What’s Wrong With the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991?

This post is part of a series examining the anti-discrimination laws that exist in each Australian jurisdiction and analysing how well, or how poorly, they protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people from discrimination. Other posts in the series can be found here.

Specifically, each post considers three main aspects of LGBTI anti-discrimination legislation:

  • Protected attributes
  • Religious exceptions, and
  • Anti-vilification coverage.

Contrary to what some might expect, Queensland’s laws are at least ‘average’, and in some cases, particularly in relation to anti-vilification laws, ‘better than average’, across these three areas. Unfortunately, that says more about the major flaws that exist across most anti-discrimination laws in Australia than it necessarily does about the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (‘the Act’) itself.

There are still significant problems that must be addressed with this legislation, beginning with the issue of who is – and isn’t – covered.

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Protected Attributes

Like most of its counterparts in other states, Queensland’s Anti-Discrimination Act does not protect all parts of the LGBTI community from discrimination.

On the positive side, it does cover all lesbian, gay and bisexual people – with discrimination on the basis of ‘sexuality’ prohibited in section 7 of the Act (defined as “sexuality means heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality” in the Dictionary found in the Schedule).

On the less positive side, it only covers some transgender people, and not others. That is because, while section 7 also includes ‘gender identity’, the Act’s definition of this term is out-dated:

“gender identity, in relation to a person, means that the person-

(a) identifies, or has identified, as a member of the opposite sex by living or seeking to live as a member of that sex; or

(b) is of indeterminate sex and seeks to live as a member of a particular sex.”

While this does protect transgender people who were previously identified as male but now identify as female (and vice-versa), it does not include non-binary trans people. In order to rectify this situation, the Act’s definition of gender identity should be updated to reflect the definition used in the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984[i].

Even worse off than transgender Queenslanders, however, are people with intersex variations – while part (b) of the definition of ‘gender identity’ may apply to some intersex people in limited circumstances, there is no stand-alone protected attribute for intersex people and therefore no clear-cut protection against discrimination for them.

Again, this could be rectified with the introduction of ‘sex characteristics’ as a protected attribute in the legislation[ii].

Overall: While the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 does protect lesbian, gay and bisexual people, and some transgender people, from discrimination, it leaves other trans people (especially those whose identity is non-binary) and most intersex people out in the cold. This should be fixed as a matter of priority, by updating the definition of gender identity, and adding sex characteristics as a protected attribute.

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Religious Exceptions

Queensland has adopted a unique approach to religious exceptions through the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, in which case I will spend more time than normal discussing this element.

The primary religious exception is found in section 109:

“Religious bodies

(1) The Act does not apply in relation to-

(a) the ordination or appointment of priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or

(b) the training or education of people seeking ordination or appointment as priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or

(c) the selection or appointment of people to perform functions in relation to, or otherwise participate in, any religious observance or practice; or

(d) unless section 90 (Accommodation with religious purposes) applies – an act by a body established for religious purposes if the act is –

(i) in accordance with the doctrine of the religion concerned; and

(ii) necessary to avoid offending the religious sensitivities of people of the religion.

(2) An exemption under subsection (1)(d) does not apply in the work or work-related area or in the education area.”

The first three sub-sections ((a), (b) and (c)) are at least concerned with the appointment of ministers of religion, or the conduct of religious celebrations, and are therefore more likely to be excusable on the basis of protecting ‘religious freedom’.

Unfortunately, the wording used in sub-section (d) – “in accordance with the doctrine of the religion concerned and necessary to avoid offending the religious sensitivities of people of the religion” – is incredibly broad, and permits discrimination against a wide range of people in terms of service delivery.

However, sub-section (2) is unusual and, as far as I can tell, not replicated in any other state or territory legislation. In essence, it provides that religious bodies cannot discriminate against employees unless their role is directly connected with ‘religious observance or practice’. It also means religious schools cannot discriminate against students on the basis of their sexuality or gender identity[iii].

If section 109 was the only source of religious exceptions in the legislation, Queensland’s Act would almost be assessed as positive. However, there are other sections that complicate this assessment.

Chief among them is section 25:

“Genuine occupational requirements

(1) A person may impose genuine occupational requirements for a position.

Examples of genuine requirements for a position-

…Example 4-

Employing persons of a particular religion to teach in a school established for students of the particular religion

(2) Subsection (3) applies in relation to-

(a) work for an educational institution (an employer) under the direction or control of a body established for religious purposes; or

(b) any other work for a body established for religious purposes (also an employer) if the work genuinely and necessarily involves adhering to and communicating the body’s religious beliefs.

(3) It is not unlawful for an employer to discriminate with respect to a matter that is otherwise prohibited under section 14 or 15, in a way that is not unreasonable, against a person if-

(a) the person openly acts in a way that the person knows or ought reasonably to know is contrary to the employer’s religious beliefs-

(i) during a selection process; or

(ii) in the course of the person’s work; or

(iii) in doing something connected with the person’s work; and

Example for paragraph (a)

A staff member openly acts in a way contrary to a requirement imposed by the staff member’s employer in his or her contract of employment, that the staff member abstain from acting in a way openly contrary to the employer’s religious beliefs in the course of, or in connection with the staff member’s employment.

(b) it is a genuine occupational requirement of the employer that the person, in the course of, or in connection with, the person’s work, act in a way consistent with the employer’s religious beliefs.

(4) Subsection (3) does not authorise the seeking of information contrary to section 124[iv].

(5) For subsection (3), whether the discrimination is not unreasonable depends on all the circumstances of the case, including, for example, the following-

(a) whether the action taken or proposed to be taken by the employer is harsh or unjust or disproportionate to the person’s actions;

(b) the consequences for both the person and the employer should the discrimination happen or not happen.

(6) Subsection (3) does not apply to discrimination on the basis of age, race or impairment.

(7) To remove any doubt, it is declared that subsection (3) does not affect a provision of an agreement with respect to work to which subsection (3) applies, under which the employer agrees not to discriminate in a particular way.

(8) In this section-

religion includes religious affiliation, beliefs and activities.”

That is obviously a lot to take in. So here are my three key observations:

  • This section expands the religious exceptions offered under section 109, so that religious bodies can discriminate on the basis of sexuality and gender identity against teachers and other staff in schools generally, but against employees in other religious organisations only “if the work genuinely and necessarily involves adhering to and communicating the body’s religious beliefs”.
  • In both cases this is limited by a potentially vague ‘reasonableness test’ (determining “whether the action taken or proposed to be taken by the employer is harsh or unjust or disproportionate to the person’s actions”), and
  • In both cases it is also limited by a ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ clause – discrimination is only permitted where “the person openly acts in a way that the person knows or ought reasonably to know is contrary to the employer’s religious beliefs” and the religious school or body cannot ask about sexuality or gender identity. This would therefore protect teachers or other staff who did not discuss their sexual orientation at their school or workplace[v].

Of course, as even the US Government and Military has eventually been forced to concede, ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ is a terrible policy, ‘invisibilising’ LGBT people in the workplace, forcing them to deny who they are and silencing them in everyday conversations (for example, gay teachers would not be able to openly acknowledge their partners at all in the classroom or even in the staffroom). It also exposes LGBT employees to potential harassment and bullying.

‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ is also a terrible policy with respect to LGBT students, because it denies them visible role models to look up to, or from whom to seek relevant information.

But, and here is the extraordinary part, these exceptions – allowing religious schools and other bodies to discriminate against ‘out’ lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender employees – are actually the third-best religious exceptions in Australia (behind only Tasmania and recently-passed ACT laws), because they don’t allow these organisations to explicitly deny employment solely on the basis of sexuality or gender identity.

The other, much more unambiguously positive part of the Act’s religious exceptions is that section 25 does not apply to students – which means that, while a religious school can reject students who are not from a particular religion, they cannot reject students on the basis of their sexuality or gender identity.

Overall: Queensland’s approach to religious exceptions is unique, and its protection of LGBT students against discrimination is to be welcomed. However, other parts of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 provide overly-generous rights to religious schools and other bodies to discriminate against LGBT employees, and people accessing services, and these should be significantly curtailed.

Specifically, subsection 109(1)(d), which allows discrimination on the basis of sexuality and gender identity in relation to service-provision, should be repealed.

And, while the limitations on discrimination in relation to employment (including a ‘reasonableness test’ and a ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ clause) might mean Queensland’s legislation is better than most, permitting discrimination in such circumstances is still unacceptable in the 21st century, meaning section 25 should ultimately also be abolished.

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Anti-Vilification Coverage

Queensland is one of only four Australian jurisdictions to provide anti-vilification protections to LGBT people – the others being NSW, the ACT and Tasmania (noting that Commonwealth anti-vilification law only applies to race).

Unlike NSW, the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act treats all types of prohibited vilification exactly the same – establishing vilification on the basis of race, religion, sexuality and gender identity in the same section (124A)[vi], and creating the offence of serious racial, religious, sexuality or gender identity vilification in another (section 131A).

The same penalties apply irrespective of attribute (“for an individual – 70 penalty units or 6 months imprisonment; or for a corporation – 350 penalty units”).

Of course, given the out-dated definition of gender identity used, and the Act’s exclusion of sex characteristics, not all parts of Queensland’s LGBTI community are currently protected against vilification – although this could be rectified at the same time as the protected attributes, described earlier.

One other, relatively minor, fault that should also be corrected is that, while the offences themselves cover sexuality and gender identity alongside race and religion, the titles of the relevant Parts or Chapters do not (“Part 4 Racial and religious vilification” and “Chapter 5A Serious racial and religious vilification”).

This obviously does not impact on the substantive rights involved. However, it may be misleading to a casual reader of the legislation, and in some cases may cause people to mistakenly believe that they are not protected against vilification. As a result, it would be preferable if these titles were renamed to be genuinely inclusive.

Overall: Queensland’s anti-vilification protections are comparatively strong, but could be further strengthened by updating the definition of gender identity, adding sex characteristics, and ensuring that the titles of relevant Parts/Chapters are inclusive and not potentially misleading.

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Other Issues

There are two additional serious problems with the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, and it would be negligent to conclude this analysis without addressing them.

The first is the truly awful subsection 28(1), which states:

“Work with children

(1) It is not unlawful to discriminate on the basis of lawful sexual activity[vii] or gender identity against a person with respect to a matter that is otherwise prohibited under subdivision 1 if-

(a) the work involves the care or instruction of minors; and

(b) the discrimination is reasonably necessary to protect the physical, psychological or emotional wellbeing of minors having full regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case, including the person’s actions.”

This is genuinely appalling – the very law that is supposed to protect transgender people against discrimination implies that trans employees may be unsuitable to work with children, and could even be a threat to the ‘physical, psychological or emotional wellbeing of minors’.

There was never a time that such a prejudiced subsection would have been acceptable, and it most definitely is not today – there is no excuse for the Palaszczuk Labor Government to leave this provision in place today.

The second additional flaw is found in section 45A, which states that the protection against discrimination in goods and services, located in section 46, “does not apply to the provision of assisted reproductive technology services if the discrimination is on the basis of relationship status or sexuality.”

Again, there can be no justification for such discrimination against lesbian, gay and bisexual people in terms of their access to in-vitro fertilisation, artificial insemination or gamete, zygote or embryo transfer. This section must also be repealed as part of the overall much-needed updating of the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991.

Annastacia Palaszczuk

Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk needs to raise the standard of the ‘so-so’ Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 before the State election due on 31 October 2020.

If you have enjoyed reading this article, please consider subscribing to receive future posts, via the right-hand scroll bar on the desktop version of this blog or near the bottom of the page on mobile. You can also follow me on twitter @alawriedejesus

Footnotes:

[i] Defined in section 4 of that Act as “gender identity means the gender-related identity, appearance or mannerism or other gender-related characteristics of a person (whether by way of medical intervention or not), with or without regard to the person’s designated sex at birth.”

[ii] In March 2017, intersex activists issued the Darlington Statement, which called for this terminology (sex characteristics) to be used instead of the protected attribute of ‘intersex status’, which is found in the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984.

[iii] Although section 42 does allow religious schools to discriminate against “applicants who are not of the particular sex or religion”. A similar provision allows religious boarding schools to discriminate on the basis of sex or religion as well (section 89).

[iv] “124 Unnecessary information

(1) A person must not ask another person, either orally or in writing, to supply information on which unlawful discrimination might be based.”

[v] Without looking at relevant case law, it is unclear how well, or poorly, the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ approach serves transgender people in the workplace.

[vi] “Section 124A Vilification on grounds of race, religion, sexuality or gender identity unlawful

(1) A person must not, by a public act, incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of the race, religion, sexuality or gender identity of the person or members of the group.

(2) Section (1) does not make unlawful-

(a) the publication of a fair report of a public act mentioned in subsection (1); or

(b) the publication of material in circumstances in which the publication would be subject to a defence of absolute privilege in proceedings for defamation; or

(c) a public act, done reasonably and in good faith, for academic, artistic, scientific or research purposes or for other purposes in the public interest, including public discussion or debate about, and expositions of, any act or matter.”

[vii] The Act defines lawful sexual activity as “means a person’s status as a lawfully employed sex worker, whether or not self-employed”.

What’s Wrong With the ACT Discrimination Act 1991?

This post is part of a series looking at Australia’s anti-discrimination laws, analysing them to determine how well, or in many cases how poorly, they protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people from discrimination and vilification. The other articles in the series can be found here.

In each post, the laws of each jurisdiction are assessed in relation to the following three areas:

  • Protected Attributes
  • Religious Exceptions, and
  • Anti-Vilification Coverage.

Based on these criteria, the Australian Capital Territory Discrimination Act 1991 was already better than average in terms of its LGBTI anti-discrimination laws. The good news is that, as a result of the passage of the Discrimination Amendment Act 2016 and the Discrimination Amendment Act 2018, the ACT’s LGBTI protections have improved further.

However, while many of the previous issues with this Act have been remedied, this doesn’t mean the ACT’s law is without faults – chief among them the ongoing broad exceptions provided to religious organisations (other than schools) allowing them to discriminate against LGBTI people.

Nevertheless, let’s focus on the positives first:

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Protected Attributes

The ACT Discrimination Act 1991 includes sexuality as a protected attribute in section 7(1)(w), which is defined in the Act’s dictionary as ‘heterosexuality, homosexuality (including lesbianism) or bisexuality’. This includes all of LGB people, and is better than some jurisdictions (including NSW, which excludes bisexuals), but could be improved by adopting the more inclusive term ‘sexual orientation’.

As a result of the Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2020, the Act’s protected attribute of gender identity in section 7(1)(g) is now defined as:

the gender expression or gender-related identity, appearance or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of a person, with or without regard to the person’s designated sex at birth.

Note Gender identity includes the gender identity that the person has or has had in the past, or is thought to have or have had in the past.

This includes all trans and gender diverse people, including those with non-binary gender identities.

Finally, 2016 amendments added intersex status as a protected attribute in section 7(1)(k), defined as ‘status as an intersex person’ – however, intersex advocates called for discrimination protections to be based on ‘sex characteristics’ in the influential March 2017 Darlington Statement.

In August 2020, the ACT Government responded, replacing intersex status with sex characteristics, with a definition based on the Yogyakarta Principles plus 10 (from the Act’s Dictionary:

sex characteristics-

(a) means a person’s physical features relating to sex; and

(b) includes-

(i) genitalia and other sexual and reproductive parts of the person’s anatomy; and

(ii) the person’s chromosomes, hormones and secondary physical features emerging as a result of puberty.

The ACT is now one of only four Australian jurisdictions to provide coverage for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and gender diverse and intersex people, the others being the Commonwealth, Tasmania and South Australia, and more importantly has up to date definitions for all attributes.

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Anti-Vilification Coverage

The ACT’s vilification protections also cover all parts of the LGBTI community, with prohibitions on vilification on the basis of sexuality, gender identity and intersex status (making it only the second jurisdiction, after Tasmania, to cover anti-intersex vilification – although again note the calls by intersex organisations for this term to be replaced by the protected attribute of sex characteristics).

In fact, the ACT’s LGBTI vilification protections are now the equal best in the country, given the offence of serious vilification, contained in section 750 of the Criminal Code 2002, applies to serious vilification on the basis of intersex status (the other jurisdiction with best practice anti-vilification laws is Tasmania).

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Religious Exceptions

On the basis of the above, it is clear the ACT now has close-to-best practice anti-discrimination laws in terms of their protected attributes (covering all parts of the LGBTI community) and anti-vilification coverage (again, protecting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people).

Alas, the Discrimination Act 1991 falls down (from its pedestal) when it comes to religious exceptions, aka special provisions that allow religious organisations to discriminate against people on the basis of their sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

The primary religious exceptions are outlined in section 32 Religious bodies, which states that:

“Part 3 [which contains the prohibitions of discrimination] does not apply in relation to-

(a) the ordination or appointment of priests, ministers of religion or members of any religious order; or

(b) the training or education of people seeking ordination or appointment as priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or

(c) the selection or appointment of people to exercise functions for the purposes of, or in connection with, any religious observance or practice; or

(d) any other act or practice (other than a defined act) of a body established for religious purposes, if the act or practice conforms to the doctrines, tenets or beliefs of that religion and is necessary to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion.”

As has been noted in previous posts, the first three sub-sections ((a), (b) and (c)), can potentially be justified on the basis that there is a direct connection with the appointment and training of religious office-holders, or the conduct of religious ceremonies.

However, sub-section 32(d) is effectively a blanket exception that allows any religious organisation – including religious-operated hospitals and community and social services – to discriminate against LGBTI employees, and LGBTI people accessing their services. This is clearly unacceptable.

Nevertheless, recent amendments passed by the ACT Parliament in the wake of the Ruddock Religious Freedom Review have at least ensured that these religious exceptions do not permit religious schools to discriminate against LGBTI students or teachers and other staff.

The Discrimination Amendment Act 2018 abolished the specific exception for ‘Educational institutions conducted for religious purposes’ which was previously found in section 33 (see footnotes*).

Importantly, it also amended the general religious exception in section 32(1)(d) so that it does not apply to ‘defined acts’, which section 32(2) defines as:

means an act or practice in relation to-

(a) the employment of contracting of a person by the body to work in an educational institution; or

(b) the admission, treatment or continued enrolment of a person as a student at an educational institution.

In short, religious schools now cannot discriminate against LGBTI students, teachers and other staff on the basis of their sexuality, gender identity or intersex status.

The ACT Government has instead adopted the best-practice Tasmanian approach where religious schools can discriminate in terms of the admission of students and employment of teachers on the grounds of the student or teacher’s respective religious belief (although they’ve gone further than Tasmania by requiring any school that wishes to discriminate in this way to publish its policies up-front – section new section 46(2)-(5)).

However, the ACT Government has left in place – at least for the moment – the special privileges that allow religious organisations other than schools, such as hospitals, community and social services, to discriminate against employees and people accessing those services on the basis of their sexuality, gender identity or intersex status.

There can be no justification for such wide-ranging discrimination. Hopefully, with the issue of discrimination by religious schools now addressed, the ACT Government can move on to limiting discrimination by these other bodies too – although time is running out before the next election, due on 17 October 2020.

andrewbarr

ACT Chief Minister Andrew Barr, who has successfully removed the right of religious schools to discriminate against LGBTI students and teachers, but still needs to address religious exceptions for other organisations.

Summary

As a result of amendments in both 2016 and 2018, the ACT Discrimination Act 1991 now protects all sections of the LGBTI community from discrimination. It also features the equal best anti-vilification coverage of any state, territory or federal framework in Australia, and has prohibited discrimination by religious schools against LGBTI students, teachers and other staff.

However, the ACT Government still needs to take action to limit the ability of other religious organisations, including hospitals, community and social services, to discriminate against employees and people accessing their services on the basis of sexuality, gender identity or intersex status.

 

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Footnotes:

NB Footnotes [i] to [iv] have been deleted as a result of editing.

*The Discrimination Amendment Act 2018 abolished section 33 of the Act, which previously provided:

“Educational institutions conducted for religious purposes

(1) Section 10 or 13 [which prohibit discrimination against applicants, employees and contract workers] does not make it unlawful for a person (the first person) to discriminate against someone else in relation to-

(a) employment as a member of the staff of an educational institution; or

(b) a position as a contract worker that involves doing work in an educational institution;

if the institution is conducted in accordance with the doctrines, tenets, beliefs or teachings or a particular religion or creed, and the first person so discriminates in good faith to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion or creed.

(2) Section 18 [which prohibits discrimination in relation to education] does not make it unlawful for a person (the first person) to discriminate against someone else in relation to the provision of education or training by an educational institution that is conducted in accordance with the doctrines, tenets, beliefs or teachings of a particular religion or creed, if the first person so discriminates in good faith to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion or creed.”

What’s Wrong With the Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination Act?

This post is part of a series of posts looking at Australian anti-discrimination laws and analysing how well, or in many cases how poorly, they protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people from discrimination and vilification. The other articles can be found here.

These articles look at the laws that exist in each jurisdiction, and assess them in three key areas:

  • Protected attributes
  • Religious exceptions, and
  • Anti-vilification coverage.

Unfortunately, the Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination Act has significant problems in relation to all three issues, meaning there is plenty of work to do for the Legislative Assembly to ensure LGBTI people are adequately protected against discrimination and vilification.

Protected Attributes

Sub-section 19(1) of the Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination Act sets out the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited, including “19(1)(c) sexuality.”

Sexuality itself is defined in section 4 of the Act as: “sexuality means the sexual characteristics or imputed sexual characteristics of heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality or transsexuality.”[i]

On a positive note, employing this definition means the Act does offer protection to lesbians, gay men and bisexual people (something not all state and territory laws do – for example, New South Wales does not cover discrimination or vilification against bisexual people). Although arguably it could still benefit from the more inclusive definition of ‘sexual orientation’, as featured in the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984[ii].

However, there are significant problems in terms of the Act’s application to discrimination against transgender people. First, because it includes ‘transsexuality’ within the term ‘sexuality’, when it is in fact about gender identity.

Second, and more importantly, by using the word ‘transsexuality’ rather than transgender (or including the term ‘gender identity’[iii] as its Commonwealth equivalent does, which would be preferred), it is possible that the Act fails to protect transgender people who are not ‘transsexual’ from discrimination, which is clearly a significant failing.

Another significant failing is the complete absence of protection against discrimination for intersex people. This stands in contrast to the Commonwealth, Tasmania, the ACT and South Australia who have all prohibited discrimination on the basis of ‘intersex status’[iv].

Summary: The Act does cover discrimination against lesbian, gay and bisexual Northern Territorians (although it could be further improved by adopting a more inclusive definition of sexual orientation). However, by using the term ‘transsexuality’, and including it within the term ‘sexuality’, it is likely the Act does not cover all transgender people. It also fails to offer any protection to intersex people.

Religious Exceptions

There are some positive, but also several negative, features of the Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination Act in terms of the special rights it grants religious organisations to discriminate against LGBTI people.

The primary provision establishing ‘religious exceptions’ is section 51:

“This Act does not apply to or in relation to:

(a) the ordination or appointment of priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or

(b) the training or education of people seeking ordination or appointment as priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or

(c) the selection or appointment of people to perform functions in relation to, or otherwise participate in, any religious observance or practice; or

(d) an act by a body established for religious purposes if the act is done as part of any religious observance or practice.”

The drafting of these exceptions is actually relatively narrow when compared with those that exist in other states and territories.

For example, while the first two paras above (section 51(a) and (b)) are identical to the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 section 56(a) and (b), the NSW legislation subsequently goes much further, allowing discrimination in relation to:

“(c) the appointment of any other person in any capacity by a body established to propagate religion; or

(d) any other act or practice of a body established to propagate religion that conforms to the doctrines of that religion or is necessary to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of the adherents of that religion.”

In contrast, the primary Northern Territory provision appears to more closely target the appointment of ministers of religion, and religious celebrations and practices, rather than the more nebulous criteria of ‘avoid[ing] injury to the religious susceptibilities of the adherents of that religion”.

Indeed, depending on the scope of ‘religious observance or practice’, and how this phrase has been interpreted by the judiciary, the NT provision is arguably more justifiable on the basis it seems to be concerned with religious freedom, rather than providing religious organisations with carte blanche to discriminate against LGBTI people.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of other sections of the Act. Section 37A provides an incredibly broad exception to religious schools:

“An educational authority that operates or proposes to operate an educational institution in accordance with the doctrine of a particular religion may discriminate against a person in the area of work in the institution if the discrimination:

(a) is on the grounds of:

(i) religious belief or activity; or

(ii) sexuality; and

(b) is in good faith to avoid offending the religious sensitivities of people of the particular religion.”

In effect, any religious school in the Northern Territory can discriminate against any employee or potential employee solely because they are LGBTI, irrespective of the role and no matter how qualified they may be. This is simply unacceptable and must be removed.

The section covering discrimination against students is not as broad. Sub-section 30(2) provides that:

“An educational authority that operates, or proposes to operate, an educational institution in accordance with the doctrine of a particular religion may exclude applicants who are not of that religion.”

Note that this only permits discrimination against students on the basis of their religion, and not because of their sexuality (or transsexuality). This is to be welcomed and, if 51(d) (above) has been interpreted narrowly, means LGBT students are protected against discrimination in NT religious schools.

The other provision that grants special rights to religious organisations to discriminate is sub-section 40(3), in relation to accommodation:

“A person may discriminate against a person with respect to a matter that is otherwise prohibited under this Division if:

(a) the accommodation concerned is under the direction or control of a body established for religious purposes; and

(b) the discrimination:

(i) is in accordance with the doctrine of the religion concerned; and

(ii) is necessary to avoid offending the religious sensitivities of people of the religion.”

If discrimination in relation to the appointment or training of ministers of religion is already allowed under section 51(a) and (b), which would presumably include the facilities used for housing these ministers/trainees, it is difficult to see how this particular section would be justified. As a result, it should be repealed alongside section 37A.

Summary: The main religious exceptions offered under the NT Act are relatively modest when compared to some other states and territories. Provided that ‘religious observance or practice’ has been interpreted to mean religious ceremonies and little else, section 51 may not require substantial amendment.

However, there is no justification for discrimination against LGBTI employees or potential employees in religious schools, meaning section 37A should be repealed as a matter of priority. Sub-section 40(3), allowing discrimination in relation to accommodation, also appears excessively broad.

Anti-Vilification Coverage

The Northern Territory is the only jurisdiction in Australia that does not prohibit racial vilification. In which case, it is perhaps unsurprising that there are no prohibitions on vilification against LGBTI people either (the definition of ‘discrimination’ in section 20(1) does include “harassment on the basis of an attribute”, however this falls far short of the usual standard of ‘offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate’[v]).

The Government should introduce prohibitions against anti-LGBTI vilification, as well as in relation to other attributes, including race.

Michael_Gunner

Will Chief Minister Michael Gunner fix the NT Anti-Discrimination Act?

On a positive note, during this term of Parliament the Northern Territory Government released a discussion paper looking at Modernisation of the Anti-Discrimination Act. It included examination of all of the above issues (protected attributes, religious exceptions and anti-vilification coverage), with submissions due by 31 January 2018.

However, more than two years later and nothing appears to have come from this consultation. Which means that, heading into the next Northern Territory election on 22 August 2020, the NT Anti-Discrimination Act remains in desperate need of reform. Will whoever is elected by up to the challenge?

 

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Footnotes:

[i] It should be noted here that these concepts (heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality and transsexuality) are not further defined in the legislation.

[ii] Section 4: “sexual orientation means a person’s sexual orientation towards:

(a) persons of the same sex; or

(b) persons of a different sex; or

(c) persons of the same sex and persons of a different sex.”

[iii] “[G]ender identity means the gender-related identity, appearance or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of a person (whether by way of medical intervention or not), with or without regard to the person’s designated sex at birth.”

[iv] In March 2017, intersex activists from around Australia released the Darlington Statement which called for the protected attribute of ‘intersex status’ to be replaced by ‘sex characteristics’. For more information, see the OII Australia website, here.

[v] For example, sub-section 18C of the Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act 1975 provides that:

“(1) It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private, if:

(a) the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of people…”

Submission to Victorian Greens Equal Opportunity Amendment (LGBTI Equality) Bill 2016

The Greens Member for Prahran in the Victorian Parliament, Sam Hibbins, is currently undertaking consultation on his exposure draft Bill to amend the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010.

Full details of the consultation process can be found here. The following is my submission:

Mr Sam Hibbins MP

Member for Prahran

94 Chapel St

Windsor VIC 3181

sam.hibbins@parliament.vic.gov.au

Friday 12 February 2016

Dear Mr Hibbins

Consultation on Equal Opportunity Amendment (LGBTI Equality) Bill 2016

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a submission on your exposure draft Equal Opportunity Amendment Bill.

Thank you also for your commitment to improving the anti-discrimination protections that are provided to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and bisexual (LGBTI) Victorians.

I agree with your statement, made as part of this consultation, that “The [Equal Opportunity] Act needs updating so that it better protects same-sex and gender diverse Victorians from discrimination at school, at work and in the community” (although I note that the phrase ‘same-sex and gender diverse’ does not include intersex people).

I believe that your exposure draft Bill addresses two of three major deficiencies in the current Act (and that I have written about previously – What’s Wrong With the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010).

Specifically, the Bill would significantly improve the protected attributes that are included in the Act, by:

  • Introducing a new protected attribute of ‘intersex status’, consistent with the protections offered under the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984, and
  • Updating the definition of ‘gender identity’ to be broader, and to remove any requirement to identify as either male or female in order to attract anti-discrimination coverage (and again in line with the 2013 Federal Labor Government reforms to the Sex Discrimination Act).

Both of these changes are overdue, and are welcome.

I also support the proposed amendments to reduce the current excessive and unjustified ‘exceptions’ that are offered to religious organisations and individuals allowing them to discriminate against LGBT Victorians in circumstances where it would otherwise be unlawful to do so.

The balance which the Bill strikes – removing religious exceptions in schools and other services, in employment and by individuals, while retaining exceptions for ‘core religious functions’, such as the appointment of ministers of religion and the conduct of religious ceremonies[i] – appears to be a reasonable one.

However, there is one major deficiency of Victorian anti-discrimination and vilification law that your exposure draft Equal Opportunity Amendment (LGBTI Equality) Bill 2016 does not address – and that is the absence of anti-vilification protections covering LGBTI people.

As I have written previously:

“There are… protections against both racial and religious vilification under Victoria’s Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001.

“With homophobic, biphobic, transphobic and intersexphobic vilification just as serious, and just as detrimental, as racial and religious vilification, there is no reason why LGBTI people should not have equivalent protections under Victorian law.”[ii]

In this context, the major suggestion I would make for improvement to your exposure draft Bill is for you to consider amendments to introduce protections against vilification on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status, equivalent to the current prohibitions on racial and religious vilification contained in the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001.

Outside of these three main issues – protected attributes, religious exceptions and anti-vilification protections – the other reforms proposed by the exposure draft Bill, to “restore… the powers of the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission to conduct public inquiries, enter into enforceable undertakings and to issue compliance notices” and to “restore… the power for the Commission to order someone to provide information and documents, and to order a witness… to attend and answer question” also appear reasonable.

Overall, then, I support the provisions contained in the exposure draft Equal Opportunity Amendment (LGBTI Equality) Bill 2016, but encourage you to consider adding provisions to provide protections against vilification on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.

Beyond the content of the proposed Bill itself, however, I would like to make the additional point that, given the failure of the Victorian Legislative Council to support reforms in late 2015 to ensure that religious organisations could not discriminate against LGBTI people accessing adoption services, the passage of any of the above reforms would appear to be difficult, at least in the current term of Parliament.

In this context, I urge you and the Victorian Greens to work collaboratively with the state Labor Government, the Sex Party (who also supported last year’s reforms), and the Victorian LGBTI community, to persuade remaining cross-benchers, and indeed sympathetic Liberal and National MLCs, to support at least some of these reforms now – while retaining the option of passing the remainder following the 2018 election.

Thank you for taking this submission into consideration. If you would like any additional information, or to clarify any of the above, please contact me at the details provided below.

Sincerely

Alastair Lawrie

160212 Sam Hibbins

Member for Prahran, Sam Hibbins MP.

Update: 14 January 2017

The Greens introduced an amended version of this legislation into Victorian Parliament in mid-2016.

Renamed the Equal Opportunity Amendment (Equality for Students) Bill 2016, as the name suggests it focused specifically on ensuring religious schools could not discriminate against LGBT students.

Its major provision would have added the following new section to the Equal Opportunity Act 2010:

84A Discrimination against school students not exempt

Sections 82(2), 83 and 84 do not permit discrimination by a person or body that establishes, directs, controls, administers or is an educational institution that is a school against a student on the basis of the student’s sex, sexual orientation, lawful sexual activity, marital status, parental status or gender identity.”

Unfortunately, despite the modest nature of this proposed reform, it was rejected by the Victorian Legislative Council on November 9 2016, by a margin of 32 to 6 (as reported by the Star Observer here).

Footnotes:

[i] The Bill would leave sub-section 82(1) of the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010 in tact:

“Nothing in Part 4 applies to-

  • the ordination or appointment of priests, ministers of religions or members of a religious order; or
  • the training or education of people seeking ordination or appointment as priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or
  • the selection or appointment of people to perform functions in relation to, or otherwise participate in, any religious observance or practice.”

[ii] What’s Wrong With the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010 

What’s Wrong With the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010?

This post is part of a series looking at Australia’s Commonwealth, state and territory anti-discrimination laws analysing how well – or in some cases, how poorly – they protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people from discrimination and vilification (other posts in the series can be found here).

Each post examines that jurisdiction’s LGBTI anti-discrimination laws, focusing on three main areas:

  • Protected attributes
  • Religious exceptions, and
  • Anti-vilification coverage.

Unfortunately, as we shall see below, Victoria’s Equal Opportunity Act 2010 has serious deficiencies in two of these three categories. It is time for the Parliament to act to ensure LGBTI Victorians enjoy adequate protections against homophobic, biphobic, transphobic and intersexphobic discrimination and vilification, including by religious institutions.

**********

Protected Attributes

Protection against discrimination for LGBTI Victorians has developed across three distinct stages.

Victoria’s first anti-discrimination protections for lesbian, gay and bisexual people were introduced in 1995. However, rather than protecting people from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or homosexuality and bisexuality, the Act instead covered ‘lawful sexual activity’.

This protected attribute was defined as “engaging in, not engaging in or refusing to engage in a lawful sexual activity”[i] and, with its focus on behaviour rather than identity, it is questionable how effective these protections were in practice.

Fortunately, as the name suggests, the Equal Opportunity (Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation) Act 2000 signalled a second stage of reform, by introducing ‘sexual orientation’ as a protected attribute, defined as “homosexuality (including lesbianism), bisexuality or heterosexuality.”[ii]

While the language used may not be the same that would be used today[iii], it is clear that lesbian, gay and bisexual Victorians are all covered from that point onwards.

The same amending legislation in 2000 also introduced anti-discrimination protections for transgender Victorians for the first time.

This is because it introduced ‘gender identity’ as a protected attribute, with the following definition:

gender identity means-

(a) the identification on a bona fide basis by a person of one sex as a member of the other sex (whether or not the person is recognised as such)-

(i) by assuming characteristics of the other sex, whether by means of medical intervention, style of dressing or otherwise; or

(ii) by living, or seeking to live, as a member of the other sex; or

(b) the identification on a bona fide basis by a person of indeterminate sex as a member of a particular sex (whether or not the person is recognised as such)-

(i) by assuming characteristics of that sex, whether by means of medical intervention, style of dressing or otherwise; or

(ii) by living, or seeking to live, as a member of that sex.”[iv]

Paragraph (a) of this definition applied to transgender people, although, given its focus on ‘binary’ genders, it would appear it only covered those people whose sex was designated as male at birth, but subsequently identified as female (and vice versa). It did not appear to cover people with non-binary gender identities.

The definition in the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010 was therefore no longer best practice, and a new, more inclusive definition of gender identity was needed[v] to ensure all transgender people benefitted from anti-discrimination protection.

Intersex Victorians were even worse off under the 2000 reforms. Paragraph (b) of the definition of gender identity, above, offered their only protection under Victorian law, and was problematic because:

  • It inappropriately conflated intersex status, which relates to physical sex characteristics, with gender identity, and
  • It only appeared to protect people with intersex variations where they identified as either male or female.

In order to remedy this situation, a stand-alone protected attribute of ‘sex characteristics’ was needed in the Act, based on the call by intersex activists in the March 2017 Darlington Statement[vi].

Fortunately, all of the above limitations appear to have been addressed in the third stage of LGBTI anti-discrimination protections, which were introduced as part of recent legislation prohibiting anti-gay and anti-trans conversion practices (as amendments in the Change or Suppression (Conversion) Practices Prohibition Act 2021).

This included:

  1. Introducing a new definition of sexual orientation: ‘means a person’s emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, or intimate or sexual relations with, persons of a different gender or the same gender or more than one gender.’ This clearly protects lesbian, gay and bisexual people, as well as pansexuals and other sexual orientations.
  2. Introducing a new definition of gender identity: ‘means a person’s gender-related identity, which may or may not correspond with their designated sex at birth, and includes the personal sense of the body (whether this involves medical intervention or not) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech, mannerisms, names and personal references.’ This means gender identity is no longer described in binary terms, thus protecting non-binary people against discrimination.
  3. Introducing a new protected attribute of ‘sex characteristics’, with the following definition: ‘means a person’s physical features relating to sex, including- (a) genitalia and other sexual and reproductive parts of the person’s anatomy; and (b) the person’s chromosomes, genes, hormones, and secondary physical features that emerge as a result of puberty.’ This means people with intersex variations of sex characteristics will finally be protected when these changes to the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 take effect (expected shortly).

Summary: It has taken longer than it should, but the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010 will soon finally protect all groups within the LGBTI community against discrimination.

**********

Religious Exceptions

The religious exceptions contained in Victoria’s Equal Opportunity Act 2010, are, to put it bluntly, outrageous. They are so broad, and so generous, that they substantially, and substantively, undermine laws that are supposed to redress discrimination against LGBTI people (amongst other groups).

While the exceptions for religious bodies[vii] contained in subsection 82(1)[viii] appear largely innocuous, relating to the appointment or training of religious ministers and the selection of people to perform religious services, it is only downhill from there.

For example, subsection 82(2) states that:

“Nothing in Part 4 applies to anything done on the basis of a person’s religious belief or activity, sex, sexual orientation, lawful sexual activity, marital status, parental status or gender identity by a religious body that-

(a) conforms with the doctrines, beliefs or principles of the religion; or

(b) is reasonably necessary to avoid injury to the religious sensitivities of adherents of the religion.”

Essentially, as long as a religious organisation can show that discriminating against LGBTI people is related to their religion, they have carte blanche to do so in areas where it would be otherwise unlawful.

And, lest there be any doubt that these provisions cover religious schools – allowing them to discriminate against LGBTI teachers and students – section 83 reinforces the ‘right’ to discriminate on these grounds:

83 Religious schools

(1) This section applies to a person or body, including a religious body, that establishes, directs, controls, administers or is an educational institution that is, or is to be, conducted in accordance with religious doctrines, beliefs or principles.

(2) Nothing in Part 4 applies to anything done on the basis of a person’s religious belief or activity, sex, sexual orientation, lawful sexual activity, marital status, parental status or gender identity by a person or body to which this section applies in the course of establishing, directing, controlling or administering the educational institution that-

(a) conforms with the doctrines, beliefs or principles of the religion; or

(b) is reasonably necessary to avoid injury to the religious sensitivities of adherents of the religion.”

The Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010 even includes a somewhat unusual, ‘special right’ for individuals to discriminate against other individuals:

84 Religious beliefs or principles

Nothing in Part 4 applies to discrimination by a person against another person on the basis of that person’s religious belief or activity, sex, sexual orientation, lawful sexual activity, marital status, parental status or gender identity if the discrimination is reasonably necessary for the first person to comply with the doctrines, beliefs or principles of their religion.”[ix]

Tasmania is the only other jurisdiction to include a similar ‘individual’ right to discriminate, although it only allows discrimination on the basis of religion – and not on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of these exceptions is that the most recent changes in this area took the law backwards.

In 2010, the then Labor Government introduced amendments to both the general religious exception, and the specific religious schools exception, so that, in order to discriminate in employment the religious body or school would first need to show that:

“(a) conformity with the doctrines, beliefs or principles of the religion is an inherent requirement of the particular position; and

(b) the person’s religious belief or activity, sex, sexual orientation, lawful sexual activity, marital status, parental status or gender identity means that he or she does not meet that inherent requirement.”[x]

However, before this ‘inherent requirement’ test could even take effect, the newly-elected Liberal-National Government repealed these provisions in 2011, effectively restoring the previous broad and generous exceptions.

Not only are groups like the Australian Christian Lobby, Christian Schools Australia and the Catholic Education Office all (predictably and) vehemently opposed to limiting what is in practice an almost unfettered right to discriminate against LGBTI employees[xi], the history of recent adoption equality legislation also shows just how committed the Liberal and National parties are to protecting this so-called ‘right’.

For those who may be unaware, as part of the long overdue introduction of equal adoption rights for same-sex couples in Victoria[xii], the Andrews Labor Government proposed that religious agencies providing adoption services should not be allowed to discriminate against LGBT people. The amendment sought to add a new subsection (3) to section 82 of the Act:

“Despite subsection (2), Part 4 applies to anything done by a religious body that is an approved agency within the meaning of the Adoption Act 1984 in relation to its exercise of any power or performance of any function or duty under that Act for or with respect to adoption, whether or not the power, function or duty relates to a service for a child within the meaning of that Act or for any other purpose.”

Unfortunately, the Liberal and National parties combined with some cross-bench MPs to defeat this amendment, meaning that, while the right of same-sex couples to adopt has now finally been passed, adoption services operated by religious organisations will continue to have the ‘right’ to turn those same couples away.

Undeterred by this setback, in the second half of 2016 the Andrews Labor Government attempted to implement its election commitment by reintroducing the inherent requirements test for anti-LGBT discrimination in employment via the Equal Opportunity Amendment (Religious Exceptions) Bill 2016.

Yet again, however, the Liberal and National parties used their numbers in the Legislative Council to block this modest reform, meaning LGBT teachers at religious schools, and employees at other religious organisations, can still be discriminated against simply because of who they are, and even where this discrimination has nothing whatsoever to do with the actual role they are performing.

With the Andrews Labor Government re-elected on 24 November 2018, and a potentially more supportive Legislative Council, it is now up to Minister for Equality Martin Foley MP and his Government to push for broader reforms than simply re-instating the ‘inherent requirement’ test for employment to considering how best to prohibit discrimination against LGBTI people accessing services.

Ultimately, of course, there is a need to remove all religious exceptions outside those required for the training and appointment of religious ministers, and for the conduct of religious ceremonies.

Summary: The religious exceptions contained in the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010 are overly broad, too generous, and – frankly – outrageous. Current provisions give religious bodies and religious schools wide powers to discriminate both against LGBTI employees and against LGBTI people accessing their services.

The Labor Government is to be commended for attempting to reinstate the ‘inherent requirement’ test for discrimination in employment, and to remove exceptions for religious adoption agencies – but now, following their re-election, they must go further and, at the very least, remove exceptions which allow religious schools to discriminate against LGBT students, teachers and other staff.

**********

Anti-Vilification Coverage

This section will be the shortest of the post – because, unlike NSW, Queensland, Tasmania and the ACT, there are no anti-vilification laws covering any parts of the LGBTI community.

Given the similar absence of LGBTI anti-vilifications provisions under Commonwealth law, this means Victoria’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community do not have any recourse to legislative anti-vilification protection.

There are, however, protections against both racial and religious vilification under Victoria’s Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001.[xiii]

With homophobic, biphobic, transphobic and intersexphobic vilification just as serious, and just as detrimental, as racial and religious vilification, there is no reason why LGBTI people should not have equivalent protections under Victorian law.

Summary: There is currently no anti-vilification coverage for LGBTI people under Victorian law. However, given there are existing protections against racial and religious vilification, LGBTI anti-vilification laws should be introduced, too.

Significantly, in 2019, Fiona Patten MLC of the Reason Party introduced a Bill to amend the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act to include sexual orientation, gender identity and sex characteristics as protected attributes (alongside gender and disability). This prompted a parliamentary inquiry into anti-vilification protections – see my submission to that inquiry here.

This inquiry is expected to report in March 2021. Hopefully, this Bill and inquiry prompts the Victorian Government and Parliament to pass this long-overdue, and much-needed, reform.

**********

In conclusion, while the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 covers all groups within the Victorian LGBTI community against discrimination (or at least will soon, when the amendments introduced as part of the ban on conversion practices take effect), it is clear there is still plenty of work to do, including reforming the overly-generous religious exceptions contained in the Act, and ensuring LGBTI Victorians have equivalent access to anti-vilification protections as those based on race and religion.

Daniel Andrews

It’s time for Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews to make sure all Victorians are protected against discrimination, including LGBT students and teachers in religious schools, and introducing prohibitions on anti-LGBTI vilification.

If you have enjoyed reading this article, please consider subscribing to receive future posts, via the right-hand scroll bar on the desktop version of this blog or near the bottom of the page on mobile. You can also follow me on twitter @alawriedejesus

Footnotes:

[i] This definition remains in subsection 4(1) of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010.

[ii] Subsection 4(1), Equal Opportunity Act 2010.

[iii] For example, the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984, which was amended in 2013, defines ‘sexual orientation’ as “a person’s sexual orientation towards:

(a) persons of the same sex; or

(b) persons of a different sex; or

(c) persons of the same sex and persons of a different sex.”

[iv] Subsection 4(1), Equal Opportunity Act 2010.

[v] Potentially modelled on the definition adopted by the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984: “gender identity means the gender-related identity, appearance or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of a person (whether by way of medical intervention or not), with or without regard to the person’s designated sex at birth.” [Although obviously exact wording should be agreed with Victoria’s transgender community.]

[vi] While the inclusion of ‘intersex status’ in the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013 was seen as world leading at the time, intersex activists now prefer the terminology ‘sex characteristics’ be used as a protected attribute.

[Again, the final wording of the new definition would need to be agreed in consultation with Victoria’s intersex community.]

[vii] Defined in section 81 as “(a) a body established for a religious purpose; or (b) an entity that establishes, or directs, controls or administers, an educational or other charitable entity that is intended to be, and is, conducted in accordance with religious doctrines, beliefs or principles.”

[viii] Subsection (82)(1) “Nothing in Part 4 applies to-

(a) the ordination or appointment of priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order;

(b) the training or education of people seeking ordination or appointment as priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or

(c) the selection or appointment of people to perform functions in relation to, or otherwise participate in, any religious observance or practice.”

[ix] Not only is it unclear why this section is necessary (given the protections contained in Part 4 only apply in specific areas of public life, such as employment, education, the provision of goods and services and accommodation, rather than establishing a general right to non-discrimination), it is also concerning that this ‘special right’ extends to unincorporated associations (because ‘person’ is defined in subsection 4(1) of the Equal Opportunity Act as “person includes an unincorporated association and, in relation to a natural person, means a person of any age.”)

[x] The same wording was used in both subsections 82(3) and 83(3) of the then Equal Opportunity Act 2010.

[xi] “Religious groups hit out at Labor’s move to rewrite state’s equal opportunity laws”, The Age, 8 December 2014.

[xii] As passed in the Adoption Amendment (Adoption by Same-Sex Couples) Act 2015.

[xiii] Section 7 prohibits racial vilification while section 8 prohibits religious vilification: Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001.

Response from Gillian Triggs re Responsibility for LGBTI Issues at the Australian Human Rights Commission

In July, I wrote about the need for a full-time Commissioner for Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex (SOGII) Issues at the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC)[i].

This was in part a response to the actions of Human Rights Commissioner, Tim Wilson, who, while serving as the AHRC spokesperson for SOGII issues, was arguing for the introduction of new rights to discriminate, including against LGBTI couples, as part of any reform to marriage laws[ii].

However, more broadly, it was a reflection of the overall need for the Commission to devote more resources to addressing issues of homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and intersexphobia across Australian society.

As part of that post, I wrote to the President of the AHRC, Gillian Triggs, calling on her to reallocate responsibility for LGBTI issues to a Commissioner other than Mr Wilson. In September, I received the following response from Ms Triggs:

“21 September 2015

Dear Mr Lawrie

Thank you for your letter to me regarding the responsibility for Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex (SOGII) Human Rights at the Commission.

The Australian Human Rights Commission comprises the President and 5 Commissioners. As President, I am responsible for all functions of the Commission. However, each Commissioner has a specific portfolio for which they are individually responsible.

I asked Tim Wilson to be the spokesperson on SOGII human rights. However, I and the other Commissioners also contribute public comment on the SOGII portfolio.

Under our statutory mandate at the Commission also has several functions that address the SOGII brief.

  1. We accept and try to resolve by conciliation individual complaints of discrimination and human rights under the four major pieces of legislation. No complaint under these acts can go to a court, unless and until the matter has been considered by the Commission.
  1. We intervene in court proceedings that involve human rights issues and we examine laws relating to certain rights and often propose improvements to those laws.
  1. We conduct national inquiries to bring special attention to issues of concern.
  1. We provide education about human rights to improve awareness, understanding and respect for rights in our community – in particular, the Commission is contributes to the inclusion of human rights education in the development of the National Schools Curriculum and works with the Safe Schools Coalition Australia.
  1. We conduct research and propose new policy and standards which promote the enjoyment of human rights.

The latest example of this is the Resilient individuals: sexual orientation, gender identity & Intersex rights national consultation report, a copy of which I have included in this letter.

The aim of the project was to consult stakeholders to identify key issues that can inform the Commission’s future work on SOGII issues. From June 2014 to January 2015 Cr Tim Wilson travelled nationally to consult lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender stakeholders in face to face meetings. In addition, over 1550 people participated in an online survey, and over 30 written submissions were received.

While each Commissioner is free to adopt an individual approach to the SOGII portfolio, the Australian Human Right Commission maintains a unified policy in ensuring human rights apply equally to LGBTI stakeholders.

I hope that this description of the contribution to SOGII matters is helpful.

Best wishes,

Gillian Triggs

President”

[NB Typographical errors in original]

In my view, this letter is not exactly a ringing endorsement of Mr Wilson, or the job that he is doing on LGBTI issues. While it notes the Resilient individuals process and report, led by Mr Wilson, it also makes clear that “I [Gillian Triggs] and the other Commissioners also contribute public comment on the SOGII portfolio” and that “the Australian Human Rights Commission maintains a unified policy in ensuring human rights apply equally to LGBTI stakeholders.”

Unfortunately, that doesn’t answer the question of whether Ms Triggs and the AHRC are unified in support of the introduction of new rights to discriminate as part of the implementation of marriage equality, something that Mr Wilson advocated for, yet again, last week in the Sydney Morning Herald.[iii]

Nor does it overcome the problem of the AHRC spokesperson on SOGII human rights prioritising the expansion of religious freedoms, including through convening his ‘religious freedom roundtable’ (with the first meeting to be held next Thursday, 5 November 2015), something which usually results in the diminution of rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people.[iv]

However, it appears that these issues aren’t going to be resolved any time soon and, in fact, they may only be conclusively resolved when either the Turnbull Liberal-National Government, or a subsequent Labor Government, finally creates and provides funding for a stand-alone LGBTI Commissioner within the AHRC. Based on the agenda currently being pursued by Mr Wilson, in my opinion that day can’t come soon enough.

President of the Australian Human Rights Commission, Professor Gillian Triggs

President of the Australian Human Rights Commission, Professor Gillian Triggs

[i] “Why we need a full-time LGBTI Commissioner at the Australian Human Rights Commission” July 12, 2015: https://alastairlawrie.net/2015/07/12/why-we-need-a-full-time-lgbti-commissioner-at-the-australian-human-rights-commission/

[ii] “Religious freedom and same-sex marriage need not be incompatible” The Australian, 6 July 2015 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/religious-freedom-and-same-sex-marriage-need-not-be-incompatible/story-e6frg6zo-1227429558684

[iii] “Religious freedom isn’t a trump card, but it does need to be a part of marriage equality debate” Sydney Morning Herald, 21 October, 2015 http://www.smh.com.au/comment/religious-freedom-isnt-a-trump-card-but-it-does-need-to-be-a-part-of-marriage-equality-debate-20151020-gkecyn.html

[iv] For more on this issue, see my “Submission on AHRC proposal to create a religious freedom roundtable” September 25, 2015: https://alastairlawrie.net/2015/09/25/submission-on-ahrc-proposal-to-create-a-religious-freedom-roundtable/

Submission on AHRC Proposal to Create a ‘Religious Freedom Roundtable’

Mr Tim Wilson

Australian Human Rights Commissioner

C/- rights@humanrights.gov.au

Friday 25 September 2015

Dear Mr Wilson

Submission on Religious Freedom Roundtable Proposal

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments on your proposal to establish a ‘Religious Freedom Roundtable’, including on its draft ‘Statement of purposes and Guiding principles.’

From the outset, I would like to express my scepticism of the need for, and purpose of, this Roundtable.

While your call for submissions[i] at least briefly acknowledges the biggest problem in this area (“how to balance religious freedom with other human rights”), the remainder instead appears to focus on the ‘expansion’ of religious freedom, with the explicit goal of developing a body of policy work “that is designed to enlarge respect for religious freedom and proper consideration of its importance in future policy development and law reform.”[ii]

This is despite the fact that no clear need is articulated for such ‘enlargement’.

Indeed, as suggested by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in its recent Interim Report as part of its own Freedoms Inquiry:

“[g]enerally speaking, Australians enjoy significant religious freedom, particularly by comparison to other jurisdictions. Australians enjoy the freedom to worship and practise religion, as well as the freedom not to worship or engage in religious practices.”[iii]

The ALRC went on to comment that:

“[t]here are few Commonwealth laws that can be said to interfere with freedom of religion. The Law Council of Australia advised that ‘it has not identified any laws imposing any specific restriction on the freedom of religion’ and ‘that any specific encroachment is likely to arise in balancing religious freedom with other protected freedoms, such as freedom of speech’.”[iv]

Indeed, it is difficult to think of many areas where religious freedoms are genuinely encroached upon, with the exception of the mistreatment of muslim Australians, by both Governments and other Australians, in the 14 years post September 11 (and it is difficult to see how this Roundtable would help address that issue), or the ongoing abuse of refugees fleeing religious persecution who are detained, processed and resettled on Nauru and Manus Island (although sadly there is nothing unique about this mistreatment, with all refugees who arrive by boat abused by Governments, of both persuasions, in this way).

On the other hand, it is easy to identify ways in which ‘religious freedom’ is currently exercised to discriminate against other Australians, and in this way cause significant harm to them and their rights.

The most obvious, and egregious, example of this is the extremely broad exceptions under most Commonwealth, state and territory anti-discrimination laws that permit religious organisations to discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) Australians.

In the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984, these exceptions are contained in sections 23(3)(b), 37 and 38, with sub-section 37(1)(d) revealing exactly how broad this special right to discriminate is in practice:

“[n]othing in Division 1 or 2 affects… any other act or practice of a body established for religious purposes, being an act or practice that conforms to the doctrines, tenets or beliefs of that religion or is necessary to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion.”

In practice, this means that the Commonwealth Government tacitly endorses discrimination by religious organisations against gay teachers, lesbian students, bisexual people accessing health of community services and transgender aged care employees, among many others.

There are also a wide variety of more indirect ways in which ‘religious freedom’ has been used, and continues to be used, to oppress lesbian, gay, bisexual transgender and intersex (LGBTI) Australians.

This obviously includes ongoing advocacy by a number of mainstream christian churches, as well as by homophobic groups like the Australian Christian Lobby, to seek continued discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status through the secular Marriage Act 1961.

But it also includes things like campaigning to ensure the National Health & Physical Education Curriculum does not include content that is genuinely-inclusive of LGBTI students (thus denying their right to health information), or calling on Governments to abolish the national Safe Schools Coalition, a program with the explicit goal of reducing homophobic, biphobic, transphobic and intersexphobic bullying.

For all of the above reasons, I call on you to reconsider the need to establish a ‘Religious Freedom Roundtable’ and that, if you do, to amend the scope of such a Roundtable to ensure that its primary focus is on addressing the many ways in which ‘religious freedom’ is currently used as a weapon, by some elements within society, to legitimise homophobic, biphobic, transphobic and intersexphobic discrimination that is, and should be considered, unacceptable.

Before I turn to the ‘Statement of purposes and Guiding principles’ I would like to make two additional points about the information contained in the call for submissions.

First, in relation to the dot point “[p]reserving religious freedom when an organisation receives taxpayer’s money to provide a public service”, I would note that nearly all religious organisations receive taxpayer’s money through the generous exemptions from taxation law which they currently enjoy.

I would also note that this dot point appears to relate to the ‘carve-out’ to existing exceptions contained in the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, which has the effect of prohibiting discrimination by religious-operated aged care services against LGBT people accessing their services, where that service receives Commonwealth funding.[v]

In my view, this carve-out is not wide enough – there is no justification for these services to be legally permitted to discriminate against LGBT employees, either.

But, most importantly, from my perspective it is not the involvement of Government funding that means such discrimination should be prohibited – it is the fact that, employment and service provision in the public sphere, which includes the operation of aged care services, should be free from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status. Full stop.

Second, in relation to the dot point “[b]alancing the right to religious freedom and equality before the law – what are the areas of shared agreement?” I note that the right not to be discriminated against (or ‘freedom from discrimination’), is in fact much broader than just ‘equality before the law’, which could be narrowly-construed as meaning equality under legislation and/or before the courts, rather than, say, equal access to employment or service provision.

Specific Comments Regarding the Draft Statement of purpose and Guiding principles[vi]

The ‘Statement of purpose’ describes the Religious Freedom Roundtable as a forum “for representatives of religious and spiritual communities to have ongoing engagement and dialogue about freedom of religion, conscience and belief (‘religious freedom’) and its interaction with public policy in 21st century Australia.”

Given the discussion above, and the fact that LGBTI Australians are the people most negatively affected by the exercise of ‘religious freedom’ in Australia, it seems odd to establish a roundtable to look at these issues and yet not have LGBTI organisations at the table.

This omission could be seen as indicating that the Religious Freedom Roundtable is in fact concerned with prioritising or ‘privileging’ the rights of religious organisations over and above the rights of other people, including those of LGBTI Australians.

Under the heading ‘Mutual respect’, in the first paragraph, you note that “[religious freedom] interacts with other fundamental freedoms including freedoms of thought, conscience, speech and association, as well as property rights.”

In response, I reiterate the position from my submission to last year’s Rights and Responsibilities Consultation that highlighting these rights, simply because they are ‘traditional’ or even just older, but omitting other rights such as the right to non-discrimination which in practice is just as important, is unjustified.[vii]

In short, “prioritising certain rights above others potentially neglects and devalues the importance of those other rights which are no less essential to ensuring all Australians are able to fully participate in modern society.”[viii]

Finally, I would like to make the following points in relation to specific ‘Guiding principles’:

Principle 1: Religious freedom is fundamental to the Australian way of life, and should be treated equally to all other human rights and freedoms.

and

Principle 2: Religious freedom is a fundamental human right that should be respected and not limited unless it infringes on the rights of others.

I agree with these statements, and particularly the observations that religious freedom should be ‘treated equally to all other human rights and freedoms’ and respected ‘unless it infringes on the rights of others’.

In practice, this should mean that the right to non-discrimination should be ‘treated equally’ to the right to religious freedom.

More importantly, it means that, given exceptions to anti-discrimination law allowing religious organisations to discriminate against LGBT Australians in health, education, community services and aged care are clearly an infringement on the right to non-discrimination in public life, and that they cause significant harm to these people, such exceptions should be abolished.

Principle 3: Religious freedom has an essential and important role in our public life or civic affairs to contribute to the moral and spiritual guidance of our nation; and faith is as legitimate basis for participation in public life and civic affairs as any other.

I disagree with this statement for two reasons. First, as an atheist, and noting that Australia is a secular state, I reject the notion that ‘our nation’ as a whole necessarily requires ‘moral and spiritual guidance’ from organised religion.

Second, while people should not be prohibited from participation in public life on the basis of their religious beliefs, I do not believe it is appropriate for religious individuals and/or organisations to seek to impose ‘religious laws’ on their fellow citizens.

An example of this is the ongoing campaign by christian fundamentalists to impose a narrow religious interpretation of marriage on their fellow citizens through the secular Marriage Act 1961, in this way denying the human rights of those who do not share the same faith – and even of other christians who do not subscribe to their particular homophobic definition of this institution.

Thus, while participation in public life and civic affairs should be open, such participation should not be abused by using religion as a tool to oppress others.

Principle 6: No Australians should be unnecessarily excluded from participation in public life or civic affairs because of their faith, age, disability, gender, race, sexual orientation, or other irrelevant personal attribute.

While I agree with the underlying sentiment of this principle, I find it disappointing that, as both the ‘Freedom Commissioner’ and also the Commissioner with responsibility for LGBTI issues, you have not explicitly mentioned gender identity or intersex status as part of this principle. These two protected attributes from the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 should be included.

Principle 8: When considering issues that affect the rights of others, it is necessary to provide equal opportunities to enlarge and consider their perspectives with the objective of accommodating and enlarging the human rights of all.

This principle appears to contradict the Statement of purpose, described above – specifically, given most contentious issues surrounding religious freedom in fact concern its intersection with the right to non-discrimination of LGBTI Australians, it is objectionable that LGBTI people and organisations are not included in this roundtable from the beginning.

Principle 10: Individuals and communities of faith will continue to constructively work with government and other public agencies to uphold the law and improve Australia’s moral and spiritual guidance.

As with principle 3, above, as an atheist I reject the implication that Australia, as a secular nation, necessarily requires ‘moral and spiritual guidance’ from organised religion.

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide comments on your proposal to establish a ‘Religious Freedom Roundtable’, including on its draft ‘Statement of purposes and Guiding principles.’

If you would like to clarify any of the above, or require further information, please contact me at the details below.

Sincerely,

Alastair Lawrie

[i] https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-freedoms/projects/religious-freedom-roundtable-call-submissions

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] ALRC, “Freedoms Inquiry Interim Report”, August 2015, para 4.1, page 97. See http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/alrc127

[iv] Ibid, para 4.39, page 104.

[v] Sub-section 37(2): Paragraph (1)(d) does not apply to an act or practice of a body established for religious purposes if: (a) the act or practice is connected with the provision, by the body, of Commonwealth-funded aged care; and (b) the act or practice is not connected with the employment of persons to provide that aged care.

[vi] https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/DRAFT_ReligiousFreedomRoundtable_2015_AHRC_1.pdf

[vii] See my full submission here: https://alastairlawrie.net/2014/10/27/submission-to-rights-responsibilities-2014-consultation/

[viii] Ibid.

Submission re Australian Law Reform Commission Freedoms Inquiry Interim Report

Australian Law Reform Commission

GPO Box 3708

SYDNEY NSW 2000

freedoms@alrc.gov.au

Monday 21 September 2015

To whom it may concern

SUBMISSION RE ALRC FREEDOMS INQUIRY INTERIM REPORT

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a submission in response to the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) Freedoms Inquiry Interim Report.

This submission builds on my submission in response to the Issues Paper released in December 2014[i].

As with my earlier submission, my primary focus is on the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) Australians, including:

  • The failure by the Commonwealth Government to protect LGBTI people from vilification and
  • The Commonwealth Government’s tacit endorsement of discrimination, by religious organisations, against LGBT people.

However, before I turn to these issues in detail – and specifically how they relate to Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of the Interim Report – I reiterate my concern about the Terms of Reference for this Inquiry.

From my earlier submission:

“The way in which the Terms of Reference have been formulated, and consequently the manner in which the Issues Paper has been drafted, appears to prioritise some rights above others, merely because they are older, or are found in common law, rather than being more modern rights or founded through legislation or international human rights documents.

This is an unjustified distinction, and makes it appear, at the very least, that property rights or ‘the common law protection of personal reputation’ (aka protection against defamation) are more important than other rights, such as freedom from vilification or discrimination.

My criticism of this inquiry is therefore similar to that of the Rights & Responsibilities 2014 Discussion Paper released by the Human Rights Commissioner Mr Tim Wilson. From my submission to that inquiry[ii]:

“Specifically, I would argue that the prioritising of certain rights above others potentially neglects and devalues the importance of those other rights which are no less essential to ensuring that all Australians are able to fully participate in modern society.

From my point of view, chief among these rights is the right to non-discrimination, or to put it another way (which may be more favourably received), to be free from discrimination, including unfair or adverse treatment on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.

The right to non-discrimination is fundamental in international human rights law adopted immediately post-World War II. Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that:

“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status.”

Similarly, article 21 of the ICCPR establishes that:

“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has, in cases which both involved complaints by Australian citizens against actions by the Tasmanian and Commonwealth Government respectively, found that the wording of these articles includes the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.[iii]

The Commonwealth Parliament has also recognised that the right to non-discrimination for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) Australians is worthy of protection, with the passage of the Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013.

This historic legislation, providing similar rights to non-discrimination to those already enjoyed on the basis of race, sex, disability and age, was a significant, albeit long overdue, step forward for the LGBTI community. For this reason, I would not wish to see the right to be free from discrimination on these attributes to be diminished in comparison to other, more ‘traditional’ rights.

Unfortunately, that is the almost inevitable conclusion of a consultation process which aims to consider “how effectively we protect people’s human rights and freedoms in Australia”… but which then only focuses on a small number of freedoms, including the right to property, but which neglects others.”

[End extract]

Unfortunately, while the ALRC Freedoms Inquiry Issues Paper acknowledged that “[f]reedom from discrimination is also a fundamental human right”, in my opinion the Interim Report does not reflect this view and in fact further privileges some rights over the right to non-discrimination simply because they are ‘older’ in legal origin.

Nevertheless, in the remainder of this submission I will continue to focus on the important right to non-discrimination, including associated protections against vilification, as it relates to the freedoms of speech, religion and association that are discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively.

Chapter 3: Freedom of Speech

My first comment relates to terminology, namely the protected attributes referred to in paragraph 3.103 on page 80.

It is disappointing that the discussion of protections against breaches of human rights and discrimination under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (and the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986) would refer to the out-dated term ‘sexual preference’, rather than the more inclusive and better practice term ‘sexual orientation’.

It is also disappointing that the two other grounds added by the Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013 – ‘gender identity’, and ‘intersex status’ – are not included in this paragraph.

Turning now to the more substantive issue of anti-vilification laws generally, and the issue of section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 specifically (as discussed on pages 80 to 84).

Despite public controversy in recent years (at least in the eyes of some conservative commentators), I do not believe that there has been any real evidence that the racial vilification protections of the RDA have, in practice, operated inappropriately, or that they require significant amendment.

Moreover, rather than repeal Commonwealth racial vilification protections, I continue to believe there is a strong case for the introduction of similar laws against vilification on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.

As I wrote in my earlier submission [edited]:

“My primary question is why laws should be established to prohibit ‘advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred’ but not to prohibit advocacy of hatred on other grounds, including sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

The impact of vilification on these grounds, and the negative influence of public homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and intersexphobia more generally, is just as harmful as racial or religious vilification, and therefore I can see no good reason why there should not also exist equivalent anti-vilification protections covering LGBTI Australians at Commonwealth level.

In short, if there should be a law to protect against the incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence on the basis of race, then there should also be a law to protect people on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.

The fact that there is no such Commonwealth law means that the Government is currently failing in its duty to protect LGBTI Australians from vilification.”

[End extract]

Therefore, my response to the ‘[c]onclusions’ in paragraph 3.191 is to reject the suggestion that “[a]nti-discrimination law may also benefit from more thorough review in relation to implications for freedom of speech” but to instead submit that the Commonwealth Government should amend the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 to include vilification protections on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status, as a matter of priority.

Chapter 4: Freedom of Religion

It is difficult to disagree with the opening paragraph of Chapter 4, where it asserts: “[g]enerally speaking, Australians enjoy significant religious freedom, particularly by comparison to other jurisdictions. Australians enjoy the freedom to worship and practise religion, as well as the freedom not to worship or engage in religious practices,” or this description in paragraph 4.39 on page 104:

“There are few Commonwealth laws that can be said to interfere with freedom of religion. The Law Council of Australia advised that “it has not identified any laws imposing any specific restriction on the freedom of religion” and “that any specific encroachment is likely to arise in balancing religious freedom with other protected freedoms, such as freedom of speech.””

In fact, I would go further to suggest that religious freedom is unnecessarily and unjustifiably prioritised, and provided with ‘special treatment’, within Australia.

This is because legal protections surrounding freedom of religion extend far beyond the right to worship freely (or not) to incorporate other ‘rights’, including the ‘right to discriminate’ against people on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

This so-called ‘right to discriminate’ applies outside places and celebrations of worship, to allow education, health and community services that are operated by religious organisations to discriminate against LGBT Australians both in employment, and in service delivery.

This is reflected in the variety of extremely broad exceptions and exemptions under Commonwealth, state and territory anti-discrimination law, which provide that the requirement not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity does not apply to these organisations.

In the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, these exceptions are contained in sections 23(3)(b), 37 and 38, with sub-section 37(1)(d) revealing exactly how broad this freedom to discriminate is in practice:

“[n]othing in Division 1 or 2 affects… any other act or practice of a body established for religious purposes, being an act or practice that conforms to the doctrines, tenets or beliefs of that religion or is necessary to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion.”

It should be noted that there is nothing inherent in the freedom of religion that automatically requires religious organisations to be provided with what is essentially a ‘blank cheque’ to discriminate against LGBT employees and LGBT people accessing services in a wide variety of circumstances.

There are two reasons for this:

First, these services, whether they are in the fields of education, health or community services, are located squarely in the public sphere, and their primary nature is related to the delivery of education, health or community services, not to the ‘celebration’ of religion.

This means that, while discrimination against ministers of religion or worshippers within a church, mosque or synagogue on these grounds might conceptually fall within freedom of religion, it is much more difficult to argue that discrimination within a school, hospital or aged care facility is as essential to enjoyment of the same freedom.

Second, we accept that there are limits to religious freedom where it threatens public order, or causes significant harm to other people. It is clear that allowing religious organisations to discriminate freely in these settings causes considerable harm to LGBT Australians, including by:

a) Denying employment to people who are eminently qualified to perform a role, with this discrimination based solely on their sexual orientation or gender identity, attributes which are irrelevant to the job at hand, and

b) Discriminating against people who wish to access services on the same basis, the most egregious example of which is mistreatment of young lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender students whose parents have chosen to send to schools operated by religious organisations (and where they are often unaware that their child is LGBT).

For both of these reasons, I reiterate the view from my earlier submission that the exceptions offered to religious organisations under Commonwealth, state and territory anti-discrimination law should be significantly curtailed.

As I wrote previously:

“Religious exceptions and exemptions under Commonwealth, state and territory anti-discrimination laws allow serious harm to be caused to LGBT Australians, on a day-to-day basis and across multiple spheres of public life, and, I submit, should be significantly curbed.

To this end, I believe the religious exemptions which are included in sub-sections 37(1)(a),(b) and (c) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984[iv], if supplemented by exemptions covering how religious ceremonies are conducted, are both more justifiable in being better targeted to protecting freedom of religious worship itself, and less likely to result in harm to LGBT people through the breach of their right to non-discrimination across broad areas of public life. These are the only religious exemptions that, I believe, should be retained.

This, much narrower, form of religious exemptions would, in my view, also be a more appropriate outcome of a system of human rights that seeks to both protect fundamental rights, and promote the responsibility not to infringe upon the fundamental rights of others.”

[End extract]

Perhaps the most concerning part of the Interim Report is the stakeholder feedback from some religious organisations, lobbyists and lobby groups that, contrary to the above view, their rights to discriminate are currently too narrowly defined and they in fact demand a far greater ability to impose discrimination against LGBT Australians.

This includes submissions from the Australian Christian Lobby, Mr Patrick Parkinson, Freedom for Faith, Family Voice, the Wilberforce Foundation, Christian Schools Australia and the Presbyterian Church of Victoria. Their suggestions include replacing the existing, already overly generous exceptions to anti-discrimination law, with a positively-framed ‘right to discriminate’.

These groups are essentially arguing that religious freedom, no matter how broadly defined or how indirectly related to the actual celebration of religion, must always take precedence over the rights of others not to be discriminated against, even where such discrimination obviously causes significant harm.

I urge the ALRC to reject the views of these religious fundamentalists, and their attempts to impose the ‘supremacy’[v] of religious freedom over any or all other rights in Australian society, including through Commonwealth law.

Finally, while on Chapter 4, I note the discussion regarding solemnising marriage ceremonies on pages 111 to 113 of the Interim Report.

While I do not propose to comment on the content which is included in this section, I would note that one issue which is not canvassed is the proposal by some that, when marriage equality is finally introduced in Australian law, it should be accompanied by the establishment of a new right for civil celebrants to refuse to solemnise wedding ceremonies of LGBTI Australians.

Such provisions have been included in the Freedom to Marry Bill 2014, introduced by Liberal Democratic Senator David Leyonhjelm, and similar rights to ‘conscientiously object’ have also been advocated for by the Australian Human Rights Commissioner, Mr Tim Wilson.

For reasons that I have outlined elsewhere[vi], such provisions should be rejected by the Commonwealth Parliament on the basis that this would set a concerning precedent whereby individuals would be able to discriminate in service delivery on the basis of their personal religious beliefs, and because a social reform which is based on love would be fundamentally undermined by provisions which legitimise hate.

Chapter 5: Freedom of Association

The issues which arise in this Chapter are similar to those raised in Chapter 4: Freedom of Religion. In particular, people like Mr Patrick Parkinson and Family Voice submit that freedom of association should allow religious organisations to discriminate against people who do not “fit with the mission and values of the organisation.”

To a certain extent I agree – churches, mosques and synagogues, indeed all formally and explicitly religious organisations, should be free to include or exclude whoever they want, on whatever basis they want, as ministers of religion and as worshippers or members of their respective congregations.

The ‘whoever they want, on whatever basis they want’ formulation is important – if the people making the case for freedom of religion, and freedom of association, to justify exempting religious organisations from anti-discrimination laws are philosophically consistent, they should be pushing for exceptions to be introduced into the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 and other anti-discrimination schemes as much as they argue for the existing exceptions in the Sex Discrimination Act 1984.

If they do not, then it reveals that they are not genuinely motivated by the pursuit of these freedoms, but are in fact engaged in an exercise in prejudice specifically directed against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people.

In a similar way to Chapter 4, I also disagree that the freedom of association should extend to allow education, health and community services operated by religious organisations to be able to discriminate against people on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

Any argument that might be raised that these schools, hospitals or aged care facility should have the freedom to include or exclude ‘whoever they want, on whatever basis they want’ is outweighed by the public interest in having education, health and community services provided on a non-discriminatory basis, and specifically by the harm caused to LGBT people by allowing such discrimination to occur.

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide a submission in response to the Interim Report. Please do not hesitate to contact me, at the details below, should you wish to clarify any of the above or to seek additional information.

Sincerely

Alastair Lawrie

[i] https://alastairlawrie.net/2015/02/15/submission-to-australian-law-reform-commission-traditional-rights-and-freedoms-inquiry/

[ii] Full submission at: https://alastairlawrie.net/2014/10/27/submission-to-rights-responsibilities-2014-consultation/

[iii] Human Rights Committee, Toonen v Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/92 and Human Rights Committee, Young v Australia, Communication No. 941/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000.

[iv] “Nothing in Division 1 or 2 affects:

  • the ordination or appointment of priests, ministers of religion or members of any religious order;
  • the training or education of persons seeking ordination or appointment as priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order;
  • the selection or appointment of persons to perform duties or functions for the purposes of or in connection with, or otherwise to participate in, any religious observance or practice…”

[v] Indeed, it is especially concerning that the Australian Christian Lobby uses the language of ‘supremacy’ in its own submission: “Courts and legislatures need to acknowledge the supremacy of the fundamental rights of freedom of religion, conscience, speech and association… [it is] a freedom which must be placed among the top levels of human rights hierarchy” as quoted at paragraph 4.96 on page 116.

[vi] See: https://alastairlawrie.net/2014/12/21/senator-leyonhjelms-marriage-equality-bill-undermines-the-principle-of-lgbti-anti-discrimination-should-we-still-support-it/

Submission on NHMRC Review of Ethical Guidelines for Assisted Reproductive Technology Stage 2

Update:

 

The updated Ethical guidelines on the use of assisted reproductive technology were released by the NHMRC in April 2017.

 

Pleasingly, they made some improvements both to the previous guidelines and to the draft revised guidelines that had been released for consultation. However, they did not address all of the points made in my submission (see original post, below).

 

First, they do not include a stand-alone ethical principle of non-discrimination, retaining it as only one element of principle 7 (“Processes and policies for determining an individual’s or a couple’s eligibility to access ART services must be just, equitable, transparent and respectful of human dignity and the natural human rights of all persons, including the right to not be unlawfully or unreasonably discriminated against”).

 

Second, on the other hand they did update the discussion of this principle on page 26 to substitute sexual orientation for sexual preference, and to add new grounds of gender identity and intersex status. Which is certainly an improvement from the original guidelines, although it would be better for the latter attribute to be replaced with sex characteristics, as called for in the March 2017 Darlington Statement.

 

Third, disappointingly but also somewhat expectedly, the NHMRC did not overturn the ethical prohibition on commercial surrogacy, something I continue to see as a necessary harm reduction initiative to limit the possible exploitation of women in overseas countries.

 

Fourth, the guidelines continue to allow staff members to refuse to provide ART procedures on the basis of their conscientious objection: “A member of staff or a student who expresses a conscientious objection to the treatment of an individual patient or to an ART procedure is not obliged to be involved in that treatment or procedure, so long as the objection does not contravene relevant anti-discrimination laws and does not compromise the clinical care of the patient…” Which means the laws of all state and territories will need to be reviewed to ensure discrimination against LGBTI people accessing ART services is specifically prohibited.

 

Fifth, and perhaps most concerningly, the NHMRC has left the door slightly ajar to the sex selection of embryos – something that has specific dangers, right now, for intersex embryos, sets a dangerous precedent for possible selection against diverse sexual orientations and gender identities in the future, and reinforces negative gender stereotyping more broadly.

 

While the NHMRC has retained the existing prohibition on sex selection (“8.14 Sex selection techniques may not be used unless it is to reduce the risk of transmission of a genetic condition, disease or abnormality that would severely limit the quality of life of the person who would be born”), they have also stated this situation could change in the future:

 

“despite AHEC’s majority view that there may be some circumstances where there is no ethical barrier to the use of sex selection for non-medical purposes, paragraph 8.14 applies until such time that wide public debate occurs and/or state and territory legislation addresses the practice.”

 

Any such moves will need to be resisted.

 

Sixth, and finally, the NHMRC address some, but not all, of the points raised by OII Australia (now Intersex Human Rights Australia) and endorsed in my submission, including:

 

  • The guidelines do recommend the provision of information and counselling to prospective parents where “clinics should promote an environment of positive acceptance and non-discrimination”, but
  • The guidelines do not specifically rule out the use of pre-implantation genetic testing to prevent the births of intersex babies.

 

Original Post:

 

Project Officer – ART Public Consultation

Ethics and Governance Section

Evidence, Advice and Governance

National Health and Medical Research Council

GPO Box 1421

CANBERRA ACT 2601

ethics@nhmrc.gov.au

Thursday 17 September 2015

Dear Project Officer

ETHICAL GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE AND RESEARCH

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a further submission to the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) review of Part B of the Ethical guidelines on the use of assisted reproductive technology in clinical practice and research, 2007 (the ART guidelines).

The following submission builds on my earlier submission, in April 2014, to this review (a copy of which is available here: https://alastairlawrie.net/2014/04/20/submission-on-nhmrc-review-of-ethical-guidelines-for-assisted-reproductive-technology/ ).

Overall, while I note that there have been some positive outcomes from the previous round of consultation – including the recognition in para 5.1.2 that “[c]linics must not accept donations from any donor who wishes to place conditions on the donation that the gametes are for the use only by individuals or couples from particular ethnic or social groups, or not be used by particular ethnic or social groups”, and the revised approach to transmissible infections/infectious disease at para 5.2.5  – there remain a range of areas where the ART guidelines should be improved.

First, I believe that the ‘principles and values’ outlined on pages 12 and 13 of the draft ART guidelines should include a specific principle of Non-Discrimination, and that the explanation for this principle should explicitly acknowledge that there should be no discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status in the provision of assisted reproductive technology services.

Second, and on a related matter, in the chapter “Application of ethical principles in the clinical practice of ART”, the discussion under point 3.5 on page 15 should be updated to reflect contemporary best practice.

Specifically, the sentence “[t]here must be no unlawful or unreasonable discrimination against an individual or couple on the basis of:

  • race, religion, sex, marital status, sexual preference, social status, disability or age”

reflects out-dated terminology and does not recognise all necessary groups.

The term ‘sexual preference’ should be replaced by ‘sexual orientation’, and the additional terms ‘gender identity’ and ‘intersex status’ should be added, to ensure that all members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) community are protected from discrimination, and also to ensure that the ART guidelines are consistent with the protected attributes covered under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984.

Third, consistent with my previous submission, I disagree with the discussion under point 3.6 on page 16 regarding commercial surrogacy.

In particular, I do not support the blanket statement that “[i]t is unethical for individuals, or couples, to purchase, offer to purchase or sell gametes or embryos or surrogacy services” or the equally unequivocal blanket ban at para 8.7.1 (“[c]linics and clinicians must not practice, promote or recommend commercial surrogacy, nor enter into contractual arrangements with commercial surrogacy providers.”)

As outlined previously, I believe that the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) should be asked to investigate the issue of commercial surrogacy, including consideration of what a best practice scheme would look like, before determining whether all commercial surrogacy services should be deemed unethical and therefore illegal.

From my previous submission:

“While I agree that commercial surrogacy raises a variety of complex ethical issues, I do not necessarily agree with such a broad-sweeping and all-encompassing statement against commercial surrogacy. I do not believe there is sufficient evidence to assert that in every single situation commercial surrogacy is ‘unethical’ or ‘wrong’.

 Of course, I am, like most people, sensitive to the very real potential for commercial surrogacy to result in the exploitation of women for their reproductive capabilities. This has to be a major, if not the major, consideration in determining whether to allow commercial surrogacy and if so what form of regulation might be appropriate.

 However, I am also aware that the current legal situation – where commercial surrogacy in Australia is banned, and as a direct result of these laws an increasing number of Australian individuals and couples are engaging in commercial surrogacy arrangements overseas – may in fact cause a far greater degree of exploitation of women, especially in developing countries and/or countries which do not closely regulate surrogacy arrangements.

 It may be that a domestic ban on commercial surrogacy has, contrary to the intended outcome of those who introduced it, in fact resulted in greater exploitation of women when considered as a whole. It may also be that, creating a domestic commercial surrogacy scheme, which would allow for direct oversight by Commonwealth (or State and Territory) authorities, could lead to a significant reduction in the potential for such exploitation.

 I do not expect the review process considering these Guidelines to come to a conclusion about these difficult matters. Nor am I willing, or in a position, to even attempt to suggest what a domestic commercial surrogacy scheme would look like.

 However, I do believe that this is an issue that requires further investigation, and could be the subject of a comprehensive review by the Australian Law Reform Commission, or their State and Territory equivalents.

 The ALRC could be asked not to review whether such a scheme should be adopted but to determine, if commercial surrogacy was to be allowed in Australia, what the best possible scheme (with the least potential for the exploitation of women) would look like. The Parliament, and the wider community, could then discuss and debate the option that was put forward and make an informed choice about whether such a model was preferable to the ongoing domestic ban on commercial surrogacy (and the corresponding trend to overseas surrogacy arrangements).

 I believe that such a debate, informed not just by a practical proposal but also by the real-world consequences of the current ban, is vital before we can truly come to grips with and possibly resolve whether a permanent ban on commercial surrogacy is ethical or otherwise.”

Fourth, I continue to oppose ‘Conscientious objection’ provisions (under point 3.7 on pages 16 and 17) that would allow a member of staff or student to refuse to treat an individual or couple on the basis of that person’s sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status, or on their relationship status.

The refusal to provide a medical service on these grounds is, and always should be considered, unethical.

Again, from my previous submission:

“While I note that the provision of ART services may, for some staff members of students, raise ethical concerns, I believe that the drafting of this provision is far too broad, and allows for conscientious objections even when such objections are themselves unethical.

 For example, the provision as drafted would allow an individual member of staff to refuse to provide ART services to a person on the basis of that person’s sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status (if that person believed that ART services should not be provided to such persons) or on the basis of relationship status (if the person believed that only ‘opposite-sex’ married persons should have access to ART).

 With the increasing acceptance of LGBTI Australians (as evidenced by the long-overdue introduction of federal anti-discrimination protections in 2013) and of different relationship statuses (including the 2008 reforms to federal de facto relationship recognition), none of these objections – while potentially genuinely held by the individual – should be allowed as the basis for refusing to provide ART services. Nor should conscientious objections on the basis of any of sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status or relationship status be recognized as acceptable or ‘ethical’ in the context of these Guidelines.

 If [point 3.7] is to be retained in the Ethical Guidelines, I recommend that it be amended to specifically note that conscientious objections do not apply, and are not accepted, with respect to the sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status or relationship status of the intended recipient of the ART procedure or service.”

Fifth, in response to the discussion of “Sex selection for non-medical purposes” on pages 55 to 58 of the consultation draft, I submit that sex selection should not be allowed on these grounds.

There are three reasons for this:

  1. Based on evidence from the submission of OII Australia (Organisation Intersex International Australia, see their submission here: https://oii.org.au/29939/nhmrc-genetic-selection-intersex-traits/ ), it appears that sex selection is already being used to select against embryos on the basis of intersex variations. This practice is entirely unethical, intending to prevent the birth of children on the basis of where they sit along the natural spectrum of sex variation, and should cease.
  2. Allowing sex selection for non-medical purposes also sets a negative precedent, opening the door in future to selecting for (or more likely against) embryos on the basis of gender identity or even sexual orientation if and when genetic testing emerges which can accurately predict the existence of, or even pre-disposition towards, these traits.
  3. As acknowledged by the consultation paper on page 55, there is a strong “possibility that sex selection for non-medical reasons may reinforce gender stereotyping, and create pressure on the person born to conform to parental expectations regarding gender.” This practice will be particularly harmful towards children born as a result of such procedures where those children express a different gender identity to that which the parents ‘choose’, and also may negatively impact children who are homosexual or bisexual.

On this basis, I do not believe that sex selection is appropriate in any of the case studies presented on pages 56, 57 and 58, and submit that it should not be included as an ‘ethical option’ under the ART guidelines.

Sixth, and finally, I would like to express my support for the submission by OII Australia to this consultation. Specifically, I endorse their recommendations that:

  • “Information giving and counselling must include non-pathologising information, aimed at supporting a philosophy of self-acceptance”
  • Pre-implantation genetic testing (PGT) should not be used to prevent the births of intersex babies and that
  • “The practice of sex selection should not be permitted for social, child replacement, or family balancing purposes.”

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide a submission to this consultation process. Please do not hesitate to contact me, at the details below, should you which to clarify any of the above, or to seek additional information.

Sincerely,

Alastair Lawrie

Submission to South Australian Law Reform Institute Consultation on Removing LGBTIQ Discrimination

South Australian Law Reform Institute

c/- salri@adelaide.edu.au

Monday 6 July 2015

 

To whom it may concern,

Submission to South Australian Law Reform Institute Consultation on Removing LGBTIQ Discrimination from South Australian Laws

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this submission to the South Australian Law Reform Institute (SALRI) public consultation on removing discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer people from South Australian laws.

While I am not a resident of South Australia, I am a passionate advocate for LGBTI rights, and I provide the following comments on possible ways to improve the legal situation of LGBTI people in South Australia, especially in terms of their protections under anti-discrimination law.

Specifically, I would like to suggest three major reforms to the South Australian Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (the ‘Act’), namely:

  1. Amend protected attributes to:
    1. Modernise wording around gender identity, and
    2. Genuinely include intersex status.

The Equal Opportunity Act 1984 currently provides protection to lesbian, gay and bisexual people through section 29 (and subsequent provisions of the Act), because of the definition of ‘sexuality’ in section 5: “sexuality means heterosexuality, homosexuality and bisexuality.”

While the SALRI may wish to consider whether to recommend amendments to the wording of these attributes (potentially to ‘sexual orientation’, to ensure consistency with the provisions of the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013), the primary concerns around protected attributes, and how they are drafted, are in respect of transgender and intersex individuals.

For example, protections for transgender people are based on the term ‘chosen gender’, which is defined under sub-section 5(5) of the Act as: “a person is a person of a chosen gender if –

  • the person identifies on a genuine basis as a member of the opposite sex by assuming characteristics of the opposite sex (whether by means of medical intervention, style of dressing or otherwise) or by living, or seeking to live, as a member of the opposite sex…”

Based on my understanding of transgender activism, and through recent developments of anti-discrimination law within Australia, it is highly likely that using the term ‘chosen gender’, and then defining it in this way, is not best practice.

For example, the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984 protections are instead based on ‘gender identity’, which is defined in section 4 of that Act as: “gender identity means the gender-related identity, appearance or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of a person (whether by way of medical intervention or not), with or without regard to the person’s designated sex at birth.”

The Commonwealth definition appears to be significantly more inclusive, especially because it does not use descriptors such as ‘opposite sex’ and therefore avoids strict gender binaries, allowing people who do not identify as either male or female to also be protected.

I suggest the SALRI consider recommending the South Australian Equal Opportunity Act 1984 be amended to incorporate the term, and definition of, ‘gender identity’ from the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984.

In a similar way, it is possible that the drafters of subsection 5(5) of the South Australian Equal Opportunity Act 1984 believed that they were including people with intersex variations, when they wrote: “a person is a person of a chosen gender if – …

  • the person, being of indeterminate sex, identifies on a genuine basis as a member of a particular sex by assuming characteristics of the particular sex (whether by means of medical intervention, style of dressing or otherwise) or by living, or seeking to live, as a member of the particular sex.”

However, once again based on my understanding of intersex activism, and on recent developments in anti-discrimination law (particularly at the Commonwealth level, and more recently in Tasmania), it is clear that this definition is not best practice – and is, in fact, inadequate to ensure protection for people on the basis of intersex status.

For this reason, the SALRI should consider recommending that South Australia adopt the provisions of the Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013, which was the first anti-discrimination legislation in the world to include ‘intersex status’ as a stand-alone protected attribute.

As a result of those reforms, ‘intersex status’ is now defined in section 4 of the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984 as: “intersex status means the status of having physical, hormonal or genetic features that are:

  • neither wholly female nor wholly male; or
  • a combination of female and male; or
  • neither female nor male.”

Adopting this definition would ensure a far larger proportion of people with intersex variations would have protection under South Australia’s anti-discrimination laws.

Obviously, as a cisgender gay man, I am not an expert on either of the grounds of gender identity or intersex status. That is why these issues have been framed as suggestions – and if this is something that the SALRI wishes to take up in more detail, it should do so in close collaboration with South Australian and/or national transgender and intersex advocacy organisations to ensure that whatever language is ultimately adopted is the best, and most inclusive, possible.

  1. Remove broad exceptions granted to religious organisations

The current exceptions which are offered to religious organisations in the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 are overly generous, and their scope should be significantly narrowed.

Section 50 of the Act provides:

Religious bodies

1. This Part does not render unlawful discrimination in relation to –

a. the ordination or appointment of priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or

b. the training or education of persons seeking ordination or appointment as priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or

ba. the administration of a body established for religious purposes in accordance with the precepts of that religion; or

c. any other practice of a body established for religious purposes that conforms with the precepts of that religion or is necessary to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of the adherents of that religion.”

While both subsections 50(1)(a) and (b) appear to be necessary to protect the genuine exercise of freedom of religion, subsection 50(1)(ba) would only be justified on this basis if it was limited to the operation of explicitly or overtly religious bodies (like churches) and should not apply to other institutions which may be operated by religions but which have a different primary purpose (for example, schools, hospitals, aged care services or other community services).

Subsection 50(1)(c) is also completely unjustifiable given it provides what amounts to essentially a ‘blank cheque’ to organisations that are operated by religious groups to discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) South Australians, both in employment and in service delivery.

There should not be a general right to discriminate against LGBT people, across multiple areas of public life like education, health, aged care or community services, simply because of the religious beliefs of certain individuals or organisations. LGBT South Australians deserve the right to access services, and to apply for or undertake employment, in the public sphere without the threat of being discriminated against solely on the basis of who they are.

The Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013, which specifically excluded religious exceptions from applying to LGBT people accessing aged care services operated by religious organisations, has successfully demonstrated that:

  1. It is possible to restrict these religious exceptions in law, and
  2. After two years of operation, there have been no practical problems in the application of such provisions.

Even more relevantly, the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 has not granted explicit exceptions to protections on sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status to religious organisations – and this approach has also worked well over the past decade.

For example, under the Tasmanian legislation, religious organisations have traditionally only been allowed to discriminate in terms of:

  1. Employment based on religion (section 51)[1] or
  2. Participation in religious observance (section 52)[2].

I suggest that the SALRI consider the long-standing Tasmanian exceptions, which do not allow for general discrimination against LGBTI people on the basis of their sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status, but only on the grounds of religious belief or activity, as a ‘best practice’ guide to help reform the South Australian Equal Opportunity Act 1984 and therefore improve the anti-discrimination protections which are offered to LGBTI South Australians.[3]

  1. Introduce anti-vilification protections for LGBTI South Australians

The final suggestion relates to the issue of anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex vilification.

Specifically, it is to recommend the creation of anti-vilification laws, on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status, which are equivalent to the race-based anti-vilification provisions of the South Australian Racial Vilification Act 1996[4].

To put it bluntly, there is no justification whatsoever to have anti-vilification laws which protect people from racist vilification, but to simultaneously not have anti-vilification laws which apply to homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and intersexphobia.

Homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and intersexphobia are just as unacceptable, and, most importantly, just as harmful, as racism – with significant impacts on the mental health of young LGBTI people in particular. If, as a community, we have (or in this case, South Australia, has) resolved to outlaw racist vilification, then similar laws should also be used to outlaw homophobic, biphobic, transphobic and intersexphobic vilification.

Currently, four Australian jurisdictions (NSW, Queensland, the ACT and Tasmania) have anti-vilification laws which cover (at least some of) the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex communities.

However, given neither the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984, nor South Australian law, have any vilification protections on these grounds, none of the LGBTI communities in South Australia have any legal protection from similar conduct.

This situation should change – and I suggest the SALRI recommend the creation of new anti-vilification laws which prohibit vilification on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.

The past 18 months have seen an extensive community conversation about race-based vilification laws at the Commonwealth level, and specifically whether section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 should be repealed, amended or retained.

The outcome of this debate appears to be relatively strong community support for the retention of section 18C. As such, I believe the SALRI should take advantage of this moment to recommend that another marginalised group within Australian society should be offered the same shield against conduct which is similarly destructive.

Thank you again for the opportunity to make a submission to the South Australian Law Reform Institute (SALRI) public consultation on removing discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer people from South Australian laws.

I look forward to the outcome of this consultation, and to the consequent improvements to South Australia’s laws – hopefully including the reforms to the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 recommended in this submission.

Sincerely,

Alastair Lawrie

[1] “Section 51: Employment based on religion.

(1) A person may discriminate against another person on the ground of religious belief or affiliation or religious activity in relation to employment if the participation of the person in the observance or practice of a particular religion is a genuine occupational qualification or requirement in relation to the employment.

(2) A person may discriminate against another person on the ground of religious belief or affiliation or religious activity in relation to employment in an educational institution that is or is to be conducted in accordance with the tenets, beliefs, teachings, principles or practices or a particular religion if the discrimination is in order to enable, or better enable, the educational institution to be conducted in accordance with those tenets, beliefs, teachings, principles or practices.”

[2] “Section 52: Participation in religious observance.

A person may discriminate against another person on the ground of religious belief or affiliation or religious activity in relation to –

  • the ordination or appointment of a priest; or
  • the training and education of any person seeking ordination or appointment as a priest; or
  • the selection or appointment of a person to participate in any religious observance or practice; or
  • any other act that –
    • is carried out in accordance with the doctrine of a particular religion; and
    • is necessary to avoid offending the religious sensitivities of any person of that religion.”

[3] However, I do not believe there is any reason to include the recently added, unnecessary – and unnecessarily discriminatory – provisions included in section 51A of the Tasmanian Act which state: “Section 51A. Admission of person as student based on religion.

(1) A person may discriminate against another person on the ground of religious belief or affiliation or religious activity in relation to admission of that other person as a student to an educational institution that is or is to be conducted in accordance with the tenets, beliefs, teachings, principles or practices of a particular religion.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who is enrolled as a student at the educational institution referred to in that subsection.

(3) Subsection (1) does not permit discrimination on any grounds referred to in section 16 other than those specified in that subsection.

(4) A person may, on a ground specified in subsection (1), discriminate against another person in relation to the admission of the other person as a student to an educational institution, if the educational institution’s policy for the admission of students demonstrates that the criteria for admission relates to the religious belief or affiliation, or religious activity, of the other person, the other person’s parents or the other person’s grandparents.”

[4] Section 4 of the SA Racial Vilification Act provides: “Racial vilification. A person must not, by a public act, incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of their race by –

  • threatening physical harm to the person, or members of the group, or to property of the person or members of the group; or
  • inciting others to threaten physical harm to the person, or members of the group, or to property of the person or members of the group.

Maximum penalty:

If the offender is a body corporate – $25 000.

If the offender is a natural person – $5 000, or imprisonment for 3 years, or both.”