trans organisations and individuals is that Male, Female and Non-Binary are sufficient, I defer to those views.

 

On the issue of time limits, I do not agree with the proposal to make any change of gender identity beyond the third occasion subject to approval by an appropriate court or tribunal. I can see no reason why, if change of name is allowed annually, that application for change of gender identity should not also be allowed every 12 months (while noting that it is highly unlikely people will actually apply more than two or three times).

 

I also believe there may be some circumstances in which, even within a particular 12 month timeframe, there may be reasons to allow a person to apply to an appropriate court or tribunal for a change of gender identity to be revised (where, for example, a person is distressed following the issuing of a new gender identity certificate and making them wait to amend it has the potential to cause additional psychological distress).

 

An additional concern I have about the model is the comment on page 70 that “The Registrar may also request further evidence if required to prove the application [for a Gender Identity Certificate] is not sought for an improper or fraudulent purpose.”

 

This power seems to undermine the overall intention for the model to reflect self-identification as far as possible. There is also already a penalty for providing a false statutory declaration, making the necessity of such a power debatable.

 

In this situation, I suggest consideration of either removing this power entirely, or for ensuring additional safeguards on its exercise, to ensure it is only used sparingly, and in exceptional circumstances (rather than reintroducing onerous requirements for individuals to supply medical and other evidence through these administrative arrangements).

 

In addition, any decision by a Registrar to reject an application for a new Gender Identity Certificate (that is different to a previous certificate) on these grounds must be easily appealable, at low or no cost to the individual.

 

Finally, in relation to determining the appropriate place to hear appeals (both in relation to this issue, and also on other questions, such as applications for Gender Identity Certificates for minors where parents disagree, or where a person seeks a change in certificate prior to the expiry of any relevant time limits), I express reservations about the suggestion on page 75 that:

 

“The Commission considers the Family Court to be an appropriate decision-maker where the application is contested by one or more parent(s)/guardian(s), given the Family Court’s jurisdiction for approving medical procedures for intersex and trans and gender diverse minors in circumstances where a child is unable to give informed consent or where there is a disagreement between the parents or guardians about the medical procedure.”

 

Based on some harmful decisions in relation to intersex minors and involuntary medical treatments and/or surgeries by the Family Court of Australia, the Western Australian Family Court may not be seen as being best-placed to adopt the role of decision-maker under the Commission’s proposed model. I therefore suggest consideration be given to adopting a different decision-maker, including the possibility of a specialist tribunal within Western Australia.

 

Other issues

 

I welcome the comments by the Commission, on page 77, that:

 

“The [Equal Opportunity Act 1984] does not provide protections for intersex people, on the basis of their sex characteristics or intersex status, nor does it provide protections for people on the basis of their gender identity. The Commission considers a detailed review of the EO Act would be beneficial.”

 

However, while I support the view that this inadequate and out-dated legislation should be reviewed, I do not believe this should delay amendments to the protected attributes covered under the Act to ensure all members of the LGBTI community in Western Australia are protected against discrimination, as quickly as possible.

 

This could be achieved by adding the protected attribute of ‘gender identity’, potentially based on the definition used in the CommonwealthSex Discrimination Act 1984(with final wording agreed following consultation with the WA trans and gender diverse community).

 

However, I disagree with the Commission that consideration should be given to introducing a protected attribute of ‘intersex status’, again potentially based on the Sex Discrimination Actdefinition.

 

While that approach would ensure greater consistency between WA and Commonwealth law, it is not best practice. Instead, I support the introduction of a protected attribute of ‘sex characteristics’, as called for by Intersex Human Rights Australia, and in the Darlington Statement, potentially using the definition included in the Yogyakarta Principles plus 10:

 

‘each person’s physical features relating to sex, including genitalia and other sexual and reproductive anatomy, chromosomes, hormones, and secondary physical features emerging from puberty.’

 

Finally, I note that any consultation that addresses the issue of legal recognition of people with intersex variations will inevitably raise the issue of harmful, involuntary and unnecessary medical surgeries and/or treatments of children born with variations in sex characteristics.

 

The Discussion Paper indeed touches on this issue, including noting on page 28 that “The Commission understands that the current medical preference is to monitor, rather than intervene, for as long as is medically viable.”

 

My own understanding, based on views expressed by intersex organisations, is that this position may not be entirely accurate. I therefore call on the Commission to further investigate this issue, in consultation with intersex organisations.

 

Ultimately, I would like to see Principle 32 of the Yogyakarta Principles plus 10 reflected in the lived experience of all intersex people in Australia:

 

‘Everyone has the right to bodily integrity, autonomy and self-determination irrespective of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics. Everyone has the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics. No one shall be subjected to invasive or irreversible medical procedures that modify sex characteristics without their free, prior and informed consent, unless medically necessary to avoid serious, urgent and irreparable harm to the concerned person’ (emphasis added).

 

Please do not hesitate to contact me at the details provided below should you wish to clarify any of the above, or for further information.

 

Sincerely

Alastair Lawrie

 

Advertisements

What’s Wrong With the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991?

This post is part of a series examining the anti-discrimination laws that exist in each Australian jurisdiction and analysing how well, or how poorly, they protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people from discrimination. Other posts in the series can be found here.

 

Specifically, each post considers three main aspects of LGBTI anti-discrimination legislation:

  • Protected attributes
  • Religious exceptions, and
  • Anti-vilification coverage.

 

Contrary to what some might expect, Queensland’s laws are at least ‘average’, and in some cases, particularly in relation to anti-vilification laws, ‘better than average’, across these three areas. Unfortunately, that says more about the major flaws that exist across most anti-discrimination laws in Australia than it necessarily does about the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (‘the Act’) itself.

 

There are still significant problems that must be addressed with this legislation, beginning with the issue of who is – and isn’t – covered.

 

**********

 

Protected Attributes

 

Like most of its counterparts in other states, Queensland’s Anti-Discrimination Act does not protect all parts of the LGBTI community from discrimination.

 

On the positive side, it does cover all lesbian, gay and bisexual people – with discrimination on the basis of ‘sexuality’ prohibited in section 7 of the Act (defined as “sexuality means heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality” in the Dictionary found in the Schedule).

 

On the less positive side, it only covers some transgender people, and not others. That is because, while section 7 also includes ‘gender identity’, the Act’s definition of this term is out-dated:

“gender identity, in relation to a person, means that the person-

(a) identifies, or has identified, as a member of the opposite sex by living or seeking to live as a member of that sex; or

(b) is of indeterminate sex and seeks to live as a member of a particular sex.”

 

While this does protect transgender people who were previously identified as male but now identify as female (and vice-versa), it does not include non-binary trans people. In order to rectify this situation, the Act’s definition of gender identity should be updated to reflect the definition used in the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984[i].

 

Even worse off than transgender Queenslanders, however, are people with intersex traits – while part (b) of the definition of ‘gender identity’ may apply to some intersex people in limited circumstances, there is no stand-alone protected attribute for intersex people and therefore no clear-cut protection against discrimination for them.

 

Again, this could be rectified with the introduction of ‘sex characteristics’ as a protected attribute in the legislation[ii].

 

Overall: While the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 does protect lesbian, gay and bisexual people, and some transgender people, from discrimination, it leaves other trans people (especially those whose identity is non-binary) and most intersex people out in the cold. This should be fixed as a matter of priority, by updating the definition of gender identity, and adding sex characteristics as a protected attribute.

 

**********

 

Religious Exceptions

 

Queensland has adopted a unique approach to religious exceptions through the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, in which case I will spend more time than normal discussing this element.

 

The primary religious exception is found in section 109:

“Religious bodies

(1) The Act does not apply in relation to-

(a) the ordination or appointment of priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or

(b) the training or education of people seeking ordination or appointment as priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or

(c) the selection or appointment of people to perform functions in relation to, or otherwise participate in, any religious observance or practice; or

(d) unless section 90 (Accommodation with religious purposes) applies – an act by a body established for religious purposes if the act is –

(i) in accordance with the doctrine of the religion concerned; and

(ii) necessary to avoid offending the religious sensitivities of people of the religion.

(2) An exemption under subsection (1)(d) does not apply in the work or work-related area or in the education area.”

 

The first three sub-sections ((a), (b) and (c)) are at least concerned with the appointment of ministers of religion, or the conduct of religious celebrations, and are therefore more likely to be excusable on the basis of protecting ‘religious freedom’.

 

Unfortunately, the wording used in sub-section (d) – “in accordance with the doctrine of the religion concerned and necessary to avoid offending the religious sensitivities of people of the religion” – is incredibly broad, and permits discrimination against a wide range of people in terms of service delivery.

 

However, sub-section (2) is unusual and, as far as I can tell, not replicated in any other state or territory legislation. In essence, it provides that religious bodies cannot discriminate against employees unless their role is directly connected with ‘religious observance or practice’. It also means religious schools cannot discriminate against students on the basis of their sexuality or gender identity[iii].

 

If section 109 was the only source of religious exceptions in the legislation, Queensland’s Act would almost be assessed as positive. However, there are other sections that complicate this assessment.

 

Chief among them is section 25:

“Genuine occupational requirements

(1) A person may impose genuine occupational requirements for a position.

Examples of genuine requirements for a position-

…Example 4-

Employing persons of a particular religion to teach in a school established for students of the particular religion

(2) Subsection (3) applies in relation to-

(a) work for an educational institution (an employer) under the direction or control of a body established for religious purposes; or

(b) any other work for a body established for religious purposes (also an employer) if the work genuinely and necessarily involves adhering to and communicating the body’s religious beliefs.

(3) It is not unlawful for an employer to discriminate with respect to a matter that is otherwise prohibited under section 14 or 15, in a way that is not unreasonable, against a person if-

(a) the person openly acts in a way that the person knows or ought reasonably to know is contrary to the employer’s religious beliefs-

(i) during a selection process; or

(ii) in the course of the person’s work; or

(iii) in doing something connected with the person’s work; and

Example for paragraph (a)

A staff member openly acts in a way contrary to a requirement imposed by the staff member’s employer in his or her contract of employment, that the staff member abstain from acting in a way openly contrary to the employer’s religious beliefs in the course of, or in connection with the staff member’s employment.

(b) it is a genuine occupational requirement of the employer that the person, in the course of, or in connection with, the person’s work, act in a way consistent with the employer’s religious beliefs.

(4) Subsection (3) does not authorise the seeking of information contrary to section 124[iv].

(5) For subsection (3), whether the discrimination is not unreasonable depends on all the circumstances of the case, including, for example, the following-

(a) whether the action taken or proposed to be taken by the employer is harsh or unjust or disproportionate to the person’s actions;

(b) the consequences for both the person and the employer should the discrimination happen or not happen.

(6) Subsection (3) does not apply to discrimination on the basis of age, race or impairment.

(7) To remove any doubt, it is declared that subsection (3) does not affect a provision of an agreement with respect to work to which subsection (3) applies, under which the employer agrees not to discriminate in a particular way.

(8) In this section-

religion includes religious affiliation, beliefs and activities.”

 

That is obviously a lot to take in. So here are my three key observations:

  • This section expands the religious exceptions offered under section 109, so that religious bodies can discriminate on the basis of sexuality and gender identity against teachers and other staff in schools generally, but against employees in other religious organisations only “if the work genuinely and necessarily involves adhering to and communicating the body’s religious beliefs”.
  • In both cases this is limited by a potentially vague ‘reasonableness test’ (determining “whether the action taken or proposed to be taken by the employer is harsh or unjust or disproportionate to the person’s actions”), and
  • In both cases it is also limited by a ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ clause – discrimination is only permitted where “the person openly acts in a way that the person knows or ought reasonably to know is contrary to the employer’s religious beliefs” and the religious school or body cannot ask about sexuality or gender identity. This would therefore protect teachers or other staff who did not discuss their sexual orientation at their school or workplace[v].

 

Of course, as even the US Government and Military has eventually been forced to concede, ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ is a terrible policy, ‘invisibilising’ LGBT people in the workplace, forcing them to deny who they are and silencing them in everyday conversations (for example, gay teachers would not be able to openly acknowledge their partners at all in the classroom or even in the staffroom). It also exposes LGBT employees to potential harassment and bullying.

 

‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ is also a terrible policy with respect to LGBT students, because it denies them visible role models to look up to, or to seek relevant information from.

 

But, and here is the extraordinary part, these exceptions – allowing religious schools and other bodies to discriminate against ‘out’ lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender employees – are actually the second-best religious exceptions in Australia (behind only Tasmania), because they don’t allow these organisations to explicitly deny employment solely on the basis of sexuality or gender identity.

 

The other, much more unambiguously positive part of the Act’s religious exceptions is that section 25 does not apply to students – which means that, while a religious school can reject students who are not from a particular religion, they cannot reject students on the basis of their sexuality or gender identity.

 

Overall: Queensland’s approach to religious exceptions is unique, and its protection of LGBT students against discrimination is to be welcomed. However, other parts of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 provide overly-generous rights to religious schools and other bodies to discriminate against LGBT employees, and people accessing services, and these should be significantly curtailed.

 

Specifically, subsection 109(1)(d), which allows discrimination on the basis of sexuality and gender identity in relation to service-provision, should be repealed.

 

And, while the limitations on discrimination in relation to employment (including a ‘reasonableness test’ and a ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ clause) might mean Queensland’s legislation is better than most, permitting discrimination in such circumstances is still unacceptable in the 21st century, meaning section 25 should ultimately also be abolished.

 

**********

 

Anti-Vilification Coverage

 

Queensland is one of only four Australian jurisdictions to provide anti-vilification protections to LGBT people – the others being NSW, the ACT and Tasmania (noting that Commonwealth anti-vilification law only applies to race).

 

Unlike NSW, the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act treats all types of prohibited vilification exactly the same – establishing vilification on the basis of race, religion, sexuality and gender identity in the same section (124A)[vi], and creating the offence of serious racial, religious, sexuality or gender identity vilification in another (section 131A).

 

This also means that the same procedures are used, and that the same penalties apply (“for an individual – 70 penalty units or 6 months imprisonment; or for a corporation – 350 penalty units”), which are both positive features.

 

Of course, given the out-dated definition of gender identity used, and the Act’s exclusion of sex characteristics, not all parts of Queensland’s LGBTI community are currently protected against vilification – although this could be rectified at the same time as the protected attributes, described earlier.

 

One other, relatively minor, fault that should also be corrected is that, while the offences themselves cover sexuality and gender identity alongside race and religion, the titles of the relevant Parts or Chapters do not (“Part 4 Racial and religious vilification” and “Chapter 5A Serious racial and religious vilification”).

 

This obviously does not impact on the substantive rights involved. However, it may be misleading to a casual reader of the legislation, and in some cases may cause people to mistakenly believe that they are not protected against vilification. As a result, it would be preferable if these titles were renamed to be genuinely inclusive.

 

Overall: Queensland’s anti-vilification protections are comparatively strong, but could be further strengthened by updating the definition of gender identity, adding sex characteristics, and ensuring that the titles of relevant Parts/Chapters are inclusive and not potentially misleading.

 

**********

 

Other Issues

 

There are two additional serious problems with the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, and it would be negligent to conclude this analysis without addressing them.

 

The first is the truly awful subsection 28(1), which states:

“Work with children

(1) It is not unlawful to discriminate on the basis of lawful sexual activity[vii] or gender identity against a person with respect to a matter that is otherwise prohibited under subdivision 1 if-

(a) the work involves the care or instruction of minors; and

(b) the discrimination is reasonably necessary to protect the physical, psychological or emotional wellbeing of minors having full regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case, including the person’s actions.”

 

This is genuinely appalling – the very law that is supposed to protect transgender people against discrimination implies that trans employees may be unsuitable to work with children, and could even be a threat to the ‘physical, psychological or emotional wellbeing of minors’.

 

There was never a time that such a prejudiced subsection would have been acceptable, and it most definitely is not today – there is no excuse for the Palaszczuk Labor Government to leave this provision in place today.

 

The second additional flaw is found in section 45A, which states that the protection against discrimination in goods and services, located in section 46, “does not apply to the provision of assisted reproductive technology services if the discrimination is on the basis of relationship status or sexuality.”

 

Again, there can be no justification for such discrimination against lesbian, gay and bisexual people in terms of their access to in-vitro fertilisation, artificial insemination or gamete, zygote or embryo transfer. This section must also be repealed as part of the overall much-needed updating of the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991.

 

Palaszczuk

With the recent re-election of the Palaszczuk Government – now with a majority – there is no excuse for it not to update the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991.

 

Footnotes:

[i] Defined in section 4 of that Act as “gender identity means the gender-related identity, appearance or mannerism or other gender-related characteristics of a person (whether by way of medical intervention or not), with or without regard to the person’s designated sex at birth.”

[ii] In March 2017, intersex activists issued the Darlington Statement, which called for this terminology (sex characteristics) to be used instead of the protected attribute of ‘intersex status’, which is found in the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984.

[iii] Although section 42 does allow religious schools to discriminate against “applicants who are not of the particular sex or religion”. A similar provision allows religious boarding schools to discriminate on the basis of sex or religion as well (section 89).

[iv] “124 Unnecessary information

(1) A person must not ask another person, either orally or in writing, to supply information on which unlawful discrimination might be based.”

[v] Without looking at relevant case law, it is unclear how well, or poorly, the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ approach serves transgender people in the workplace.

[vi] “Section 124A Vilification on grounds of race, religion, sexuality or gender identity unlawful

(1) A person must not, by a public act, incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of the race, religion, sexuality or gender identity of the person or members of the group.

(2) Section (1) does not make unlawful-

(a) the publication of a fair report of a public act mentioned in subsection (1); or

(b) the publication of material in circumstances in which the publication would be subject to a defence of absolute privilege in proceedings for defamation; or

(c) a public act, done reasonably and in good faith, for academic, artistic, scientific or research purposes or for other purposes in the public interest, including public discussion or debate about, and expositions of, any act or matter.”

[vii] The Act defines lawful sexual activity as “means a person’s status as a lawfully employed sex worker, whether or not self-employed”.