Submission on NHMRC Review of Ethical Guidelines for Assisted Reproductive Technology Stage 2

Update:

 

The updated Ethical guidelines on the use of assisted reproductive technology were released by the NHMRC in April 2017.

 

Pleasingly, they made some improvements both to the previous guidelines and to the draft revised guidelines that had been released for consultation. However, they did not address all of the points made in my submission (see original post, below).

 

First, they do not include a stand-alone ethical principle of non-discrimination, retaining it as only one element of principle 7 (“Processes and policies for determining an individual’s or a couple’s eligibility to access ART services must be just, equitable, transparent and respectful of human dignity and the natural human rights of all persons, including the right to not be unlawfully or unreasonably discriminated against”).

 

Second, on the other hand they did update the discussion of this principle on page 26 to substitute sexual orientation for sexual preference, and to add new grounds of gender identity and intersex status. Which is certainly an improvement from the original guidelines, although it would be better for the latter attribute to be replaced with sex characteristics, as called for in the March 2017 Darlington Statement.

 

Third, disappointingly but also somewhat expectedly, the NHMRC did not overturn the ethical prohibition on commercial surrogacy, something I continue to see as a necessary harm reduction initiative to limit the possible exploitation of women in overseas countries.

 

Fourth, the guidelines continue to allow staff members to refuse to provide ART procedures on the basis of their conscientious objection: “A member of staff or a student who expresses a conscientious objection to the treatment of an individual patient or to an ART procedure is not obliged to be involved in that treatment or procedure, so long as the objection does not contravene relevant anti-discrimination laws and does not compromise the clinical care of the patient…” Which means the laws of all state and territories will need to be reviewed to ensure discrimination against LGBTI people accessing ART services is specifically prohibited.

 

Fifth, and perhaps most concerningly, the NHMRC has left the door slightly ajar to the sex selection of embryos – something that has specific dangers, right now, for intersex embryos, sets a dangerous precedent for possible selection against diverse sexual orientations and gender identities in the future, and reinforces negative gender stereotyping more broadly.

 

While the NHMRC has retained the existing prohibition on sex selection (“8.14 Sex selection techniques may not be used unless it is to reduce the risk of transmission of a genetic condition, disease or abnormality that would severely limit the quality of life of the person who would be born”), they have also stated this situation could change in the future:

 

“despite AHEC’s majority view that there may be some circumstances where there is no ethical barrier to the use of sex selection for non-medical purposes, paragraph 8.14 applies until such time that wide public debate occurs and/or state and territory legislation addresses the practice.”

 

Any such moves will need to be resisted.

 

Sixth, and finally, the NHMRC address some, but not all, of the points raised by OII Australia (now Intersex Human Rights Australia) and endorsed in my submission, including:

 

  • The guidelines do recommend the provision of information and counselling to prospective parents where “clinics should promote an environment of positive acceptance and non-discrimination”, but
  • The guidelines do not specifically rule out the use of pre-implantation genetic testing to prevent the births of intersex babies.

 

Original Post:

 

Project Officer – ART Public Consultation

Ethics and Governance Section

Evidence, Advice and Governance

National Health and Medical Research Council

GPO Box 1421

CANBERRA ACT 2601

ethics@nhmrc.gov.au

Thursday 17 September 2015

Dear Project Officer

ETHICAL GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE AND RESEARCH

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a further submission to the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) review of Part B of the Ethical guidelines on the use of assisted reproductive technology in clinical practice and research, 2007 (the ART guidelines).

The following submission builds on my earlier submission, in April 2014, to this review (a copy of which is available here: https://alastairlawrie.net/2014/04/20/submission-on-nhmrc-review-of-ethical-guidelines-for-assisted-reproductive-technology/ ).

Overall, while I note that there have been some positive outcomes from the previous round of consultation – including the recognition in para 5.1.2 that “[c]linics must not accept donations from any donor who wishes to place conditions on the donation that the gametes are for the use only by individuals or couples from particular ethnic or social groups, or not be used by particular ethnic or social groups”, and the revised approach to transmissible infections/infectious disease at para 5.2.5  – there remain a range of areas where the ART guidelines should be improved.

First, I believe that the ‘principles and values’ outlined on pages 12 and 13 of the draft ART guidelines should include a specific principle of Non-Discrimination, and that the explanation for this principle should explicitly acknowledge that there should be no discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status in the provision of assisted reproductive technology services.

Second, and on a related matter, in the chapter “Application of ethical principles in the clinical practice of ART”, the discussion under point 3.5 on page 15 should be updated to reflect contemporary best practice.

Specifically, the sentence “[t]here must be no unlawful or unreasonable discrimination against an individual or couple on the basis of:

  • race, religion, sex, marital status, sexual preference, social status, disability or age”

reflects out-dated terminology and does not recognise all necessary groups.

The term ‘sexual preference’ should be replaced by ‘sexual orientation’, and the additional terms ‘gender identity’ and ‘intersex status’ should be added, to ensure that all members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) community are protected from discrimination, and also to ensure that the ART guidelines are consistent with the protected attributes covered under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984.

Third, consistent with my previous submission, I disagree with the discussion under point 3.6 on page 16 regarding commercial surrogacy.

In particular, I do not support the blanket statement that “[i]t is unethical for individuals, or couples, to purchase, offer to purchase or sell gametes or embryos or surrogacy services” or the equally unequivocal blanket ban at para 8.7.1 (“[c]linics and clinicians must not practice, promote or recommend commercial surrogacy, nor enter into contractual arrangements with commercial surrogacy providers.”)

As outlined previously, I believe that the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) should be asked to investigate the issue of commercial surrogacy, including consideration of what a best practice scheme would look like, before determining whether all commercial surrogacy services should be deemed unethical and therefore illegal.

From my previous submission:

“While I agree that commercial surrogacy raises a variety of complex ethical issues, I do not necessarily agree with such a broad-sweeping and all-encompassing statement against commercial surrogacy. I do not believe there is sufficient evidence to assert that in every single situation commercial surrogacy is ‘unethical’ or ‘wrong’.

 Of course, I am, like most people, sensitive to the very real potential for commercial surrogacy to result in the exploitation of women for their reproductive capabilities. This has to be a major, if not the major, consideration in determining whether to allow commercial surrogacy and if so what form of regulation might be appropriate.

 However, I am also aware that the current legal situation – where commercial surrogacy in Australia is banned, and as a direct result of these laws an increasing number of Australian individuals and couples are engaging in commercial surrogacy arrangements overseas – may in fact cause a far greater degree of exploitation of women, especially in developing countries and/or countries which do not closely regulate surrogacy arrangements.

 It may be that a domestic ban on commercial surrogacy has, contrary to the intended outcome of those who introduced it, in fact resulted in greater exploitation of women when considered as a whole. It may also be that, creating a domestic commercial surrogacy scheme, which would allow for direct oversight by Commonwealth (or State and Territory) authorities, could lead to a significant reduction in the potential for such exploitation.

 I do not expect the review process considering these Guidelines to come to a conclusion about these difficult matters. Nor am I willing, or in a position, to even attempt to suggest what a domestic commercial surrogacy scheme would look like.

 However, I do believe that this is an issue that requires further investigation, and could be the subject of a comprehensive review by the Australian Law Reform Commission, or their State and Territory equivalents.

 The ALRC could be asked not to review whether such a scheme should be adopted but to determine, if commercial surrogacy was to be allowed in Australia, what the best possible scheme (with the least potential for the exploitation of women) would look like. The Parliament, and the wider community, could then discuss and debate the option that was put forward and make an informed choice about whether such a model was preferable to the ongoing domestic ban on commercial surrogacy (and the corresponding trend to overseas surrogacy arrangements).

 I believe that such a debate, informed not just by a practical proposal but also by the real-world consequences of the current ban, is vital before we can truly come to grips with and possibly resolve whether a permanent ban on commercial surrogacy is ethical or otherwise.”

Fourth, I continue to oppose ‘Conscientious objection’ provisions (under point 3.7 on pages 16 and 17) that would allow a member of staff or student to refuse to treat an individual or couple on the basis of that person’s sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status, or on their relationship status.

The refusal to provide a medical service on these grounds is, and always should be considered, unethical.

Again, from my previous submission:

“While I note that the provision of ART services may, for some staff members of students, raise ethical concerns, I believe that the drafting of this provision is far too broad, and allows for conscientious objections even when such objections are themselves unethical.

 For example, the provision as drafted would allow an individual member of staff to refuse to provide ART services to a person on the basis of that person’s sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status (if that person believed that ART services should not be provided to such persons) or on the basis of relationship status (if the person believed that only ‘opposite-sex’ married persons should have access to ART).

 With the increasing acceptance of LGBTI Australians (as evidenced by the long-overdue introduction of federal anti-discrimination protections in 2013) and of different relationship statuses (including the 2008 reforms to federal de facto relationship recognition), none of these objections – while potentially genuinely held by the individual – should be allowed as the basis for refusing to provide ART services. Nor should conscientious objections on the basis of any of sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status or relationship status be recognized as acceptable or ‘ethical’ in the context of these Guidelines.

 If [point 3.7] is to be retained in the Ethical Guidelines, I recommend that it be amended to specifically note that conscientious objections do not apply, and are not accepted, with respect to the sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status or relationship status of the intended recipient of the ART procedure or service.”

Fifth, in response to the discussion of “Sex selection for non-medical purposes” on pages 55 to 58 of the consultation draft, I submit that sex selection should not be allowed on these grounds.

There are three reasons for this:

  1. Based on evidence from the submission of OII Australia (Organisation Intersex International Australia, see their submission here: https://oii.org.au/29939/nhmrc-genetic-selection-intersex-traits/ ), it appears that sex selection is already being used to select against embryos on the basis of intersex variations. This practice is entirely unethical, intending to prevent the birth of children on the basis of where they sit along the natural spectrum of sex variation, and should cease.
  2. Allowing sex selection for non-medical purposes also sets a negative precedent, opening the door in future to selecting for (or more likely against) embryos on the basis of gender identity or even sexual orientation if and when genetic testing emerges which can accurately predict the existence of, or even pre-disposition towards, these traits.
  3. As acknowledged by the consultation paper on page 55, there is a strong “possibility that sex selection for non-medical reasons may reinforce gender stereotyping, and create pressure on the person born to conform to parental expectations regarding gender.” This practice will be particularly harmful towards children born as a result of such procedures where those children express a different gender identity to that which the parents ‘choose’, and also may negatively impact children who are homosexual or bisexual.

On this basis, I do not believe that sex selection is appropriate in any of the case studies presented on pages 56, 57 and 58, and submit that it should not be included as an ‘ethical option’ under the ART guidelines.

Sixth, and finally, I would like to express my support for the submission by OII Australia to this consultation. Specifically, I endorse their recommendations that:

  • “Information giving and counselling must include non-pathologising information, aimed at supporting a philosophy of self-acceptance”
  • Pre-implantation genetic testing (PGT) should not be used to prevent the births of intersex babies and that
  • “The practice of sex selection should not be permitted for social, child replacement, or family balancing purposes.”

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide a submission to this consultation process. Please do not hesitate to contact me, at the details below, should you which to clarify any of the above, or to seek additional information.

Sincerely,

Alastair Lawrie

Submission to Alex Greenwich Discussion Paper re Removing Surgical Requirement for Changes to Birth Certificate

Alex Greenwich MP

58 Oxford St

PADDINGTON NSW 2021

sydney@parliament.nsw.gov.au

Friday 21 August 2015

Dear Mr Greenwich

SUBMISSION ON DISCUSSION PAPER RE REMOVING SURGICAL REQUIREMENT FOR CHANGES TO BIRTH CERTIFICATE

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this short submission in response to the above-mentioned Discussion Paper, and for highlighting what is clearly an important issue for transgender people in NSW.

I should begin by noting that I am writing this from the perspective of a cisgender gay man and that, if this submission is contrary to the views expressed by trans* individuals and organisations, then those submissions should obviously be preferred.

Nevertheless, as a long-term advocate and activist within the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) community, I find it hard to disagree with the premise of the Discussion Paper which is that trans* people should not be required to undergo irreversible sex affirmation surgical procedures before being able to apply to amend their birth certificate.

Similarly, I can see no valid reason why the approach which has been adopted by Ireland – and which is described in the Discussion Paper as ‘world’s best practice’ – should not be adopted here.

This approach – allowing transgender individuals to legally change their birth certificate through a statutory declaration process without any need for medical documentation – has a number of significant advantages.

These include:

  • Recognising the diversity of experience within the transgender community
  • Respecting the personal autonomy of people to identify themselves and
  • Removing the unnecessary ‘medicalisation’ of this process.

Above all, adopting the Irish approach would make it easier for trans* people to obtain documentation which reflects their gender identity, which is a positive outcome in and of itself.

I look forward to seeing the Final Report of this consultation later in 2015, and to the ongoing work of yourself and the NSW Cross-Party LGBTI Working Group on a wide range of other, related issues, including (but not limited to):

  • The abolition of incredibly unjust ‘forced trans* divorce’ laws
  • The removal of exceptions to the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 which allow private schools to discriminate against trans* students and teachers[i] and
  • The abolition of the unjustifiably broad exceptions granted to religious organisations in sub-section 56(d)[ii] of the same Act.

Thank you in advance for taking this submission into account. Please contact me at the details provided below if you would like clarification or further information about any aspect of this submission.

Sincerely,

Alastair Lawrie

[i] Section 38K of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, which covers education, provides that “[n]othing in this section applies to or in respect of private educational authorities”.

[ii] “Nothing in this Act affects: … (d) any other act or practice of a body established to propagate religion that conforms to the doctrines of that religion or is necessary to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of the adherents of that religion.”

State Member for Sydney Alex Greenwich (source NSW Parliament website).

State Member for Sydney Alex Greenwich (source: NSW Parliament website).

Why we need a full-time LGBTI Commissioner at the Australian Human Rights Commission

As I have written previously, the passage of the Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013 was a major achievement for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) rights in Australia[1].

It provided anti-discrimination protections for LGBTI people under Commonwealth law for the first time – including historic world-first specific protections for people with intersex variations.

However, one thing this legislation did not do was establish a statutory position for a Commissioner for Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex (SOGII) Issues within the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) – unlike existing positions for race and sex (indeed, the Sex Discrimination Commissioner is created in section 96 of the same act in which LGBTI anti-discrimination protections now live[2]).

This means there is no guaranteed advocate for LGBTI equality within the AHRC. The current President of the AHRC, Gillian Triggs, has sought to overcome this serious shortcoming by asking the Human Rights Commissioner, Tim Wilson, to also accept responsibility for SOGII issues, in addition to his existing priorities.

Nevertheless, this essentially stop-gap measure does not reconcile the challenges presented when his ‘part-time’ role – his responsibilities for LGBTI matters – conflicts with his full-time role – he was appointed by the Commonwealth Attorney-General, Senator George Brandis, with the explicit mandate to advocate for ‘freedoms’, by which he meant traditional civil liberties as opposed to more contemporary rights like freedom from discrimination.

Over the past 18 months, this tension has played out in a variety of ways, including through the failure of the otherwise worthy Resilient Individuals: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity & Intersex Rights 2015 Report[3] to adequately address the issue of state-sanctioned discrimination by religious organisations against people simply for being LGBT.

However, this conflict has come to a head in a column which Mr Wilson wrote for The Australian last week on the topic “Religious freedom and same-sex marriage need not be incompatible”[4], in which he argued that, should marriage equality legislation be passed in Australia, new rights should be created to allow not just ministers of religion, but also businesses involved in providing wedding-related services (and yes, that includes businesses selling wedding cakes), to discriminate against customers.

Through this column, Mr Wilson has indicated that his first priority is protecting the freedom to discriminate, and that the right of LGBTI Australians not to be discriminated against comes second (and even then arguably by some distance). He has therefore demonstrated that his roles as Human Rights Commissioner, and ‘part-time’ responsibility for SOGII issues, are incompatible.

In the short-term, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex Australians deserve a Commissioner within the AHRC whose existing responsibilities do not cause them to advocate against their interests. In the medium-term, we need a stand-alone full-time Commissioner for SOGII issues within the Commission, to avoid these problems arising in the future.

I have written below two letters, one to the President of the AHRC, Gillian Triggs, calling for Mr Wilson’s responsibilities for LGBTI matters to be reallocated within the Australian Human Rights Commission.

And I have written a second letter to the Shadow Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus, asking him to support a resolution at the upcoming ALP National Conference to amend the Labor Party Platform to include a commitment to create a new Commissioner for Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Issues within the AHRC.

I have chosen not to write or send a third letter, to the current Attorney-General, George Brandis, given he likely agrees with the actions of Mr Wilson, and it is extremely unlikely that someone who axed funding for the position of Disability Commissioner (and therefore ended the role of the highly-respected disability rights advocate Graeme Innes) last year, would somehow find funding for the creation of a SOGII Commissioner today.

As always, I will publish any responses I receive from Ms Triggs and Mr Dreyfus.

Professor Gillian Triggs

President

Australian Human Rights Commission

GPO Box 5218

SYDNEY NSW 2001

Sunday 12 July 2015

Dear Professor Triggs

PLEASE REALLOCATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY AND INTERSEX ISSUES WITHIN THE AHRC

I am writing to you about the allocation of responsibility for sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex issues within the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC).

Specifically, I call on you to reallocate these responsibilities, which currently lie (informally at least) with the Human Rights Commissioner, Mr Tim Wilson, to another of the Commissioners within the AHRC.

I do so because I believe that the stance which Mr Wilson has adopted, in advocating for traditional freedoms like freedom of religion, has taken precedence over and is increasingly incompatible with the responsibility to advocate for the equal rights, and freedom from discrimination, of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex Australians.

I cite as evidence the column which Mr Wilson wrote for The Australian newspaper, published on Monday 6 July 2015, titled “Religious freedom and same-sex marriage need not be incompatible.”

In this piece, Mr Wilson does the following four things:

First, he argues that the legislation which finally introduces marriage equality in Australia should include new provisions which provide a substantive right to discriminate against couples, not just for ministers of religion (which are already proposed), but also for businesses that provide wedding-related services.

Second, the argument for this appears to be primarily to allow businesses the ability to discriminate against LGBTI couples (so that the individuals who operate these businesses are not “forced to act against their conscience”).

Not only is Mr Wilson raising this issue now as part of the broader discussion around making marriage non-discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status – but, just as importantly, there does not appear to be any other public calls for a greater right to discriminate for wedding service providers outside of the marriage equality debate.

Third, the ‘solution’ which he offers, which would allow discrimination by wedding service providers on the basis of the religious (or not) nature of the wedding involved, would allow increased discrimination against a wide range of couples – in practice, this would inevitably include a detrimental impact on some LGBTI couples (although of course they would not be the only ones affected).

Fourth, at a time when one of the last major legal sources of discrimination against LGBTI Australians are the wide-ranging exceptions to anti-discrimination laws which are offered to religious organisations, instead of advocating for the curtailment of these exceptions, Mr Wilson is arguing for establish new rights to discriminate in a key area of public life.

Mr Wilson may well respond to the above description of his column by indicating he is performing his primary role, which is to advocate for traditional rights and freedoms, including the freedom of religion. I am not disputing that view.

However, I submit that, in doing so, he is not fulfilling his ‘part-time’ responsibilities, which include advocating for the removal of discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people.

LGBTI Australians deserve better than to have a ‘part-time’ Commissioner for whom, when potential conflict arises between freedom of religion and their freedom from discrimination, as it does in this situation, the former takes precedence.

I urge you to reallocate the responsibility for sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex issues within the Australian Human Rights Commission from Mr Wilson to another Commissioner, hopefully to one where there is less apparent conflict between their primary role and these additional functions.

The only way in which such a conflict can be resolved on a permanent basis would be for the amendment of the Sex Discrimination Act to create, and for Government to appoint, a full-time Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Issues Commissioner within the AHRC. I therefore also urge you to advocate for the creation of such a position by the Government.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of this correspondence.

Sincerely

Alastair Lawrie

President of the Australian Human Rights Commission, Professor Gillian Triggs, should reallocate responsibility for LGBTI issues within the Commission.

President of the Australian Human Rights Commission, Professor Gillian Triggs, should reallocate responsibility for LGBTI issues within the Commission.

Hon Mark Dreyfus QC, MP

Shadow Attorney-General

PO Box 6022

House of Representatives

Parliament House

CANBERRA ACT 2600

Sunday 12 July 2015

Dear Mr Dreyfus

PLEASE SUPPORT THE CREATION OF A COMMISSIONER FOR SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY AND INTERSEX ISSUES WITHIN THE AHRC

I am writing to you about the Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013.

Specifically, I call on you to help address one of the outstanding issues of this historic legislation – namely, the failure to create a new statutory position of Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex (SOGII) Issues Commissioner within the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC).

Without such a position, the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) Australians are not being as effectively promoted as they could be, and certainly not as effectively as the rights promoted by the statutory Race and Sex Discrimination Commissioners, also within the AHRC.

For example, currently, and in the absence of a statutory position, responsibility for SOGII issues has been allocated, on a ‘part-time’ basis, to the Human Rights Commissioner, Mr Tim Wilson, whose primary role is to advocate for ‘freedoms’, meaning traditional civil liberties as opposed to more contemporary rights like freedom from discrimination.

This means that, not only do issues of discrimination that confront LGBTI Australians not receive sufficient time and resources, but they are also secondary to, and sometimes incompatible with, the promotion of other rights like the freedom of religion.

One example of this incompatibility comes from the column which Mr Wilson wrote for The Australian newspaper, published on Monday 6 July 2015, titled “Religious freedom and same-sex marriage need not be incompatible.”

In this piece, Mr Wilson does the following four things:

First, he argues that the legislation which finally introduces marriage equality in Australia should include new provisions which provide a substantive right to discriminate against couples, not just for ministers of religion (which are already proposed), but also for businesses that provide wedding-related services.

Second, the argument for this appears to be primarily to allow businesses the ability to discriminate against LGBTI couples (so that the individuals who operate these businesses are not “forced to act against their conscience”).

Not only is Mr Wilson raising this issue now as part of the broader discussion around making marriage non-discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status – but, just as importantly, there does not appear to be any other public calls for a greater right to discriminate for wedding service providers outside of the marriage equality debate.

Third, the ‘solution’ which he offers, which would allow discrimination by wedding service providers on the basis of the religious (or not) nature of the wedding involved, would allow increased discrimination against a wide range of couples – in practice, this would inevitably include a detrimental impact on some LGBTI couples (although of course they would not be the only ones affected).

Fourth, at a time when one of the last major legal sources of discrimination against LGBTI Australians are the wide-ranging exceptions to anti-discrimination laws which are offered to religious organisations, instead of advocating for the curtailment of these exceptions, Mr Wilson is arguing for establish new rights to discriminate in a key area of public life.

In my opinion as an LGBTI advocate, it is simply not good enough that, when there is a conflict between the freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination, the person with responsibility for SOGII issues within the AHRC promotes the former at the expense of the latter.

The issues of homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and intersexphobia which confront LGBTI Australians, every day, are both real and serious. We deserve a full-time Commissioner within the AHRC to help address these problems – and certainly not a ‘part-time’, informal appointee, whose primary responsibilities can conflict with, and in some instances override, LGBTI rights.

I understand that, at the upcoming ALP National Conference in Melbourne, on July 24-26 2015, there will likely be a resolution to amend the Labor Party Platform to include a commitment to create a new Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Issues Commissioner within the Australian Human Rights Commission.

This resolution is based on recent developments in Victoria, where the new Labor Government has committed to appointing Australia’s first Gender and Sexuality Commissioner within the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (VEOHRC)[5].

I call on you, as Shadow Attorney-General, to support moves to amend the Platform in this way, so that the Federal Labor Party can establish the first stand-alone SOGII Commissioner at Commonwealth level when it returns to Government.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of this correspondence.

Sincerely,

Alastair Lawrie

[1] Highs & Lows of 2013, No 2: Australia finally adopts federal anti-discrimination protections for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people: https://alastairlawrie.net/2013/12/26/no-2-australia-finally-adopts-federal-anti-discrimination-protections-for-lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender-and-intersex-people/

[2] “Section 96. Sex Discrimination Commissioner. (1) There shall be a Sex Discrimination Commissioner, who shall be appointed by the Governor-General.”

[3] The Resilient Individuals Report is available here: https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/sexual-orientation-sex-gender-identity/publications/resilient-individuals-sexual

[4] http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/religious-freedom-and-same-sex-marriage-need-not-be-incompatible/story-e6frg6zo-1227429558684

[5] VEOHRC Media Release welcoming Budget funding for this appointment: http://www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/index.php/news-and-events/media-releases/item/1225-commission-welcomes-funding-for-lgbti-community-in-state-budget

Submission to South Australian Law Reform Institute Consultation on Removing LGBTIQ Discrimination

South Australian Law Reform Institute

c/- salri@adelaide.edu.au

Monday 6 July 2015

 

To whom it may concern,

Submission to South Australian Law Reform Institute Consultation on Removing LGBTIQ Discrimination from South Australian Laws

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this submission to the South Australian Law Reform Institute (SALRI) public consultation on removing discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer people from South Australian laws.

While I am not a resident of South Australia, I am a passionate advocate for LGBTI rights, and I provide the following comments on possible ways to improve the legal situation of LGBTI people in South Australia, especially in terms of their protections under anti-discrimination law.

Specifically, I would like to suggest three major reforms to the South Australian Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (the ‘Act’), namely:

  1. Amend protected attributes to:
    1. Modernise wording around gender identity, and
    2. Genuinely include intersex status.

The Equal Opportunity Act 1984 currently provides protection to lesbian, gay and bisexual people through section 29 (and subsequent provisions of the Act), because of the definition of ‘sexuality’ in section 5: “sexuality means heterosexuality, homosexuality and bisexuality.”

While the SALRI may wish to consider whether to recommend amendments to the wording of these attributes (potentially to ‘sexual orientation’, to ensure consistency with the provisions of the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013), the primary concerns around protected attributes, and how they are drafted, are in respect of transgender and intersex individuals.

For example, protections for transgender people are based on the term ‘chosen gender’, which is defined under sub-section 5(5) of the Act as: “a person is a person of a chosen gender if –

  • the person identifies on a genuine basis as a member of the opposite sex by assuming characteristics of the opposite sex (whether by means of medical intervention, style of dressing or otherwise) or by living, or seeking to live, as a member of the opposite sex…”

Based on my understanding of transgender activism, and through recent developments of anti-discrimination law within Australia, it is highly likely that using the term ‘chosen gender’, and then defining it in this way, is not best practice.

For example, the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984 protections are instead based on ‘gender identity’, which is defined in section 4 of that Act as: “gender identity means the gender-related identity, appearance or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of a person (whether by way of medical intervention or not), with or without regard to the person’s designated sex at birth.”

The Commonwealth definition appears to be significantly more inclusive, especially because it does not use descriptors such as ‘opposite sex’ and therefore avoids strict gender binaries, allowing people who do not identify as either male or female to also be protected.

I suggest the SALRI consider recommending the South Australian Equal Opportunity Act 1984 be amended to incorporate the term, and definition of, ‘gender identity’ from the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984.

In a similar way, it is possible that the drafters of subsection 5(5) of the South Australian Equal Opportunity Act 1984 believed that they were including people with intersex variations, when they wrote: “a person is a person of a chosen gender if – …

  • the person, being of indeterminate sex, identifies on a genuine basis as a member of a particular sex by assuming characteristics of the particular sex (whether by means of medical intervention, style of dressing or otherwise) or by living, or seeking to live, as a member of the particular sex.”

However, once again based on my understanding of intersex activism, and on recent developments in anti-discrimination law (particularly at the Commonwealth level, and more recently in Tasmania), it is clear that this definition is not best practice – and is, in fact, inadequate to ensure protection for people on the basis of intersex status.

For this reason, the SALRI should consider recommending that South Australia adopt the provisions of the Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013, which was the first anti-discrimination legislation in the world to include ‘intersex status’ as a stand-alone protected attribute.

As a result of those reforms, ‘intersex status’ is now defined in section 4 of the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984 as: “intersex status means the status of having physical, hormonal or genetic features that are:

  • neither wholly female nor wholly male; or
  • a combination of female and male; or
  • neither female nor male.”

Adopting this definition would ensure a far larger proportion of people with intersex variations would have protection under South Australia’s anti-discrimination laws.

Obviously, as a cisgender gay man, I am not an expert on either of the grounds of gender identity or intersex status. That is why these issues have been framed as suggestions – and if this is something that the SALRI wishes to take up in more detail, it should do so in close collaboration with South Australian and/or national transgender and intersex advocacy organisations to ensure that whatever language is ultimately adopted is the best, and most inclusive, possible.

  1. Remove broad exceptions granted to religious organisations

The current exceptions which are offered to religious organisations in the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 are overly generous, and their scope should be significantly narrowed.

Section 50 of the Act provides:

Religious bodies

1. This Part does not render unlawful discrimination in relation to –

a. the ordination or appointment of priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or

b. the training or education of persons seeking ordination or appointment as priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or

ba. the administration of a body established for religious purposes in accordance with the precepts of that religion; or

c. any other practice of a body established for religious purposes that conforms with the precepts of that religion or is necessary to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of the adherents of that religion.”

While both subsections 50(1)(a) and (b) appear to be necessary to protect the genuine exercise of freedom of religion, subsection 50(1)(ba) would only be justified on this basis if it was limited to the operation of explicitly or overtly religious bodies (like churches) and should not apply to other institutions which may be operated by religions but which have a different primary purpose (for example, schools, hospitals, aged care services or other community services).

Subsection 50(1)(c) is also completely unjustifiable given it provides what amounts to essentially a ‘blank cheque’ to organisations that are operated by religious groups to discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) South Australians, both in employment and in service delivery.

There should not be a general right to discriminate against LGBT people, across multiple areas of public life like education, health, aged care or community services, simply because of the religious beliefs of certain individuals or organisations. LGBT South Australians deserve the right to access services, and to apply for or undertake employment, in the public sphere without the threat of being discriminated against solely on the basis of who they are.

The Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013, which specifically excluded religious exceptions from applying to LGBT people accessing aged care services operated by religious organisations, has successfully demonstrated that:

  1. It is possible to restrict these religious exceptions in law, and
  2. After two years of operation, there have been no practical problems in the application of such provisions.

Even more relevantly, the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 has not granted explicit exceptions to protections on sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status to religious organisations – and this approach has also worked well over the past decade.

For example, under the Tasmanian legislation, religious organisations have traditionally only been allowed to discriminate in terms of:

  1. Employment based on religion (section 51)[1] or
  2. Participation in religious observance (section 52)[2].

I suggest that the SALRI consider the long-standing Tasmanian exceptions, which do not allow for general discrimination against LGBTI people on the basis of their sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status, but only on the grounds of religious belief or activity, as a ‘best practice’ guide to help reform the South Australian Equal Opportunity Act 1984 and therefore improve the anti-discrimination protections which are offered to LGBTI South Australians.[3]

  1. Introduce anti-vilification protections for LGBTI South Australians

The final suggestion relates to the issue of anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex vilification.

Specifically, it is to recommend the creation of anti-vilification laws, on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status, which are equivalent to the race-based anti-vilification provisions of the South Australian Racial Vilification Act 1996[4].

To put it bluntly, there is no justification whatsoever to have anti-vilification laws which protect people from racist vilification, but to simultaneously not have anti-vilification laws which apply to homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and intersexphobia.

Homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and intersexphobia are just as unacceptable, and, most importantly, just as harmful, as racism – with significant impacts on the mental health of young LGBTI people in particular. If, as a community, we have (or in this case, South Australia, has) resolved to outlaw racist vilification, then similar laws should also be used to outlaw homophobic, biphobic, transphobic and intersexphobic vilification.

Currently, four Australian jurisdictions (NSW, Queensland, the ACT and Tasmania) have anti-vilification laws which cover (at least some of) the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex communities.

However, given neither the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984, nor South Australian law, have any vilification protections on these grounds, none of the LGBTI communities in South Australia have any legal protection from similar conduct.

This situation should change – and I suggest the SALRI recommend the creation of new anti-vilification laws which prohibit vilification on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.

The past 18 months have seen an extensive community conversation about race-based vilification laws at the Commonwealth level, and specifically whether section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 should be repealed, amended or retained.

The outcome of this debate appears to be relatively strong community support for the retention of section 18C. As such, I believe the SALRI should take advantage of this moment to recommend that another marginalised group within Australian society should be offered the same shield against conduct which is similarly destructive.

Thank you again for the opportunity to make a submission to the South Australian Law Reform Institute (SALRI) public consultation on removing discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer people from South Australian laws.

I look forward to the outcome of this consultation, and to the consequent improvements to South Australia’s laws – hopefully including the reforms to the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 recommended in this submission.

Sincerely,

Alastair Lawrie

[1] “Section 51: Employment based on religion.

(1) A person may discriminate against another person on the ground of religious belief or affiliation or religious activity in relation to employment if the participation of the person in the observance or practice of a particular religion is a genuine occupational qualification or requirement in relation to the employment.

(2) A person may discriminate against another person on the ground of religious belief or affiliation or religious activity in relation to employment in an educational institution that is or is to be conducted in accordance with the tenets, beliefs, teachings, principles or practices or a particular religion if the discrimination is in order to enable, or better enable, the educational institution to be conducted in accordance with those tenets, beliefs, teachings, principles or practices.”

[2] “Section 52: Participation in religious observance.

A person may discriminate against another person on the ground of religious belief or affiliation or religious activity in relation to –

  • the ordination or appointment of a priest; or
  • the training and education of any person seeking ordination or appointment as a priest; or
  • the selection or appointment of a person to participate in any religious observance or practice; or
  • any other act that –
    • is carried out in accordance with the doctrine of a particular religion; and
    • is necessary to avoid offending the religious sensitivities of any person of that religion.”

[3] However, I do not believe there is any reason to include the recently added, unnecessary – and unnecessarily discriminatory – provisions included in section 51A of the Tasmanian Act which state: “Section 51A. Admission of person as student based on religion.

(1) A person may discriminate against another person on the ground of religious belief or affiliation or religious activity in relation to admission of that other person as a student to an educational institution that is or is to be conducted in accordance with the tenets, beliefs, teachings, principles or practices of a particular religion.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who is enrolled as a student at the educational institution referred to in that subsection.

(3) Subsection (1) does not permit discrimination on any grounds referred to in section 16 other than those specified in that subsection.

(4) A person may, on a ground specified in subsection (1), discriminate against another person in relation to the admission of the other person as a student to an educational institution, if the educational institution’s policy for the admission of students demonstrates that the criteria for admission relates to the religious belief or affiliation, or religious activity, of the other person, the other person’s parents or the other person’s grandparents.”

[4] Section 4 of the SA Racial Vilification Act provides: “Racial vilification. A person must not, by a public act, incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of their race by –

  • threatening physical harm to the person, or members of the group, or to property of the person or members of the group; or
  • inciting others to threaten physical harm to the person, or members of the group, or to property of the person or members of the group.

Maximum penalty:

If the offender is a body corporate – $25 000.

If the offender is a natural person – $5 000, or imprisonment for 3 years, or both.”

Submission to Rights & Responsibilities 2014 Consultation

The Human Rights Commissioner, Tim Wilson, is currently undertaking a public consultation called Rights & Responsibilities 2014. Unfortunately, similar to the ALRC Freedoms Inquiry, it is very much focused on ‘traditional’ rights at the expense of other rights like the right to non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status. This post is my submission to this consultation process.

You can find out more about the inquiry, including downloading the Discussion Paper, at the following link: https://www.humanrights.gov.au/rights-responsibilities-2014 Written submissions, including an option to complete an online survey, are due by Friday 14 November 2014. Public consultations are also being held across the country, with a session in Sydney scheduled for Wednesday 19 November 2014 (details at the AHRC website).

Mr Tim Wilson

Human Rights Commissioner

Australian Human Rights Commission

c/- rights2014@humanrights.gov.au

Monday 27 October 2014

Dear Commissioner Wilson

SUBMISSION TO RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES 2014 CONSULTATION

I welcome the opportunity to provide a submission to the Rights & Responsibilities 2014 public consultation, and in particular to provide feedback on the Discussion Paper, of the same name, published on the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) website.

In this submission, I will provide feedback on two of the four rights, or related sets of rights, featured in Appendix A of the discussion paper (namely, the right to freedom of expression, and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religious worship).

However, before doing so I would like to express my serious concern that the focus of the discussion paper is limited to some rights, which could be characterised as being more ‘traditional’ in nature (for example, the right to property), to the apparent exclusion of other rights which, I believe, are no less important in the contemporary world.

Specifically, I would argue that prioritising certain rights above others potentially neglects and devalues the importance of those other rights which are no less essential to ensuring that all Australians are able to fully participate in modern society. From my point of view, chief among these rights is the right to non-discrimination, or to put it another way (which may be more favourably received), to be free from discrimination, including unfair or adverse treatment on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.

The right to non-discrimination is fundamental in international human rights law adopted immediately post-World War II. Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status.”

Similarly, article 21 of the ICCPR establishes that: “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has, in cases which both involved complaints by Australian citizens against actions by the Tasmanian and Commonwealth Government respectively, found that the wording of these articles includes the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.[1]

The Commonwealth Parliament has also recognised that the right to non-discrimination for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) Australians is worthy of protection, with the passage of the Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013. This historic legislation, providing similar rights to non-discrimination to those already enjoyed on the basis of race, sex, disability and age, was a significant, albeit long overdue, step forward for the LGBTI community.

For this reason, I would not wish to see the right to be free from discrimination on these attributes to be diminished in comparison to other, more ‘traditional’ rights. Unfortunately, that is the almost inevitable conclusion of a consultation process which aims to consider “how effectively we protect people’s human rights and freedoms in Australia” (page 1 of the Discussion Paper) but which then only focuses on a small number of freedoms, including the right to property, and which neglects others.

In this way, the Rights & Responsibilities 2014 Discussion Paper appears to reinforce the message, already made clear by the Attorney-General, Senator the Hon George Brandis’ ‘Freedom Inquiry’ reference to the Australian Law Reform Commission (see http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/freedoms/terms-reference for the terms of reference), that some freedoms are somehow better or more worthy of protection than others. Both inquiries appear to suggest that there is a hierarchy of rights, with ‘traditional’ rights at the top, and other rights, such as the right to non-discrimination, placed below them.

This is particularly concerning when some of those traditional rights being promoted or ‘privileged’ in these consultations, including the right to property and the right to ‘common law protection of personal reputation’ (aka defamation), are rights which are inherently more valuable to those who already enjoy ‘privilege’ within society, while other rights vital to protect the interests of people who are not ‘privileged’ are largely ignored.

Above all, I am concerned that you, in your role as Human Rights Commissioner, should actively participate in the reinforcement of this supposed hierarchy of rights, with the right to non-discrimination placed somewhere toward the bottom – especially as you are also the Commissioner at the AHRC with responsibility for sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status issues.

I would ask that you reconsider your approach to these issues in the Rights & Responsibilities 2014 consultation process, and, instead of promoting a narrow view of what constitutes fundamental human rights, ensure that other rights, including the right to non-discrimination – or to be free from discrimination – are also given appropriate consideration.

I will now turn my attention to two of the four rights, or related sets of rights, featured in Appendix A of the Discussion Paper.

Right to freedom of expression (page 5 of the Discussion Paper)

I acknowledge the importance of the right to freedom of expression, or freedom of speech. However, I also welcome the Discussion Paper’s statement that freedom of speech is not absolute, in particular where it notes that: “Under international law, freedom of expression may only be limited where it is prescribed by law and deemed necessary to protect the rights or reputations of others, national security, public order, or public health or morals. A mandatory limitation also applies to the right to freedom of expression in relation to ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’.”[2]

In this context, I question why laws should be established to prohibit ‘advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred’ but not to prohibit advocacy of hatred on other grounds, including sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status. The impact of vilification on these grounds, and the negative influence of public homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and intersexphobia more generally, is just as harmful as racial or religious vilification. Therefore I can see no good reason why there should not also exist equivalent anti-vilification protections covering LGBTI Australians a Commonwealth level.

It is for this reason that I provided a submission earlier this year in response to the Attorney-General, Senator the Hon George Brandis’, Exposure Draft Bill seeking to repeal section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, in which I argued that, instead of abolishing racial vilification laws, similar protections against vilification on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status should be added to the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (a copy of this submission can be found at the following link: https://alastairlawrie.net/2014/04/24/dont-limit-racial-vilification-protections-introduce-vilification-protections-for-lgbti-australians-instead/ ).

Thus, while I understand the focus of this section of the Discussion Paper is on ensuring that there exist only narrow restrictions on ‘freedom of expression’ (as summed up in the question “how individuals can be held accountable for the use of their freedom of expression outside of law” emphasis added), I submit there remains a proper, indeed necessary, role for legal restrictions on this freedom to protect against the “incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”.

I further submit that these protections should cover lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex Australians against such incitements. I sincerely hope that, in your capacity as both Human Rights Commissioner and AHRC Commissioner with responsibility for sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status issues, you agree.

Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religious worship (page 6 of the Discussion Paper)

I also acknowledge the fundamental importance of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religious worship. I further agree with the Discussion Paper on page 6 where it states that “[t]he internal dimension of the right – the freedom to adopt or hold a belief – is absolute.”

However, just as importantly, I support the statement that “the external dimension – the freedom to manifest that belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching – may be limited by laws when deemed necessary to protect the public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (emphasis added). This is a vital caveat that allows Governments to protect other individuals and groups against both potential and real harm.

Unfortunately, I do not believe that Australian law currently strikes the right balance between respecting the right to freedom of religious worship, and the harms caused by breaches of the right to non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.

Specifically, I am concerned that the broad exceptions and/or exemptions which are provided to religious organisations under Commonwealth, state and territory anti-discrimination laws, including those protections added by the Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013, are far too generous, and essentially approve the prejudicial and discriminatory treatment of LGBT Australians by religious bodies in a large number of areas of public life[3].

For example, the combined impact of sub-section 37(1)(d) of the amended Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (which provides that “[n]othing in Division 1 or 2 affects… any other act or practice of a body established for religious purposes, being an act or practice that conforms to the doctrines, tenets or beliefs of that religion or is necessary to avoid injury to the religious susceptibility of adherants of that religion”) and section 38 of the same law (which applies to educational institutions established for religious purposes), means that, according to Commonwealth law:

  • Religious schools can freely discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender students, including expelling those students simply for being who they are;
  • Religious schools can also freely discriminate against LGBT staff members, including by refusing to provide or terminating their employment, where sexual orientation and gender identity is completely irrelevant to the ability of that person to perform the duties of the role;
  • Religious health and community services can similarly discriminate, with impunity, against both LGBT employees and potential employees, as well as LGBT individuals and families accessing these services; and
  • Religious aged care services can discriminate against LGBT employees or potential employees.[4]

It is difficult to see how these exemptions, which allow LGBT people to be discriminated against simply as they seek to obtain an education, or access healthcare (which are themselves fundamental international human rights), and to be treated unfairly in employment in a large number of jobs across a wide range of areas, is not a gross breach of their human rights.

It is even more difficult to envisage how these exemptions fit with the statements on page 2 of the Discussion Paper that “[r]ights and freedoms… are about being treated fairly, treating others fairly…” (emphasis added) and that “[l]imits on rights have been established to ensure individuals do not harm others when exercising their own rights.” Religious exceptions and exemptions under Commonwealth, state and territory anti-discrimination laws allow serious harm to be caused to LGBT Australians, on a day-to-day basis and across multiple spheres of public life, and, I assert, should be significantly curbed.

To this end, I believe the religious exemptions which are included in sub-sections 37(1)(a),(b) and (c) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984[5], if supplemented by exemptions covering how religious ceremonies are conducted, would be both more justifiable in being better targeted to protecting freedom of religious worship itself, and less likely to result in harm to LGBT people through the breach of their right to non-discrimination across broad areas of public life. Therefore, these are the only religious exemptions which should be retained.

This, much narrower, approach to religious exemptions would, in my view, also be a more appropriate outcome of a system of human rights that seeks to both protect fundamental rights, and promote the responsibility not to infringe upon the fundamental rights of others. In this respect, I question why the Discussion Paper does not live up to its title – examining both Rights AND Responsibilities – but instead focuses primarily on the expansion of some rights, including the right to freedom of religious worship, even at the possible expense of others, such as the right to non-discrimination.

For example, the conclusion of the section on “Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religious worship” notes that: “Rights & Responsibilities will focus on:

  • the ways you exercise your right to freedom of religion
  • where restrictions on freedom of religious worship exist
  • whether you have felt restricted or prohibited from exercising your right to freedom of religion
  • what could be done to enable you to exercise your right to freedom of religion.”

This focus presupposes that the only changes with respect to this area of law should be expansions to the ‘freedom of religion’, rather than allowing for the possibility that people claiming to exercise this freedom are in fact unjustifiably and inappropriately infringing upon the rights of others. The Discussion Paper does not seem to even contemplate the possibility that more protections may be needed to shield LGBT Australians from discrimination, perpetrated by religious organisations, but which at this stage is legitimated by exemptions to Commonwealth anti-discrimination law.

I submit that removing these wide-ranging, and overly-generous, religious exemptions is one of the most important, and effective, reforms the Government could make to improve the rights of any group of Australians. I sincerely hope that, as AHRC Commissioner with responsibility for sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status issues, you agree that LGBT Australians should be free to live their lives without homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and intersexphobia. And to do so without exception. Thank you in advance for your consideration of this submission. Sincerely Alastair Lawrie

Human Rights Commissioner and Rights & Responsibilities 2014 author, Tim Wilson.

Human Rights Commissioner and Rights & Responsibilities 2014 author, Tim Wilson.

[1] Human Rights Committee, Toonen v Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/92 and Human Rights Committee, Young v Australia, Communication No. 941/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000. [2] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 20(2). [3] Noting that the religious exemptions contained in the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 do not apply to intersex status, only to sexual orientation and gender identity. [4] Noting that the religious exemptions contained in the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 do not apply to LGBT people accessing aged care services. [5] “Nothing in Division 1 or 2 affects:

  • the ordination or appointment of priests, ministers of religion or members of any religious order;
  • the training or education of persons seeking ordination or appointment as priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order;
  • the selection or appointment of persons to perform duties or functions for the purposes of or in connection with, or otherwise to participate in, any religious observance or practice…”

Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee Inquiry into the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014

As I committed to in my previous post on the topic of the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 (see here: <https://alastairlawrie.net/2014/06/26/why-i-dont-support-the-recognition-of-foreign-marriages-bill-2014/ ), unless somebody was able to provide a satisfactory explanation as to why, as a strategy, the recognition of foreign marriages should be pursued separately to, and ahead of, equality for domestic marriages, I would lodge a submission to the Senate Inquiry into the Bill expressing my serious concerns about this proposed law.

In the absence of any such explanation, I lodged my submission at the end of July, making clear my personal opinion that the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 should be withdrawn, and replaced by genuine marriage equality legislation.

I understand that this position may be controversial with some people, and that my words may even be used against me by others (indeed my original post has been quoted, selectively, by the Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney in their own submission to the inquiry), but I absolutely believe that, as a movement, we should be fighting for real marriage equality, and that we should be pushing for it to be passed by the Parliament as quickly as possible – unfortunately, the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 is not such a law.

One final, more positive, point: it appears that, as a result of a range of submissions, and the evidence given to the Senate Inquiry by Tony Briffa, there is now a strong chance that the Bill will at least be amended to ensure that it is not discriminatory on the basis of gender identity and intersex status.

This is obviously a very welcome development, but it would nevertheless leave intact the Bill’s inherent discrimination on the basis of class and nationality. Which, at least from my perspective, remains sufficient justification to argue for the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 to be withdrawn.

The following is the text of my submission to the Senate Inquiry into this Bill, which has been published on the APH website, and is available at the following link: <http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Recognition_of_Foreign_Marriages_Bill_2014/Submissions

For more than ten years, and especially since the lead-up to the passage of the ban on marriage equality by the Howard Liberal-National Government, supported by the Labor Opposition, in 2004, I have been a strong and consistent – and occasionally vocal – supporter of marriage equality.

I firmly believe that all couples deserve the right to marry, and have that marriage recognized under Commonwealth law, irrespective of their sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

I do not accept that there is any valid reason for the Australian Government to continue to discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people, and to devalue their (our) relationships, by denying a fundamental right which is offered without question to cisgender heterosexual couples.

This is particularly true following the High Court decision in December 2013, which overturned the ACT’s same-sex marriage legislation but also established that there is no constitutional impediment to the Commonwealth Parliament passing a Bill which would finally affirm that our love is indeed truly equal.

I deliberately use the word finally because we have been waiting long enough. My fiancé and I have already been engaged for four and a half years – and it may be several more before we have the opportunity to have a legally recognised wedding, something that my sister and her husband, and my brother and his wife, simply took for granted.

I strongly urge the Commonwealth Parliament, including all Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to pass a marriage equality Bill as a matter of priority, and thus bring to an end the sorry situation whereby LGBTI Australians are treated as second class citizens in their own country.

Unfortunately, the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 is not such a Bill. It will not end the second class treatment of all of our relationships, and I do not believe it should be brought before the Parliament for debate.

My problem with this proposed law is not necessarily about what is included (although there is an issue in its terminology which I will come to later). It almost goes without saying that I completely support the legal recognition of the marriages of same-sex couples that have been wed in other countries.

Instead, my problem concerns what is not included in the Bill – the recognition of domestic marriages – and the consequence of only recognising marriages conducted ‘outside’ Australia, and not those ‘inside’ at the same time.

If passed, such legislation would create a situation whereby there would be three main, distinct categories of same-sex couples who wish to be treated as married in Australia:

    • Couples who have the financial resources to take advantage of the opportunity to marry under the laws of another country;
    • Couples who have been or are able to marry under the laws of another country because of their current or former nationality (including where one partner has UK citizenship, and can therefore marry in a UK consulate in Australia, or where the couple has emigrated from a country with marriage equality); and
    • Couples who do not have the financial resources or nationality to be able to take advantage of marriage equality elsewhere. 
Under this Bill, only couples in the first two categories would be able to be considered legally married.

In effect, if the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 were to succeed, Australia would have a system which, far from implementing genuine ‘marriage equality’, would actually create new types of marriage inequality, only this time based on distinctions around class and nationality rather than sexual orientation. 
Put simply, I cannot advocate for the progression of a Bill which would provide the opportunity for a couple who can afford it to get married overseas and have that marriage legally recognised here, but which would tell an elderly couple barely surviving on the age pension that they cannot be married under Australian law solely because they do not have the money.

If we are genuinely interested in marriage equality, then both couples must have the same right to wed. To put it another way, I am only interested in advocating for the progression of a Bill which redresses the injustice perpetrated against both couples, not just the couple that can afford to marry.

The only argument which I can see for pursuing this legislation is that some people may view it as an incremental step towards full marriage equality. And I whole-heartedly agree that, in some cases, incremental reform may be necessary to achieve larger, longer-term change.

However, I believe that in this case the people proposing this route towards achieving full marriage equality have not understood the fact that incrementalism is only ever a strategy, and not a goal in and of itself.

In this instance, there is absolutely no need for an incrementalist approach. There is no difference in how the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 would be treated by Commonwealth Parliament and how a genuine Marriage Amendment Bill – one that provides for the recognition of both overseas and domestic marriages – would be received.

Both Bills would involve asking the same people, sitting in the same place, exercising the same powers, and almost inevitably using the same arguments, to vote yes (or no).

The only potential justification for proceeding with the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill and not a genuine Marriage Amendment Bill would be if there existed Senators and Members of the House of Representatives who would tell LGBTI-inclusive couples in Australia that they can only have their marriages recognised if they travel overseas, away from their family and friends, for the wedding.

I refuse to believe that, when it came time for the second reading debate on such a Bill in the Chamber, there is a single MP who would stand up and deliver that message. I do not accept that there would be MPs willing to tell LGBTI members of their community that yes, they can be married, but only on the proviso they go somewhere else for the ceremony. Instead, I sincerely believe the same people who would be willing to vote for the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 would also vote yes to full marriage equality.

In which case, there is no reason why the Commonwealth Parliament should not proceed directly to a genuine Marriage Amendment Bill, rather than consider something which falls far short of what could be considered fair, and is substantively less than what LGBTI Australians deserve.

I urge Senators who wish to pursue the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 to reconsider their approach. I submit that they should abandon this Bill in favour of legislation that would deliver the right to marry to all couples, not just those who can afford to take advantage of the opportunity to marry under the laws of another country first.

The next Bill to be debated in the Commonwealth Parliament should be, must be, legislation which provides for genuine marriage equality, irrespective of sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status, and not one which would allow some same-sex couples to marry, but only those from certain classes or nationalities.

As I alluded to earlier, there is another problem with the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014. And it is not a minor problem, either – although, as it concerns terminology, (hopefully) it is something which can be more readily resolved.

The Bill would leave intact the current definition of marriage in section 5 of the Marriage Act 1961 (“marriage means the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life”). Instead, it replaces section 88EA with the following:

(1) Despite the definition of marriage in subsection 5(1), a union between:

(a) a man and another man; or

(b) a woman and another woman;

solemnised in a foreign country under local law as a marriage is recognised as a marriage in Australia.

(2) The parties to a union mentioned in subsection (1) have the same rights and obligations under this Act, or under any law of the Commonwealth, as the parties to a marriage between a man and a woman.

This is explicitly, and only, a same-sex marriage Bill. It is not genuinely inclusive of any marriages of people who may not be, or who may not identify as, a man or a woman. Some couples which include trans* or intersex individuals may not be able to utilise such laws or may not want to, because the language does not reflect who they are, and therefore denies the nature of their relationships.

The Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 does not challenge the unnecessary inclusion of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ in section 5 of the Marriage Act, something which we should be moving away from – instead, it further entrenches these concepts, by replicating this language in additional subsections.

This is an issue which, I hope, is more about drafting than any deliberate intention to exclude people on the basis of gender identity or intersex status. As such, if, after this Senate Inquiry is concluded, the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 does proceed to Parliamentary debate, it should be amended to ensure all couples are included, not just ‘same-sex couples’.

Nevertheless, even if the Bill were amended to ensure that it did not discriminate against some trans* and intersex inclusive couples, my fundamental problem with it would remain – this legislation would not achieve genuine marriage equality, and therefore I believe it should be replaced by something that would.

The primary positive outcome to arise from this legislation, and the Senate Inquiry which it has precipitated, is that it has placed a spotlight on the injustice perpetrated on same-sex couples that have been married overseas (either Australian couples who have travelled elsewhere, or other couples who have emigrated here) and yet are told by the Australian Government that they are not considered legally married here.

Undoubtedly, this is a horrible, and heart-breaking, situation for any couple to be placed in. And it is yet another argument for the recognition of genuine marriage equality within Australia, and additional motivation for such a law to be passed as quickly as possible.

But it is not sufficient justification to proceed with legislation that addresses only this injustice. The discrimination against these couples, and the discrimination against other Australian couples who are waiting for the opportunity to be married here, is, in practice, the same discrimination. After all, we are all told that our relationships are not worthy of the same recognition as those of other Australians, simply because we are LGBTI.

These injustices can and should be remedied through the same Bill, rather than prioritising the needs of some couples over others without any clear or rational explanation why that should be the case.

One final point. I have tried to be clear in this submission that I do not support progress of the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 to second reading debate, and ultimately for vote on the floor of Parliament. Instead, I have consistently argued that this Bill should be replaced with genuine marriage equality legislation before it reaches that stage.

However, if the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 does proceed to a vote, there is no reason for Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to vote against it, and thereby vote against the potential expansion of marriage to include more couples than are currently allowed.

Nevertheless, it is still my preferred outcome that the next Parliamentary vote on marriage be on a genuine, and genuinely inclusive, marriage equality Bill – and therefore not on the Recognition of Foreign Marriages Bill 2014.

In conclusion, while the intentions of those who have drafted this legislation are most likely sound, the outcome that its passage would deliver is not. It is time to go back to the drawing board, and return with a Bill that delivers marriage equality, not just for some couples, but for all.

Alastair Lawrie

Thursday 31 July 2014

10 Things I Hate About Marriage Inequality. #1: Because I can’t marry the man I love

The number one reason why I hate marriage inequality in Australia is because it means that I cannot marry the man who I love.

Me (on the left) and Steven (aka the handsome guy with the sunnies).

Me (on the left) and Steven (aka the handsome guy with the sunnies).

I was half-tempted to leave it at that because, really, what more do I need to say?

There can be few things more beautiful than the desire to celebrate the love that you have for your partner, in front of your family and friends. I want to experience that with Steve, the person I care about most in the world, and who brings me more happiness than I ever thought possible.

At the same time, there can be few things uglier than a Government intervening to tell you “No”, you cannot experience that, simply because of your sexual orientation (or, for others, gender identity or intersex status). Especially when there is absolutely no legitimate reason why the Marriage Act 1961 should discriminate against LGBTI-inclusive couples, something that is incredibly frustrating, to Steve and me, and to the thousands of other Australian couples in the same situation.

Obviously, the issue of marriage equality is very personal for all of the people that it directly affects. And, in that, I am no different. It does affect me personally and, as the people closest in my life can attest (and as this countdown has made exceptionally clear) I take its denial very personally.

How could I not? When you celebrate wedding after wedding, of your sister, and your brother, and your cousins, and your partner’s extended family, and your friends and his friends as well, and you just want to do the same, yet you cannot because 139 Senators and Members of the House of Representatives back in September 2012 decided that you are ‘unworthy’ simply because you’re gay, well, how could that not feel like a knife right through your heart?

In fact, there are very few contemporary public policy issues for which the old maxim – that the personal is political – could be more accurate. The recognition of our relationships is obviously immensely personal, and it is impossible to deny that whether they are recognised or not, or recognised but with a lesser value than cisgender heterosexual relationships, is inherently political.

That particular saying works the other way, too. The position that each of our parliamentarians adopts on this political issue reflects something profound about who they are as a person as well.

And I’m not just talking about the Cory Bernardis or Helen Polleys of this world, either – Senators who thought it appropriate to link the prospect of marriage equality with bestiality and the Stolen Generation, respectively – although their parliamentary speeches certainly revealed their utter contempt for LGBTI Australians.

I am talking about the MPs who might not say anything ‘overtly’ homophobic during Parliamentary debates about marriage, but who cast their vote against equality nonetheless. In doing so, they indicate that they choose discrimination and inequality over love and inclusion. They stand up against the idea that all Australians deserve equal treatment under the law, instead supporting the notion that some people are ‘more equal’ than others.

Those who vote against marriage equality devalue our relationships, telling us that they are less worthy of recognition than those of other people. And they devalue us as individuals too, subtly (or in some cases, not so subtly) sending the signal that we are less than full citizens of our own country. Even if they do not say the words, their position reveals, loud and clear, that they believe LGBTI people are – and should be – second class.

At its most personal, an MP who votes against marriage equality is saying that they themselves are more deserving of certain rights, that their own relationships are more worthy of recognition, that they as individuals are simply better than LGBTI Australians.

To them I say, “How dare you”. How dare you suggest that, because I am gay and you are heterosexual, you are more deserving of certain rights than I am. And how dare you deny us the rights that you currently enjoy (whether you choose to exercise them or not) simply because we are in a same-sex relationship and you are not.

The love that Steve and I share is not better or worse, more valuable or less valuable, or more deserving or less deserving, than the love between cisgender heterosexual couples. It’s all just love. The law should not make a distinction between the love that Steve and I have for each other, and that between my sister and her husband, or my brother and his wife.

Sadly, because of the amendments made under the Howard Government in August 2004, and the failure of our MPs since then to remedy this discrimination, the law does make such a distinction.

Today, Wednesday 13 August 2014, those amendments, that legal distinction, this ongoing and unjustified discrimination against LGBTI Australians, ‘celebrates’ its own ten year anniversary.

The traditional gift for a ten-year wedding anniversary is tin. I’m sure you’ll forgive me for not wanting to buy anything special to mark the occasion.

What I will do, what I feel compelled to do on this day, is say to all of those MPs who voted against equality in 2004, and continue to do so now, you truly are the tin men and tin women of Australian politics. You have forgotten that you have hearts, or, at the very least, you have forgotten how to use them. Indeed, it seems you have forgotten what hearts are even there for.

Well, now is the time to rediscover their purpose. And now is also the time to rediscover your purpose as our elected representatives – that it is your responsibility to act for the betterment of Australia, and the welfare of its people, all of its people, not just the cisgender heterosexual ones.

On this, the 10th anniversary of the ban, it’s time to support marriage equality, and in so doing to support the full and equal citizenship of all Australians, irrespective of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status. If you do, if you finally agree to pass marriage equality, then you should rest assured that nothing bad will happen. The sky will not fall in. There will be no negative consequences whatsoever.

The only outcome will be overwhelmingly positive. Thousands, indeed tens of thousands, of couples will finally be able to express their love and commitment in front of their family and friends. Couples like Steve and me. We are ready and waiting to say those two small words to each other, “I do”. We just need you to say two other words first, “You can.”

Don’t Limit Racial Vilification Protections, Add Vilification Protections for LGBTI Australians

The following is my submission to the Attorney-General’s Department’s Review of the Freedom of speech (repeal of s.18C) Bill 2014 – Exposure Draft (aka the Bill to significantly limit the scope of racial vilification protections under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975).

Submissions close on Wednesday 30 April, and more details can be found here: <http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Pages/ConsultationsonamendmentstotheRacialDiscriminationAct1975.aspx

I strongly encourage you to make a submission, and include in it the call for the Commonwealth to focus on expanding protections for the benefit of all lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex Australians, rather than limiting the operation of s18C for one Melbourne-based News Ltd columnist. Thanks.

Human Rights Policy Branch

Attorney-General’s Department

3-5 National Circuit

BARTON ACT 2600

s18cconsultation@ag.gov.au

Thursday 24 April 2014

To whom it may concern,

SUBMISSION ON RACIAL VILIFICATION AMENDMENTS

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission on the proposed changes to the racial vilification provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, as contained in the Freedom of speech (repeal of s.18C) Bill 2014 Exposure Draft.

For the reasons explained below, I do not support the replacement of existing sections 18B, 18C, 18D and 18E with the new clauses of the Exposure Draft Bill.

However, I do believe that significant changes should be made to vilification provisions in Commonwealth law: namely, that vilification protections should be expanded to cover sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.

The absence of such protections leaves lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) Australians vulnerable to the same types of adverse public conduct experienced by people of different racial backgrounds, but without recourse to the same complaint resolution mechanisms.

I will now turn to these two issues – the proposed reforms, and the case for introducing LGBTI vilification protections – in more detail.

Proposed Reforms to Section 18C

In considering any potential reforms to section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, it is useful to start at the particular sub-section which features in most debate. Sub-section 18C(1)(a) makes it “unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private, if: the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of people.”

I am of the view that the drafting of this sub-section is probably not ideal, and, arguably, is too broad in terms of the types of conduct that at least theoretically could be captured. I do not believe that, were provisions regarding racial vilification to be drafted today, they would include the terms ‘offend’ or ‘insult’ (or at least not without aggravating factors or considerations).

However, it is one thing to suggest that the drafting of a provision is something less than ‘ideal’ – it is another to suggest that poor drafting has directly caused problems that mean it must be amended. And even if that test is satisfied, any proposed reforms to the law should be an improvement, and not worsen any potential harm.

Turning to the question of whether the drafting of section 18C has directly led to, or caused, any significant problems, I am not convinced that it has. Racial vilification protections under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 appear to be widely supported by the community, and, for the most part, appear to be working well, both with the oversight of the Australian Human Rights Commission and in the Courts.

There is, of course, one case which is frequently cited as necessitating change to section 18C, and its related provisions, and that is the case of Eatock v Bolt [2011] FCA 1103.

Even ignoring the old legal maxim that hard cases make bad law (“Hard cases, it has frequently been observed, are apt to introduce bad law”, from Judge Rolfe in Winterbottom v Wright in 1842), it is not clear that the outcome of the “Bolt case” makes any persuasive case for change.

In the summary of that decision, Justice Mordecai Bromberg explained that “I am satisfied that fair-skinned Aboriginal people (or some of them) were reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to have been offended, insulted, humiliated or intimidated by the imputations conveyed by the newspaper articles” of Mr Bolt (para 17).

Justice Bromberg also explained that Mr Bolt’s conduct could not fit within what are, to be frank, extremely generous exemptions in section 18D, writing that “I have not been satisfied that the offensive conduct that I have found occurred, is exempted from unlawfulness by section 18D. The reasons for that conclusion have to do with the manner in which the articles were written, including that they contained errors of fact, distortions of the truth and inflammatory and provocative language” (para 23, emphasis added).

In his summary, Justice Bromberg also articulates at least one of the reasons why laws should exist to prohibit writings such as those of Mr Bolt: “People should be free to fully identify with their race without fear of public disdain or loss of esteem for so identifying. Disparagement directed at the legitimacy of the racial identification of a group of people is likely to be destructive of racial tolerance, just as disparagement directed at the real or imagined practices or traits of those people is also destructive of racial tolerance” (para 22).

In short, there appears to at least be an arguable case that not only was the “Bolt case” decided correctly on the existing law, but also that the current provisions are operating as intended to limit the negative effects of racial intolerance. Conversely, I believe it is difficult to argue, solely on the basis of Eatock v Bolt, that section 18C is so deficient that it should be amended, and amended as a matter of high priority.

Even if the argument that change was, indeed, necessary was accepted, I do not support that changes proposed in the Freedom of speech (repeal of s.18C) Bill 2014 Exposure Draft.

I believe that the replacement of ‘offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate’ with to vilify (defined as “to incite hatred against a person or a group of persons”) or to intimidate (meaning “to cause fear of physical harm; to a person; to the property of a person; or to the members of a group of persons”), would arbitrarily and unduly limit the effectiveness of these protections.

I agree with the Australian Human Rights Commission, in their statement of Tuesday 25 March 2014, that: “the bill reduces the level of protection by providing a narrow definition of vilification and by limiting intimidation to causing fear of physical harm. It is not clear why intimidation should not include the psychological and emotional damage that can be caused by racial abuse.”

I also agree with the Australian Human Rights Commission in their concerns about the breadth of the exemptions proposed in new clause (4). As the Commission notes “[t]his provision is so broad it is difficult to see any circumstances in public that these protections would apply.”

This is at least in part because the previous limitations of section 18D – that words or conduct must be done “reasonably and good faith” to be exempted – have been removed, again without a clear explanation or motivation. In my opinion, the proposals contained in the Exposure Draft Bill would not improve the operation of racial vilification protections generally, but instead have the capacity to make things substantially worse.

Overall, while I concede that the current drafting of section 18C is not ‘ideal’, I do not believe that there are sufficient problems in practice for it to be amended. I also strongly oppose the replacement of sections 18B, 18C, 18D and 18E of the current Racial Discrimination Act 1975, with the clauses contained in the Freedom of speech (repeal of s.18C) Bill 2014 Exposure Draft.

Recommendation 1. The Freedom of speech (repeal of s.18C) Bill 2014 – Exposure Draft should not be introduced into or passed by the Commonwealth Parliament.

Need to expand vilification protections to cover sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status

While I do not believe a case has been made to reform the racial vilification provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, I do believe there is a strong case for expanding vilification provisions under Commonwealth law to offer additional protection to LGBTI Australians.

In a similar way to their ongoing problems with race, some extreme elements within Australian society continue to demonstrate their difficulty in accepting people, and treating them equally, irrespective of sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

Both groups – Australians of diverse racial backgrounds, and LGBTI people – are regularly subject to vilification in public contexts, whether that be in political or media debates, or in harassment and abuse in public spaces.

Significantly, while LGBTI Australians finally achieved anti-discrimination protections under Commonwealth law in 2013 (a mere 38 years after the passage of the Racial Discrimination Act), the Sex Discrimination Act amendments did not include protections from homophobic, biphobic, transphobic and anti-intersex vilification. Unlike people of diverse races, LGBTI people still cannot launch complaints about vilification under Commonwealth law.

There is no philosophical or conceptual reason why this should be the case – both are vulnerable groups, subject to vilification against which they deserve to be protected.

The vilification of LGBTI people can take many forms. A 2003 NSW Attorney-General’s Report found that, in the previous 12 months, 56% of gay men and lesbians had been subject to one or more forms of homophobic abuse, harassment or violence.

This violence can also be extreme – as demonstrated by the disturbingly high number of gay men violently murdered in Sydney during the 1980s and 1990s, but whose tragic deaths are only now being properly investigated.

In terms of vilification in public debate, there are almost too many examples of homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and anti-intersex discrimination to choose from (and certainly enough to hold an annual event ‘celebrating’ the worst of these comments in a range of different areas of public life, aka The GLORIAs).

One notorious example from recent years was the homophobic comment of a religious figure, addressing a ‘National Marriage Day’ rally outside Parliament House in 2012, who said “I’m convinced that homosexuals (re)produces (sic) themselves by molesting children.”

Unfortunately, heading inside Parliament House, the tenor of public debate is sometimes not much better. Over the past 12 years we have seen Senators argue that allowing two men or two women to marry could lead to humans having sex with animals, arguing that enacting marriage equality would potentially result in another ‘Stolen Generations’, and abusing parliamentary privilege to smear an openly-gay High Court Justice with unfounded allegations of paedophilia (apparently solely because of his homosexuality).

This is not to say that all, or even any, of those comments would necessarily qualify as vilification under an equivalent provision to section 18C, but, the fact those comments are able to be made in our National Parliament provides a small insight into the type of abuse and vitriol which continues in other forums, day-in, day-out, which are not subject to the same levels of scrutiny.

That includes street-level harassment and abuse which my fiancé Steven and I, like many thousands of other LGBTI Australians, experience all-too-frequently. Anyone who is ‘visibly’ identifiable as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or intersex, including non-LGBTI people who are perceived as being LGBTI by others, and anyone who simply wants to engage in the tender act of holding one’s same-sex partner’s hand, knows the risks that being or expressing who you are in public can bring, from being yelled at from passing cars, to the very real threat of much, much worse.

Of course, the introduction of s18C-style protections on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status will not automatically lead to a reduction in such abuse, but it will allow for people to contest the most egregious examples of homophobic, biphobic, transphobic and anti-intersex vilification in public life.

Over time, the introduction of vilification protections for LGBTI Australians, on top of the recently passed anti-discrimination laws, would help to send a strong signal to the wider community that such conduct was no longer tolerated.

The impetus for sending such a signal can be found in figures which show that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex Australians continue to experience disproportionately high rates of mental health issues, including depression, attempted suicide and suicide.

This problem is especially pronounced amongst younger LGBTI people, with young same-sex attracted people estimated to be 6 times more likely to attempt suicide than their heterosexual counterparts (source: National LGBTI Health Alliance). Young people’s experience of discrimination and homophobia has been found to play a key role in this huge, and sadly persisting, health disparity.

Not only is public vilification in the form of homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and anti-intersex discrimination wrong in and of itself, it has serious consequences, including in negative mental health outcomes for LGBTI people.

I believe that anti-LGBTI vilification must be prohibited under the Sex Discrimination Act, in the same way that racial vilification was in 1995 when the Racial Hatred Act amended the Racial Discrimination Act, and that it should be done as soon as possible.

Recommendation 2. The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 should be amended to prohibit vilification on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.

Obviously, there are other potential attributes which could also be aided by the introduction of vilification protections, including those grounds which already have Commonwealth anti-discrimination laws (sex, disability and age), but, as I am not an expert in any of those issues, I am not in a position to argue for or against their inclusion in this submission.

Nevertheless, I strongly believe that these questions – whether vilification protections should be expanded, and which additional groups they should cover – are the ones which should be occupying the mind of our Commonwealth Attorney-General, and indeed all MPs, rather than working out how to restrict the protections offered by the racial vilification provisions contained in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975.

I sincerely hope that this submission assists in helping to turn that conversation around, and that we, as a community, start to focus on enhancing instead of undermining human rights.

Thank you for taking these comments into consideration. Should you require clarification or further information, I can be contacted at the details below.

Sincerely,

Alastair Lawrie

LGBTI refugees on Nauru & Manus Island

So, the past few weeks have been pretty busy (with the SDA Bill and my Change.org petition to help ensure the national Health & Physical Education curriculum is genuinely LGBTI-inclusive). One thing which happened earlier in June, which I had previously committed to place on my blog, is that I finally received a response to my letter to the then Minister for Immigration, Chris Bowen – which I first sent in September 2012!

It has only taken 9 months, including a follow up letter to Minister Bowen, a new message to Minister Brendan O’Connor, who was appointed in February, and then some ongoing twitter harassment/stalking. Even after all of this the response which I have received is not from the Minister himself (either of them) but rather from the Director of the relevant Branch in the Department.

I have included the full text of the letter below. But I have chosen to omit the name of the Branch Director, because as a former public servant I can only imagine that they were instructed to draft the letter in this particular way, and after all, this is about the Government’s policy and not an individual.

In my original letter (see: https://alastairlawrie.net/2012/09/07/letter-to-chris-bowen-on-lgbti-asylum-seekers/), amongst other questions, I asked whether the Government supported the rights of LGBTI people to seek asylum, as well as whether these asylum seekers would be subject to the laws of Nauru and Papua New Guinea (Manus Island) which still criminalise homosexuality.

The response to the first question appears to be yes – the letter at least accepts the fact that people can claim refugee status on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity (although it is less clear that intersex status is accepted). How well Australia implements this commitment is, of course, a much longer discussion.

However, the letter refuses to answer the second key point. I can only assume that, based on the Director’s avoidance of this issue, the criminal offences relating to homosexuality in Nauru and Papua New Guinea do, at the very least, technically apply to the asylum seekers which we as a country distressingly continue to send to these places.

The letter then rather cryptically goes into detail about what individuals can do if they object to being transferred to a particular Regional Processing Country. While I would fully expect that the ‘Ministerial discretion’ which is alluded to would be exercised to override such concerns, I believe that the lawyers who represent LGBTI asylum seekers being sent to Nauru or Manus Island should at the very least raise their concerns under s198AE with the Minister (whoever that might be after the reshuffle tomorrow).

As an aside I don’t actually think that it matters whether the particular asylum seeker is seeking protection because of persecution on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity (or intersex status), merely that they are LGBTI and fear persecution by the Governments of Nauru or Papua New Guinea because of their ongoing criminalisation of same-sex activity.

I will now endeavour to ensure that LGBTI and/or general refugee advocates are aware of this advice and can take any appropriate steps (noting that these applications may have already been made to, and rejected by, the Minister for Immigration since the detention centres were reopened last August).

Overall, of course, even if LGBTI asylum seekers were removed from Nauru and Manus Island, this would only be ‘fiddling at the edges’ of the revived Pacific Solution, a policy so awful that it brings shame to the entire Australian population, myself included. No asylum seeker, whether LGBTI or not, should ever be sent to such places, for an indefinite period, merely for exercising their fundamental right to seek protection from persecution.

Most depressingly of all, the upcoming federal election doesn’t appear like it will change these policies – if anything, the probable election of Tony Abbott as Prime Minister, with Scott Morrison as Minister for Immigration, will make things substantially worse.

On that ‘glass-completely-empty’ note, here is the response from the Department which only took 9 months to conceive:

Dear Mr Lawrie,

Thank you for your email of 7 September 2012 to the former Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the Hon Chris Bowen MP, concerning the treatment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) asylum seekers. Your letter has been referred to me for a reply. I apologise for the delay in responding.

The Australian Government’s commitment to removing discrimination was demonstrated by its reforms to remove discrimination from 85 Commonwealth laws. These reforms, which passed in 2009, removed discrimination and equalised treatment for same-sex couples in areas of taxation, social security, health, aged care, superannuation, immigration, child support and family law.

The Government is also proceeding with introducing long overdue protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status. On 21 March 2013, the Attorney-General introduced the Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Bill 2013. This Bill will ensure that protections from discrimination for people who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender and intersex are put in place as soon as practicable.

Concerning the transfer of post-13 August 2012 irregular maritime arrivals (IMAs) to Regional Processing Countries (RPC) and the treatment of LGBTI asylum seekers, as a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (the Refugee Convention), Australia takes its international obligations seriously and is committed to providing protection to refugees consistent with the obligations set out in the Refugees Convention and other human rights treaties to which Australia is a party. Any person has the right to seek protection in Australia from persecution in their home country.

The Government has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the Governments of Nauru and Papua New Guinea which permit people who arrived irregularly by boat on or after 13 August 2012 to be taken to Nauru or Papua New Guinea (Manus Island) for assessment of their claims against the Refugee Convention. Changes to the Migration Act 1958 (the Act) which give effect to regional processing arrangements were passed by the Australian Parliament and became law on 18 August 2012.

The MoU signed with Nauru and Papua new Guinea reaffirms the commitment of both countries to the Refugee Convention, with people transferred to the Regional Processing Country (RPC) to be treated with dignity and respect in line with human rights standards.

The Department of Immigration and Citizenship recognises that human rights abuses and gender-related persecution can also be experienced by people on the basis of their sexual orientation and/or gender identity. As such, an applicant’s gender-related claims may include claims relating to their
sexual orientation and/or gender identity.

In the guidelines set out in the Departmental Procedures Advice Manual 3 (PAM3), for the guidance of interviewing officers, they are advised that

“Unlike other persecuted groups, sexual orientation and gender identity is not a readily visible characteristic and has to be revealed by the individual. Homosexual and transsexual applications may, therefore, have only spoken to a handful of people, or none at all, about their sexuality and have kept it a secret. Interviewers and decision makers should, therefore, not be surprised if an applicant suddenly raises the issue of sexual orientation or gender identity late in an application process, prefaced perhaps by an earlier weak or false claim on other grounds.”

Pre-Transfer Assessment is undertaken prior to a person’s transfer to an RPC to consider whether there are specific circumstances or special needs that mean it is not reasonably practicable to transfer an asylum seeker to an RPC at this time.

Where a person raises concerns against a designated RC, the Departmental officer refers to relevant country information, as well as the assurances received by Australia from the RPC governments, to assess if those charges are credible. If the person makes credible protection claims against all RPCs, the case is brought to the Minister’s attention in accordance with his guidelines for considering the exercise of his power under section 198AE of the Migration Act 1958 to exempt that person from transfer.

A copy of the Minister’s s198AE guidelines and the Pre-Transfer Assessment form and guidelines can be found at the Department’s website at: www.immi.gov.au/visas/humanitarian/whatsnew.htm

Also for your information, I attach a copy of the relevant sections of PAM3 regarding gender and sexual orientation. For a full interactive copy of that document you may need to contact your nearest public library which should be able to provide free access.

Thank you for writing about this matter and I apologise again for the delay in respond.

Yours sincerely

[Name withheld]

Director

Protection Policy Section

6 June 2013

Submission on Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012

I am very happy that my submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee inquiry into the exposure draft Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 was published this afternoon

(http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/anti_discrimination_2012/submissions.htm).

The full text of my submission is reproduced below:

Exposure Draft Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012

Inquiry by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs

Submission by Alastair Lawrie

Friday 21 December 2012

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission on the exposure draft of the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012. This submission reflects my personal views on the Bill, and makes a number of recommendations for improvements to the draft legislation to ensure that it provides adequate protection to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex Australians from – what will hopefully be – unlawful discrimination. Nevertheless, these recommendations for improvements do not change my primary recommendation; namely, that the Parliament should pass this Bill as a matter of priority in 2013.

Recommendations:

  1. The Parliament should pass the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 as a matter of priority in 2013.
  2. The Bill should retain the exposure draft definitions of ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘relationship status’ so that discrimination on these grounds is prohibited under Commonwealth law.
  3. The Bill should amend the definition of ‘gender identity’ to reflect the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 definition, so that it removes the phrase ‘genuine basis’ and includes gender expression and presentation.
  4. The Bill should include the definition of ‘intersex’ as used in the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012, so that anti-discrimination protections adequately cover this protected attribute.
  5. Exceptions from anti-discrimination requirements should only be provided to religious organisations where it relates to religious appointments or celebrations (for example, appointment of ministers of religion, admission to membership of the religion or celebrating sacraments within the religion).
  6. Religious organisations should not be provided with exceptions in terms of service-delivery, including service delivery in schools and education, healthcare, aged care and other community services.
  7. If Recommendation 6 is not agreed, the existing provisions of the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 which preclude the application of exceptions with respect to aged care service delivery by religious organisations should be retained.
  8. Religious organisations should not be provided with exceptions in terms of employment, in any area outside appointment of ministers of religion or other appointments which are essentially religious in nature.
  9. If either or both recommendations 6 or 8 are not accepted, or if recommendation 7 is accepted, then wherever religious organisations are provided with exceptions with respect to either service delivery or employment, they must publish a statement outlining their intention to discriminate in position descriptions and job advertisements, on their website and in any brochures or advertisements of their service.
  10. The Bill should expand anti-vilification protections to cover sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex.
  11. The Bill should provide for the appointment of a dedicated Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Commissioner.

The draft Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 covers subject matter which is close to my heart, and which is also an important issue of public policy; namely, providing legal protections to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) Australians against unjust discrimination, harassment and abuse.

These legal protections are long overdue. By the time this legislation is (hopefully) passed in 2013, it will be 38 years since the passage of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, 29 years since the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, more than two decades since the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 and almost a decade since the Age Discrimination Act 2004. These Acts were passed to address major problems of discrimination within society on each of these grounds.

Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex is no less offensive, and tackling this discrimination is no less urgent. It is a failing of successive Commonwealth Governments that they have not introduced anti-discrimination legislation covering these attributes before now, but happily this is something that the current Parliament can address in this term.

There is abundant evidence that discrimination against LGBTI Australians is both serious and widespread. The 2003 NSW Attorney-General’s Department report You Shouldn’t Have to Hide to be Safe, found that 56% of respondents had been the victims of homophobic abuse, violence or harassment in the previous 12 months. 85% of respondents had experienced abuse, violence or harassment at some point in their life. That fact alone is sickening: 5 out of every 6 LGBTI Australians have suffered some form of homophobic abuse, violence or harassment simply for being themselves.

This discrimination can particularly target, and have the most damaging effects on, young people. The Writing Themselves In 3 report found that 60% of young same-sex attracted and gender questioning young people had experienced some form of physical or verbal abuse. Homophobic, bi-phobic and trans-phobic discrimination, and discrimination against intersex people, can have a lasting, negative impact on their mental health, and limit their ability to fully participate in society. LGBTI youth should not have to suffer because of the prejudices of others.

But you do not need to consult these reports to understand that discrimination against LGBTI people is rife. Instinctively, we all know, simply as ordinary members of Australian society, that homophobia is an unacceptably widespread phenomenon, and that it has the potential to affect almost every facet of life. As individuals, we have likely seen it, heard about it, felt its impact on family members or friends.

For those of us who are LGBTI, we have been on the receiving end of this abuse, this violence, this harassment. As a gay man, I have been the victim of numerous counts of homophobic discrimination. I have been ‘moved on’ by police officers simply for kissing another man. I have been yelled at on the street for holding my boyfriend’s hand, and called ‘faggot’ more times than I care to remember. I have been subjected to multiple instances of prejudice and exclusion by my school. And I have probably been discriminated against in other ways which I didn’t even know at the time, because discrimination can be insidious.

My fiancé Steve has similar stories. His lesbian sister and her partner have been discriminated against too, both as individuals, and as mothers in a rainbow family. Steve’s best friends, another lesbian couple, have their own stories of prejudice, as do many of our other gay and lesbian friends. Sadly, each and everyone one of us has our own story of how discrimination has affected our everyday lives, in so many different situations.

What we have not had, until now, is any protection under Commonwealth law against this discrimination. Federal anti-discrimination legislation, covering LGBTI Australians, is essential to complement existing protections under state and territory law, and ensure that there are no holes or gaps in this coverage.

Even more importantly, the passage of this bill would be a statement by our elected leaders that prejudice and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex will no longer be tolerated. I urge the Commonwealth parliament to pass this law, and do so as quickly as possible.

Recommendation 1: The Parliament should pass the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 as a matter of priority in 2013.

 

The exposure draft Bill already features a useful and inclusive definition for ‘sexual orientation’ which will ensure that lesbians, gay men and bisexuals are afforded anti-discrimination protection. The amendment of the previously protected ground of ‘marital status’ to ‘relationship status’ will also ensure that all relationships are covered, irrespective of the sex or gender of the participants. Both of these definitions should be retained in the final Bill.

Recommendation 2: The Bill should retain the exposure draft definitions of ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘relationship status’ so that discrimination on these grounds is prohibited under Commonwealth law.

I am also supportive of the inclusion of anti-discrimination protection for transgender people. However, I understand that the definition of ‘gender identity’ in the exposure draft Bill requires significant improvement. In particular, it is unclear why the definition includes the additional test of living on a “genuine basis” for transgender people. The definition also does not appear to adequately capture and protect gender expression, including mannerisms and appearance. A much better definition is contained in the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012, which is currently before their state parliament. That definition should be used in the Commonwealth’s Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012.

Recommendation 3: The Bill should amend the definition of ‘gender identity’ to reflect the 2012 Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Bill definition, so that it removes the test of ‘genuine basis’ and includes gender expression and presentation.

An even larger drafting problem concerns the definition of, and therefore protection for, intersex people. The exposure draft Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 appears to try to include intersex under part (b) of gender identity. This is incorrect, because intersex is not a matter of identity, instead it is a biological fact.

It should also be noted that similar definitions which have been included previously under state and territory laws have either operated to provide only limited protection from discrimination to intersex people, or provided no protection at all.

It would be tragic if, 38 years after the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, the Commonwealth parliament finally acted to extend anti-discrimination protection to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people, but, at the same time, failed to cover intersex people and instead further entrenched rather than remedied discrimination on this ground.

Once again, the definition of intersex which has been used in the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 appears to offer a better and more inclusive basis for this protected attribute, and one that should be included in the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 as a stand-alone attribute, rather than inappropriately subsumed within gender identity.

Recommendation 4: The Bill should include the definition of ‘intersex’ as used in the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Bill, so that anti-discrimination protections adequately cover this protected attribute.

One of the most controversial elements of any anti-discrimination regime, and the one that regularly receives the most attention, is the topic of exceptions. In particular, there is usually significant focus on the question of whether religious organisations should be granted exceptions from the obligation not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex (and, it must also be noted, on the basis of sex and relationship status). As a result, I will devote the largest section of this submission to addressing these questions, firstly on a philosophical basis and, secondly, on a more personal level.

To begin with, I think it is important to remember the justification for implementing anti-discrimination protections in the first place. These laws are designed to publicly state that some forms of prejudice are not acceptable and to prohibit discrimination on illegitimate grounds (such as race, sex or religion), thereby protecting people from these groups against discrimination in a range of public areas, such as employment, education, healthcare and other forms of service delivery.

By introducing anti-discrimination protections covering sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex in this Bill, parliament would be effectively saying that discrimination on these grounds is no longer acceptable, and that all LGBTI people should be protected from discrimination in all areas of public life. Exceptions from this principle, if they are to be introduced, must therefore have a clear rationale and must be adopted only where it furthers the public interest.

The argument for providing exceptions to religious organisations from obligations under anti-discrimination law is based on the separation of church and state, and respect for religious freedoms for people of all faiths. That is, religious exceptions are intended to allow the free celebration of religious beliefs, even if these beliefs include discrimination against other groups that would not otherwise be acceptable.

This argument potentially has some merit in terms of public policy. Religion is an intensely personal matter, and something which individuals and groups should be allowed to pursue however they so choose. This would apply to all matters within that religion which have no impact on the rest of society – such as determining who may join that religion, who may be a minister within that religion, and how the religion is celebrated.

As a result, philosophically, this approach would allow anything which occurs entirely within that religion to be free from anti-discrimination obligations – so, for example, the religious exception would allow religions to discriminate when determining who to employ as ministers, who is admitted as a member of the religious community, who is provided with a funeral, even who is married within that religion (although obviously not who can marry through a civil ceremony).

As a consequence, if religions wanted to discriminate against any group in any of these areas (for example, by excluding LGBTI people) then that right would be allowed through a religious exception in these narrow or confined circumstances. [Of course, it should be noted at this point that state and territory parliaments have in fact legislated to restrict this right – so that, while religions can discriminate on sex, relationship status and LGBTI grounds, they are not allowed to discriminate on race. But that inconsistency is an argument for another day.]

The problem comes when religious organisations seek to broaden that exception to cover a wide range of scenarios which are not primarily based on the celebration of that religion. So, for example, some religions seek to use the religious exception to cover anything that is done in connection with a school where it is run by a religious organisation. They argue that they should be able to discriminate in terms of what may be taught within that school, who may be employed (including not employing LGBTI staff) and even being able to directly discriminate against LGBTI students.

This is an inappropriate extension of the principle of respecting religious freedom. The main function of a school is to provide education. This is a service or transaction which occurs primarily in the ‘public sphere’, which is why it is subject to many levels of government regulation, in terms of teacher qualifications, starting and finishing ages, and agreed state and territory (and soon to be federal) curricula. Even home-schooling by a parent is strictly regulated by the state because the provision of education services is in and of itself a ‘public good’.

Just because a school is run by a religious organisation, does not automatically mean that school education suddenly becomes primarily concerned with ‘celebrating religious freedom’ and thereby removed from the public sphere. The day-to-day provision of classes, by teachers to students, is not in its very nature or essence a religious sacrament. Even where there is direct religious instruction offered by a religious-run school, it is usually only a very small component of their curriculum, the vast majority of which is the same no matter who is offering it, religious or non-religious.

As a result, I submit that providing education services is not at its core about ‘celebrating religious freedom’ but, rather mundanely, is actually mostly just about providing education services. The service provision within those schools, and the employment contracts which they enter into, are not fundamentally religious in nature, meaning that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating both areas. Consequently, it is not an inappropriate restriction of fundamental religious freedom to rule that a religious school cannot discriminate against LGBTI teachers, and cannot exclude LGBTI students.

In short, the rationale of respecting religious freedom is not sufficient to allow a religious-run school to be granted an exception from lawful obligations with which it would otherwise have to comply, including anti-discrimination obligations. The proposition put forward by religious organisations, to exclude religious-run schools from anti-discrimination law, does not have sufficient weight to pass the public interest test.

I am aware that I have chosen what is perhaps the most hotly-contested area of service-delivery to make my case. The basic argument is even clearer if we examine other services which may be provided by a religious-run organisation. Take, for example, the case of a ‘for-profit’ business, which is purchased by a religious organisation to make money to divert back into its religious activities. In this example, it doesn’t actually matter what the business makes, sells or provides, just that the process involved is not religious, and that the product or service is not religious.

Philosophically, there is no justification to allow the for-profit business to discriminate against employees on the basis of their LGBTI status because the business at its core is not religious – and this applies irrespective of the fact it is owned by a religious organisation. Further, people would be outraged, quite legitimately, if the business was allowed to discriminate in its service-provision (for example, by not serving certain people because of sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex, or even sex or relationship status) simply because it was owned by the religion involved.

The same arguments can in fact be made with respect to all employment contracts and service-provision which is not inherently about religious celebration. This would include healthcare services, education services, other community services, and employment as anything other than religious ministers or religious office-holders. In each of these cases, the service provision or employment contract is part of the public sphere and the fact that it merely involves a religious organisation is not enough to justify the transaction being excluded from the operation of the law.

There is another popular argument why religious-run schools, and other religious-run services, should not be provided with exceptions from anti-discrimination obligations. This is the fact that nearly all of these services are in receipt of public funding, and often significant sums. As a matter of fairness, everyday taxpayers – including, it must be highlighted, LGBTI taxpayers – should not be subsidising the religious freedoms of others, especially the so-called religious ‘freedom’ to not hire a gay doctor in a religious hospital, to fire a lesbian teacher, or to expel a transgender student from a high school. If religious organisations want to exercise these ‘rights’, then they should not be using public funding to do so.

While this argument is morally attractive, I do not think it goes far enough in practice. That is, even if a religious-run high school received no public funding, the fact that it is a high school, which is primarily concerned with providing education services and is firmly in the ‘public sphere’, is sufficient to attract government intervention, including the requirement to comply with anti-discrimination legislation.

After all, an LGBTI student who might be discriminated against by the school should, philosophically, have the same right to be treated fairly irrespective of the funding breakdown for that particular school. The discrimination is no less egregious, and the homophobia no more acceptable, where no money comes from public funding, rather than if 10, 40 or even 70 % of the school’s funding is provided by the government. It genuinely doesn’t matter who funds the discrimination against that student, only that the student has a legitimate public interest in being protected from it.

Which brings me to the much more ‘personal’ argument for why exceptions for religious organisations should be narrow in scope. I mentioned earlier that, like most LGBTI Australians, I have been subjected to numerous instances of homophobic discrimination and harassment over the course of my life (I am now 34 years old). Well, I experienced the vast, vast majority of that prejudice during my time as a boarding student at a religious school in Queensland in the early to mid-1990s.

I have chosen not to include the name of the school here because I don’t think it actually matters – only the instances of homophobic discrimination which I experienced matter for the purposes of this inquiry. And, sadly, I don’t think what I experienced sets me apart from what many other students have experienced over the years, at many different schools.

During my time at his particular school, being gay was either not mentioned at all, or was mentioned in a negative context. This tyranny of silence extended to sex education, which, over the course of five years, made not one mention of same-sex attraction, or even of anal intercourse.

Imagine that, at the peak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, while it was still very much a matter of life and death (before protease inhibitors and combination therapies), actively ignoring a major risk factor of HIV transmission simply because it didn’t fit within the religious philosophy of the school. That is not a celebration of religious freedom; that is criminal negligence.

Homophobic bullying was also common – including regular taunts of ‘faggot’, ‘poofter’, graffiti-ing of those words on books and bags, physical confrontations such as pushing and shoving – and was never actively discouraged by the school. In fact, at one end of year boarding house awards ceremony, I was given the ‘big fat poof’ award, which I was expected to get up and accept in front of everyone, including in the presence of school authorities, and to take in good humour (but, of course, which caused great personal anguish and distress).

An even worse example: in year 11, I was twice held down by a large group of students and had my chest hair shaved off. This was done because I was academic, non-sporting, basically an outsider who was not interested in girls – and, I suspect, because some of the students had correctly assumed I was gay (based on the award described above, some obviously had). The school was aware of both of these assaults and yet, within a few days of the second attack, appointed one the boys responsible school captain, and another as boarding house captain.

But the worst example of homophobic bullying at the school came during a speech by a pastor. He talked about a student at a former parish, who had struggled with his ‘identity’ for some time, and how it did not fit within god’s plan. Ultimately, he said, the student had committed suicide. The pastor made it clear that this was not the worst thing which could have happened (the former student was now at ‘peace’ and no longer struggling).

This pastor was clever – he did not use the exact words, but through his intimations he made it clear that killing yourself could be a better option than growing up and adopting a ‘homosexual lifestyle’. To be honest, I am not even sure that the heterosexual students who were present would have known the full import of what was being said – but the LGBTI students certainly would have, and they were the real ‘target’ of his hate speech.

And that is the fundamental nature of homophobic (and bi-phobic, trans-phobic and anti-intersex) discrimination. It can be insidious, and subtly but harmfully pervade everyday life. At a religious school like mine, these instances do not happen in isolation either – they are allowed to happen, cultivated and even nurtured, because the school adopts an active policy of not tolerating homosexuality or bisexuality (I am not sure they would have even understood transgender or intersex – if they did, I am sure they would have been actively against those too – but through their silence they would have seriously harmed any transgender or intersex student there as well).

Of course, I am not saying that my experience of discrimination at school is unique. There are thousands, probably tens or perhaps even hundreds of thousands, of other people with horror stories of their own from their school days, and their accounts relate to both government and religious schools. You just have to ask your LGBTI family members and friends about what their experiences were like to begin to understand.

But, in doing so, always remember that these stories are just from the adults who have survived their ordeals – sadly, some LGBTI students do not survive, and instead take their own lives along the way. Sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex-related youth suicide in Australia remains disproportionately high, and it is fair to point the finger at school-based silence, exclusion and prejudice as one of the key factors involved.

Unfortunately, the evidence is clear that discrimination against LGBTI students is still occurring in our schools today. As indicated earlier, the 2010 Writing Themselves In 3 report found that 60% of same-sex attracted and gender questioning young people had experienced some form of physical or verbal abuse. More pertinently here, the same report found that 80% of all harassment, discrimination and abuse actually happened in school settings.

This is a major national scandal. Anti-LGBTI prejudice in schools is something which all levels of government should address, in all states and territories, and in all types of school, government, non-government, religious and non-religious. There is indeed some work which is being done in different jurisdictions, such as the NSW Proud Schools initiative, and the efforts of Daniel Witthaus through his ‘Beyond That’s So Gay’ projects (www.thatssogay.com.au). But this work, without the support of every government and every school system, will never reach each and every student who needs support and protection.

More importantly, any campaign to address prejudice based on sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex is fatally undermined if we provide religious schools with exceptions from anti-discrimination obligations. We cannot in good conscience say that we support the rights of LGBTI students if, at the same time, we allow schools which are run by religious organisations to continue to actively discriminate against or marginalise students because of their sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex.

To apply this to my own experiences, providing that school with an exception under anti-discrimination legislation would mean that everything they did (with the exception of the chest shaving incidents, because, after all, assault is still assault) would have been legally protected. Not including homosexuality in sex education would be acceptable because they would claim they have a religious objection to teaching about ‘sinful’ activities.

Allowing students to denigrate other students because of their apparent homosexuality would be fine because the abusers would simply be following the teachings of their religion. And a pastor implying that killing yourself rather than lead a ‘gay lifestyle’ would be protected because they would argue that their religion included proclamations against the ‘abomination’ of homosexuality.

This situation – allowing religious schools to hide behind religious exceptions to commit acts which essentially amount to child abuse – is no longer acceptable in 2013 (if it ever was).

Thus, for both philosophical and intensely personal reasons, I submit that if the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 is to include exceptions for religious organisations, these exceptions should only apply to religious appointments or celebrations.

Recommendation 5: Exceptions from anti-discrimination requirements should only be provided to religious organisations where it relates to religious appointments or celebrations (for example, appointment of ministers of religion, admission to membership of the religion or celebrating sacraments within the religion).

This means that, in practice, these exceptions should not apply to any other area of service-delivery where it is provided by a religious organisation, including service delivery in schools and education, healthcare, aged care and other community services.

Of course, I am realistic enough to know that campaigning by religious organisations to maintain their ‘religious freedom’ (or, in other words, to retain their right to exercise prejudice on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex) will be successful, and that, shamefully, religious schools will continue to be able to discriminate against and marginalise LGBTI people for a long time to come.

In this case, I would submit that, at a minimum, the existing provisions of the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 which remove the ability of religious organisations from discriminating in aged care service delivery should be retained.

This is a positive move by the federal government, and complements their work in releasing the National LGBTI Ageing and Aged Care Strategy on 20 December 2012. The removal of the exception from this area also recognises the very personal nature of aged care services, and the fact that LGBTI people, and their families and carers, should not be discriminated against in accessing these services.

Recommendation 6: Religious organisations should not be provided with exceptions in terms of service-delivery, including service delivery in schools and education, healthcare, aged care and other community services.

Recommendation 7: If Recommendation 6 is not agreed, the existing provisions of the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 which preclude the application of exceptions with respect to aged care service delivery by religious organisations should be retained.

The same arguments which dictate that religious organisations should not be able to discriminate in terms of service delivery, also mean that the religious exception should not apply to employment. After all, employment as anything other than a minister of religion (or other internal religious appointments), is a contract or transaction undertaken in the ‘public sphere’, and is not something which is so fundamental to the ‘celebration of religious freedom’ that it should be excluded from lawful obligations not to discriminate.

In practical terms, there is nothing fundamentally religious about the role of a doctor in a public hospital, meaning a religious hospital should not be able to sack someone from this role simply for being gay. Nor is there anything inherently religious about teaching maths in a secondary school, hence a lesbian teacher should not be able to be dismissed on that basis. And an employee in an aged care facility is there to provide services to the elderly – provided they do their job well, it is irrelevant that the employee may be transgender or intersex.

Recommendation 8: Religious organisations should not be provided with exceptions in terms of employment, in any area outside appointment of ministers of religion or other appointments which are essentially religious in nature.

Once again, I am realistic enough to know that it is highly likely at least some of the exceptions which are currently provided to religious organisations – in either or both service delivery and employment – will be retained when the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 is eventually passed.

In this case, I submit that religious organisations should be required to actively disclose any and all situations where they intend to use their ‘religious freedoms’ in ways which discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex. This disclosure should be included in positions descriptions and part of job advertisements, should be included in the organisation’s websites (including at individual school or healthcare service level), and in brochures advertising the services which they provide.

This is a minimum level of public accountability and transparency, and is not a significant regulatory burden if we are allowing an organisation to evade what are otherwise lawful obligations. It will also mean that everyone is clear on the situations in which a religious organisation intends to exercise its prejudice against LGBTI people.

For example, a gay teacher would be able to take into consideration the fact that the school could reject him for no other reason than his sexuality. Parents of a lesbian daughter would be able to choose an alternative and more inclusive environment for their child. And citizens who do not support homophobia, bi-phobia, trans-phobia and anti-intersex discrimination will be able to boycott discriminatory services if they so desire.

Obviously, this is not an ideal situation – and clearly it is far removed from my preferred model. But if we are to allow religious organisations the ‘right’ to be excepted from their obligations under anti-discrimination legislation, at the very least the potential victims of this discrimination equally have the right to know and be forewarned.

Recommendation 9: If either or both recommendations 6 or 8 are not accepted, or if recommendation 7 is accepted, then wherever religious organisations are provided with exceptions with respect to either service delivery or employment, they must publish a statement outlining their intention to discriminate in position descriptions and job advertisements, on their website and in any brochures or advertisements of their service.

There is one area which the Bill has essentially ignored – despite reproducing the existing ban on racial vilification, the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 does not extend these protections to the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex.

This is a significant shortcoming in the exposure draft legislation. As outlined earlier, the majority of LGBTI Australians have experienced homophobic, bi-phobic, trans-phobic and anti-intersex abuse, violence or harassment.

The level of this abuse – and its corollary, the legitimate fear of it – means that I am not at all surprised by the findings of the Private Lives survey, which showed that 67% of participants’ fear of prejudice or discrimination caused them, at least sometimes, to modify their daily activities in particular environments. This same survey revealed that 90% of participants had at some time avoided expressions of public affections and disclosure of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

My fiancé Steve and I have made the conscious decision to ignore the abuse which we might receive and behave in exactly the way we choose – including kissing, holding hands and expressing our affection in public. This is a right which every couple should have. As a result of merely exercising our ‘rights’, we have been yelled at, with ‘faggot’ an all-too-common word in the bigot’s vocabulary. We are also aware that in a couple of situations things have had the potential to turn violent, with an unspoken level of threat present. And we have had nails put through all four tyres on our car, we suspect simply because we were the neighbours of someone who disagreed with our sexual orientation, and our relationship.

Of course, others do not have the ability to make a conscious decision – they may be more easily identifiable as LGBTI simply because of how they appear, or certain sex or gender characteristics which they may have. This means they are exposed to the risk of violence, abuse or harassment irrespective of how they behave, solely for having the temerity of being in a public space.

It shouldn’t be this way. LGBTI people should not be forced to accept a threat of verbal and sometimes physical violence simply for being themselves in a public space. Commonwealth law should embrace the approach already adopted by some states and territories and prohibit vilification on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex.

This could be based on anti-vilification measures contained in the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, which outlaws public acts which “[i]ncite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of the homosexuality of the person or members of the group.”

Such anti-vilification measures should also be adopted because there is no intellectual distinction between vilification on the basis of race, and vilification on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex. Both are abhorrent, and both should be banned – as such both should be included in the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012.

Recommendation 10: The Bill should expand anti-vilification protections to cover sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex.

The final recommendation of this submission relates back to the justification for the Commonwealth legislating to protect LGBTI Australians in the first place: and that is, to address the significant problems of homophobia, bi-phobia, trans-phobia and anti-intersex discrimination which exist across our society.

If that is our goal, then simply providing a legal remedy for some individuals to take action against the individual or organisation that has directly discriminated against them will not be sufficient to achieve it. That is why the existing Commonwealth Acts which have prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, sex, disability and age, have also created specific commissioners within the Australian Human Rights Commission to take primary responsibility for these issues (namely the Race, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander, Sex, Disability and Age Commissioners).

These Commissioners, in addition to overseeing the disputes which arise under their respective portfolio, can take on a wider role to redress discrimination more broadly across society. The appointment of a specific commissioner, together with proper resourcing, is also a powerful statement of the significance which the Government places on combating discrimination in a particular area. Conversely, not appointing a commissioner, and instead subsuming it within an existing, completely unrelated portfolio, would demonstrate that the Government does not believe these issues warrant any particular attention.

For all of these reasons, I believe that the Bill should provide for a dedicated or stand-alone Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Commissioner. This Commissioner would not only assist with implementation of the range of new attributes under Commonwealth legislation, but would also be able to take an active role in fighting the homophobia which I, my fiancé, and all of our LGBTI family members and friends know all-too-well.

Recommendation 11: The Bill should provide for the appointment of a dedicated Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Commissioner.