Monthly Archives: February 2016

Submission to Commonwealth Parliamentary Inquiry into Surrogacy

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Update 19 May 2016:

In advance of the widely-anticipated election announcement by Malcolm Turnbull on Sunday May 8, a range of Parliamentary Committees handed down inquiry reports in the first week of May. This included the inquiry into surrogacy conducted by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, with their final report – called Surrogacy Matters – available here.

This update will provide a brief summary of that report, including consideration of whether they incorporated any of the recommendations made in my submission to the inquiry (included below).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the Committee was chaired by George ‘the Safe Schools program is like grooming’ Christensen, the Committee did not support any change in approach to commercial surrogacy in Australia:

Recommendation 1. The Committee recommends that the practice of commercial surrogacy remain illegal in Australia.

Nevertheless, this is still a disappointing outcome, particularly given the Committee did accept my suggestion that a body like the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) could be tasked to develop best practice legislation in this area – they just decided to limit it to altruistic surrogacy:

Recommendation 2. The Committee recommends that the Australian Government, in conjunction with the Council of Australian Governments, consider the development of a model national law that facilitates altruistic surrogacy in Australia. The model law should have regard to the following four guiding principles:

  • that the best interests of the child should be protected (including the child’s safety and well-being and the child’s right to know about their origins),
  • that the surrogate mother is able to make a free and informed decision about whether to act as a surrogate,
  • that sufficient regulatory protections are in place to protect the surrogate mother from exploitation, and
  • that there is legal clarity about the parent-child relationships that result from the arrangement.

Looking at this recommendation in detail, I can see absolutely no reason why these same ‘guiding principles’ could not also be used to develop a framework for commercial surrogacy for inclusion in the model law (but that would take a Committee, and a Parliament, with more courage than the one that was just dissolved).

On the positive side, the Committee notes on page 5 that “[m]any inquiry participants also highlighted a number of discriminatory provisions that exist in relation to gender, marital status and sexual orientation” in state and territory laws (and referenced submissions from the Australian Human Rights Commission, myself, and the NSW Gay & Lesbian Rights Lobby).

As a result, one of the factors the Committee believes the ALRC should consider is “the need for State and Territory laws to be non-discriminatory” (Recommendation 3), which is obviously welcome.

However, the Committee’s recommendations around international commercial surrogacy are far less welcome – and far more frustrating.

The Committee acknowledged that the ban on domestic commercial surrogacy is a major contributing factor to Australian couples, including LGBTI couples, seeking access to commercial surrogacy in other countries. It also acknowledged that the criminalisation of this practice, by Queensland, NSW and the ACT, has so far been ineffective in stopping it.

But, instead of using this evidence to justify a reconsideration of the domestic prohibition of commercial surrogacy, the Committee decided to reinforce this ‘criminalisation’ agenda:

Recommendation 9. The Committee recommends that the Australian Government introduce legislation to amend the Migration Act 1958 such that Australian residents seeking a passport for a young child to return to Australia are subject to screening by Department of Immigration and Border Protection officials to determine whether they have breached Australian or international surrogacy laws while outside Australia, and that, where the Department is satisfied that breaches have occurred, the Minister for Immigration is given the authority to make determinations in the best interests of the child, including in relation to the custody of the child.

So, in Christensen & co’s ideal world, Department of Immigration and Border Protection officials will investigate Australian families who return from overseas with children born through surrogacy arrangements and, presumably, assist in their criminal prosecution under state and territory law.

Most worrying of all is the proposal for the Minister for Immigration to make determinations about the custody of that child, including potentially stripping their parents of responsibility. Imagine for a moment the current Minister, Peter Dutton (or his predecessor, Scott Morrison) making such decisions, including about LGBTI families? Let’s hope that terrifying reality never comes to pass.

All in all then, while the Committee’s Surrogacy Matters report does include some positive recommendations (such as supporting the principle that state and territory surrogacy laws should be non-discriminatory), its failure to reconsider the ban on domestic commercial surrogacy, and its approach to international commercial surrogacy, is frustrating and worrying, respectively.

George Christensen

George Christensen, Committee Chair.

 

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Original Post:

Committee Secretary

House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs

PO Box 6021

Parliament House

Canberra ACT 2600

spla.reps@aph.gov.au

 

Thursday 11 February 2016

 

To whom it may concern

 

Submission to Commonwealth Parliamentary Inquiry into Surrogacy

 

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission to the inquiry into surrogacy, being conducted by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs.

 

In this submission, I will not be addressing all eight terms of reference of the inquiry in detail.

 

Instead, I propose to focus on the following three issues:

 

  • Surrogacy and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) parent(s)
  • National consistency and
  • Commercial surrogacy, including international commercial surrogacy.

 

These three issues are of particular relevance to the first three terms of reference of the inquiry:

 

  1. the role and responsibility of states and territories to regulate surrogacy, both international and domestic, and differences in existing legislative arrangements
  2. medical and welfare aspects for all parties, including regulatory requirements for intending parents and the role of health care providers, welfare services and other service providers [and]
  3. issues arising regarding informed consent, exploitation, compensatory payments, rights and protections for all parties involved, including children.

 

For context, I am writing this submission as an LGBTI advocate and activist, and as someone who is in a long-term same-sex relationship, but not as someone who intends to enter into a surrogacy arrangement at any point in the foreseeable future.

 

Surrogacy and LGBTI parents

 

While I am not an expert in surrogacy policy and/or law across Australia, I am aware that different jurisdictions have adopted different approaches to the eligibility of LGBTI people to access surrogacy.

 

Specifically, it is my understanding that, while most Australian jurisdictions now allow non-discriminatory access to altruistic surrogacy (including my current state of residence, NSW), some jurisdictions continue to prohibit same-sex couples solely on the basis of their sexual orientation – including both South Australia and Western Australia.

 

There can be no justification for this discrimination.

 

The overwhelming majority of credible research shows that children raised in same-sex parented families are as healthy, and as happy, as those raised by mixed-sex couples.

 

As Deborah Dempsey found in the 2013 research paper “Same-sex parented families in Australia”[i]:

 

“[o]verall, research to date considerably challenges the point of view that same-sex parented families are harmful to children. Children in such families do as well emotionally, socially and educationally as their peers from heterosexual couple families” [emphasis added].

 

This conclusion was supported by research in the following year, by Dr Simon Crouch and others, that:

 

“children with same-sex attracted parents in Australia are being raised in a diverse range of family types. These children are faring well on most measures of child health and wellbeing, and demonstrate higher levels of family cohesion than population samples.”[ii]

 

These findings accord with reputable studies from overseas, with evidence consistently revealing that children from same-sex parented families experience the same levels of physical and mental health as their peers, if not better.

 

Given this, I believe that it is time for the remaining Australian jurisdictions to remove any outstanding discrimination against LGBTI people seeking access to surrogacy. To support this objective, the current inquiry should express its support for the equal treatment of LGBTI parents and prospective parents, and encourage remaining jurisdictions to amend their laws.

 

Recommendation 1: The Committee should expressly support the principle that there should be no discrimination against LGBTI people seeking access to surrogacy and should encourage jurisdictions that currently discriminate against LGBTI people in this area to remove such discrimination as a matter of priority.

 

National Consistency

 

The above issue (LGBTI eligibility) is just one area where there is significant inconsistency in the legislative approach to surrogacy across Australia.

 

There are a variety of other inconsistencies, including the very different treatment of international commercial surrogacy by different states and territories (which will be addressed in more detail below).

 

There seems to be little justification for Australian jurisdictions to adopt such widely divergent approaches.

 

Moreover, the differences in legislative approach can have significant impacts on people who may be mobile, moving regularly between jurisdictions, who are contemplating becoming parents and where surrogacy is one, or even the most likely, method in which this may occur.

 

Alternatively, the differences in legislative approaches to surrogacy may induce, or in some cases compel, people to move between states and territories, especially to avoid possible criminal sanction.

 

As someone who has already lived in four different jurisdictions for extended periods (and twice in one of those jurisdictions), it seems illogical that at different points in time I would not have had access to altruistic surrogacy due to where I lived at the time, or that currently accessing international commercial surrogacy would make me a criminal in some of those places, but not others.

 

Wherever possible – and provided that LGBTI people are not denied access to surrogacy because of their sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status – I believe that the laws regulating surrogacy should be consistent across all Australian jurisdictions, and that the current inquiry should adopt this as a principle for proposed reforms.

 

Recommendation 2: Provided that LGBTI people are not discriminated against, the Committee should expressly support the principle that the laws regulating surrogacy should be uniform across Australian states and territories, wherever possible.

 

Commercial Surrogacy, including International Commercial Surrogacy

 

The first two parts of this submission have covered issues that should be uncontroversial for most people – that LGBTI parents, and prospective parents, should be treated equally, and that, wherever possible, there should be national consistency on the laws which apply to surrogacy.

 

There is no denying, however, that the third issue is inherently controversial – and that is the question of whether, and if so how, commercial surrogacy should be allowed in Australia.

The current response by Australian states and territories has been to prohibit domestic commercial surrogacy in all circumstances, with three jurisdictions[iii] going one step further and criminalising participation in international commercial surrogacy arrangements as well.

 

My approach to this issue is informed by the following four observations:

 

  1. Surrogacy arrangements, and especially commercial surrogacy arrangements, contain a risk of exploitation of the surrogate
  2. The risk of exploitation significantly increases in the absence of appropriate regulatory oversight
  3. There are some women who perform the role of surrogate, who wish to be paid for this service and who would not be exploited by doing so, and
  4. There are many prospective parents, including but not limited to LGBTI (and especially gay male) people, for whom commercial surrogacy is their most likely avenue to become parents and who are therefore willing to participate in these arrangements, domestically or internationally and, in some cases, irrespective of its potential illegality.

 

Based on these observations, I do not believe that the current approach adopted by the states and territories on this issue is the correct one.

 

Instead, it is my view that it would be preferable for commercial surrogacy to be made lawful within Australia, but only within a regulatory framework that includes appropriate safeguards and oversight to minimise the risk of exploitation of surrogates.

 

As I have submitted previously to the NSW Government[iv], and to the National Health & Medical Research Council[v], I believe that the NSW and/or Australian Law Reform Commissions could be tasked with investigating this issue, and proposing a regulatory framework that significantly reduces the risk of surrogate exploitation.

 

This framework could then be considered by the respective Parliaments, rather than debating the issue of commercial surrogacy in the abstract, which is too often the case, and which too easily leads to blanket bans rather than a more considered approach.

 

Indeed, as I wrote to the NHMRC:

 

“While I agree that commercial surrogacy raises a variety of complex ethical issues, I do not necessarily agree with… broad-sweeping and all-encompassing statement[s] against commercial surrogacy. I do not believe there is sufficient evidence to assert that in every single situation commercial surrogacy is ‘unethical’ or ‘wrong’.

 

“Of course, I am, like most people, sensitive to the very real potential for commercial surrogacy to result in the exploitation of women for their reproductive capabilities. This has to be a major, if not the major, consideration in determining whether to allow commercial surrogacy and if so what form of regulation might be appropriate.

 

“However, I am also aware that the current legal situation – where commercial surrogacy in Australia is banned, and as a direct result of these laws an increasing number of Australian individuals and couples are engaging in commercial surrogacy arrangements overseas – may in fact cause a far greater degree of exploitation of women, certainly in developing countries and/or countries which do not closely regulate surrogacy arrangements.

 

“It may be that a domestic ban on commercial surrogacy has, contrary to the intended outcome of those who introduced it, in fact resulted in greater exploitation of women when considered as a whole. It may also be that, creating a domestic commercial surrogacy scheme, which would allow for direct oversight by Commonwealth (or State and Territory) authorities, could lead to a significant reduction in the potential for such exploitation…

 

“I… believe that this is an issue that requires further investigation, and could be the subject of a comprehensive review by the Australian Law Reform Commission, or their State and Territory equivalents.

 

“The ALRC could be asked not to review whether such a scheme should be adopted but to determine, if commercial surrogacy was to be allowed in Australia, what the best possible scheme (with the least potential for the exploitation of women) would look like. The Parliament, and the wider community, could then discuss and debate the option that was put forward and make an informed choice about whether such a model was preferable to the ongoing domestic ban on commercial surrogacy (and the corresponding trend to overseas surrogacy arrangements).”

 

It is my view that this process has the potential to produce a regulatory framework to allow commercial surrogacy within Australia that would significantly reduce the risk of surrogate exploitation and therefore allay the concerns, and garner the support, of a majority of stakeholders.

 

Recommendation 3: The Committee should recommend that the Australian Law Reform Commission be asked to review the issue of domestic commercial surrogacy and develop a regulatory scheme that significantly reduces the risk of exploitation of surrogates and which is then presented for the consideration of Parliament.

 

The above discussion obviously focuses on the issue of domestic commercial surrogacy, leaving the even more vexed question of international commercial surrogacy unanswered.

 

To some extent, I would hope that, were commercial surrogacy to be allowed within Australia, the demand to engage in international commercial surrogacy arrangements would be significantly reduced.

 

However, the introduction of such a scheme, either nationwide or in some states and/or territories, is likely to be years away. In the meantime, Australian individuals and couples will continue to seek to participate in international commercial surrogacy arrangements.

 

I think it is undeniable that some of these arrangements have already led, and will continue to lead, to the exploitation of the surrogate involved. There have also been very public examples of such arrangements where the child involved has been abandoned.

 

But I also believe that there are other examples where no such exploitation has taken place, and that the arrangement has demonstrably been to the benefit of all parties concerned, including the parents, the surrogate and the child(ren).

 

Given this, there are a range of options that could be explored, including the introduction of ‘mutual recognition’ laws, where, provided appropriate safeguards and oversight exist, the commercial surrogacy schemes of specific countries are deemed to be accepted under Australian law. However, I will leave it to experts in this area to provide submissions on how such options might be drafted.

 

What I do want to comment on is the approach of Queensland, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory in criminalising those people who currently engage in international commercial surrogacy arrangements.

 

While, as indicated above, I understand the motivations behind such prohibitions, I question whether in practice they have been successful. Specifically, it is my understanding that individuals and couples from all three jurisdictions continue to engage in international commercial surrogacy.

 

Even if the overall number who do so has been reduced from before the respective bans were introduced (which may not be verifiable, and therefore may or may not be true), there are nevertheless negative consequences for children who are born through such arrangements.

 

This can include increased uncertainty of their legal parentage when their families have returned to Queensland, NSW and the ACT, as well as the obvious risk of criminal sanctions being imposed on their primary caregiver(s) were the international commercial surrogacy arrangement involved to come to the attention of authorities. As a general principle, it is difficult to see how criminalising the parents involved in such cases would benefit the child(ren).

 

In this context, and given the laws in all three jurisdictions have been in operation for some time, I believe it would be useful for Queensland, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory to specifically review their criminalisation of international commercial surrogacy arrangements, including the potential detriment of these policies on the children born as a result of such arrangements.

 

Recommendation 4: The Committee should recommend that states and territories that have introduced criminal sanctions for people engaging in international commercial surrogacy arrangements should review the effectiveness of these laws, including investigating their impact on the children born as a result of these arrangements.

 

Thank you again for the opportunity to make a submission to this inquiry. I can be contacted at the details provided with this submission should the Committee wish to obtain additional information, or to seek clarification of any of the above.

 

Sincerely

Alastair Lawrie

 

 

[i] Dempsey, D, “Same-sex parented families in Australia”, Child Family Community Australia, Research Paper No. 18, 2013.

[ii] Crouch, S, Waters, E McNair, R, Power, J, Davis, E, “Parent-reported measures of child health and wellbeing in same-sex parented families: a cross-sectional survey”, BMC Public Health, 21 June 2014.

[iii] ACT (Parentage Act 2004, s45), NSW (Surrogacy Act 2010, s11) and Queensland (Surrogacy Act 2010, s54).

[iv] Submission on Review of the NSW Surrogacy Act 2010, April 23 2014.

[v] Submission on NHMRC Review of Ethical Guidelines for Assisted Reproductive Technology Stage 2, September 17 2015.

What’s Wrong With the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977?

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UPDATED 11 March 2023:

This post is part of a series looking at anti-discrimination laws around Australia and examining how well, or how poorly, they protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people against discrimination and vilification.[i]

This includes analysing three key issues: protected attributes, religious exceptions and anti-vilification coverage. Unfortunately, as we shall see below, the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 has serious shortcomings in all of these areas, and NSW has gone from having the first gay anti-discrimination laws in Australia, to having the worst.

It is clear this legislation is in urgent need of major reform. What is less clear is whether the current NSW Government is up to the task.

Protected Attributes

As indicated above, NSW was the first jurisdiction in Australia to introduce anti-discrimination protections for ‘homosexuals’. In fact, it passed these laws in late 1982, 18 months before homosexuality was decriminalised, meaning a gay man could not be discriminated against for who he was (in some areas of public life at least), but could still be convicted for having sexual intercourse in private. The problem is that the protected attributes included in the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 have not kept pace with community standards in the decades since.

There was one positive clarification in 1994 that “homosexual means male or female homosexual”[ii] (to overcome any erroneous assumption that homosexuality only referred to gay men). However, the only significant expansion in the past 41 years was the introduction of transgender as a protected attribute in 1996:

“Section 38A Interpretation

A reference in this Part to a person being transgender or a transgender person is a reference to a person, whether or not the person is a recognised transgender person[iii]:

(a) who identifies as a member of the opposite sex by living, or seeking to live, as a member of the opposite sex, or

(b) who has identified as a member of the opposite sex by living as a member of the opposite sex, or

(c) who, being of indeterminate sex, identifies as a member of a particular sex by living as a member of that sex,

and includes a reference to the person being thought of as a transgender person, whether the person is, or was, in fact a transgender person.”

While this reform was a major step forward, it nevertheless failed to cover all discrimination on the basis of gender identity. This protected attribute focuses only on binary genders – covering people whose sex was designated as male at birth, but now identify as female (and vice versa). It does not cover other people along a more inclusive spectrum, including people who do not identify exclusively as either male or female.

Section 38A of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 is therefore no longer best practice, and a new, more inclusive definition[iv] should be adopted to ensure all trans and gender diverse people, including non-binary people, benefit from anti-discrimination protection.

Intersex people are even worse off under the Act. Paragraph (c) of the definition above offers their only protection under NSW law, but it is problematic because:

  • It inappropriately conflates intersex, which relates to physical sex characteristics, with gender identity, and
  • It only appears to protect people with innate variations of sex characteristics where they identify as either male or female.

To remedy this situation, a stand-alone protected attribute of ‘sex characteristics’ should be introduced, based on the March 2017 Darlington Statement by intersex activists.[v]

There is, however, one section within the LGBTI community that is not included in the entire Anti-Discrimination Act, not even in an out-dated, fundamentally flawed or only partial way. In fact, one of the five letters of the acronym has no anti-discrimination coverage at all: bisexual people.

NSW is the only jurisdiction in Australia where its anti-discrimination laws do not cover discrimination on the basis of bisexuality. That is as bizarre as it is offensive.

It must be remedied at the earliest possible opportunity by the NSW Parliament, with either the introduction of a new stand-alone protected attribute of ‘bisexual’, or (preferably) by the modernisation of the current protected attribute of ‘homosexual’ to instead refer to ‘sexual orientation’, in line with the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984[vi].

Summary: The protected attributes contained in the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 are the narrowest in the country, only offering protection to gay men, lesbians, and some transgender people. It needs to be updated to ensure it covers gender identity and sex characteristics – so that non-binary and intersex people are protected – as well as extending anti-discrimination protection to bisexual people, whose exclusion is a gross oversight that has been allowed to stand for far too long.

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Religious Exceptions

In contrast to its narrowly-defined protected attributes, the religious exceptions included in the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act are in fact the broadest in Australia.

These loopholes allow religious organisations to discriminate against lesbian, gay and transgender people in a wide variety of circumstances, and are so generous that they substantially, and substantively, undermine the overall purpose of the legislation (which is supposedly “[a]n Act to render unlawful racial, sex and other types of discrimination in certain circumstances and to promote equality of opportunity between all persons”).

The main exceptions permitting anti-LG&T discrimination by religious organisations are found in section 56 of the Act:

“Section 56 Religious bodies

Nothing in this Act affects:

(a) the ordination or appointment of priests, ministers of religion or members of any religious order,

(b) the training or education of persons seeking ordination or appointment as priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order,

(c) the appointment of any other person in any capacity by a body established to propagate religion, or

(d) any other act or practice of a body established to propagate religion that conforms to the doctrines of that religion or is necessary to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of the adherents of that religion.”

While sub-sections (a) and (b) might appear reasonable, as they are at least related to the internal training and appointment of ministers of religion, sub-sections (c) and especially (d) are outrageous in their breadth, essentially sanctioning discrimination against lesbian, gay and transgender employees and people accessing services in any organisation that is considered ‘religious’, including schools, hospitals and social services.

The operation of these provisions, and sub-section 56(d) in particular, in giving effective carte blanche to religious organisations to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in NSW was confirmed in a 2010 decision of the Court of Appeal[vii], allowing Wesley Mission to discriminate against a male same-sex couple who had applied to be foster carers to children in need.

Wesley successfully defended its prejudiced approach on the basis that “[t]he biblical teaching on human sexuality makes it clear that monogamous heterosexual partnership within marriage is both the norm and ideal.”[viii] This was in spite of the fact Wesley allowed single men and women to be carers (apparently they believed two dads or two mums had less to offer than one).

The ‘right to discriminate’ provided to religious organisations by section 56 of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 is essentially without restriction. And this general ability to exclude lesbian, gay and transgender people in NSW is supplemented by additional loopholes covering specific areas of public life.

One of these covers discrimination in adoption services. While the equal right of same-sex couples to adopt was recognised in NSW law in 2010, those very same reforms inserted the following into the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977:

“Section 59A Adoption services

(1) Nothing in Part 3A [transgender protections] or 4C [homosexual protections] affects any policy or practice of a faith-based organisation concerning the provision of adoption services under the Adoption Act 2000 or anything done to give effect to any such policy or practice.”

Which means that a religious organisation that operates an adoption service is legally permitted to deny a child the best possible adoptive parents solely because they might be lesbian, gay or transgender.

Perhaps the most (in)famous exceptions in the Act are those that apply to ‘private educational authorities’.[ix] Even though subsection 56(d) already allows religious schools to do whatever they want in relation to lesbian, gay and transgender teachers and students, NSW Parliament added specific clauses to ensure that private educational authorities can:

  • Discriminate against transgender employees[x]
  • Discriminate against transgender students, including by refusing their admission, attaching conditions to their admission, denying them benefits as a student, or by expelling them[xi]
  • Discriminate against lesbian and gay employees[xii] and
  • Discriminate against lesbian and gay students, including by refusing their admission, attaching conditions to their admission, denying them benefits as a student, or by expelling them[xiii].

Imagine considering it justified to seek special privileges to discriminate against these groups, let alone for State Parliament to condone such discrimination via legislation?

Perhaps the most extraordinary part of the ‘private educational authorities’ exceptions is that they aren’t even restricted to religious schools – in fact, the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 allows all non-government schools and colleges, even where they have absolutely nothing to do with religion, to refuse to employ lesbian, gay and transgender people, and exclude or expel LG&T students.

Summary: The religious exceptions contained in the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 are the broadest in Australia, and fundamentally undermine the integrity of a framework which is supposed to address discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. Subsections 56(c) and (d) should be repealed, as well as the more specific exceptions offered to religious organisations in relation to adoption services, and those allowing private educational authorities to discriminate against lesbian, gay and transgender employees and students.

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Anti-Vilification Coverage

There is one area where anti-discrimination law in NSW has improved recently, and that is anti-vilification coverage, with the passage of the Crimes Amendment (Publicly Threatening and Inciting Violence) Act 2018.

However, because this was a piecemeal change, rather than part of a comprehensive reform package, it means NSW is left with a two-tier, fundamentally inconsistent anti-vilification regime.

On one hand, the civil prohibitions against vilification contained in the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 only apply to homosexuality [xiv] and, as explained above, narrowly-defined transgender [xv] .

This means that bisexuals, non-binary people and people with innate variations of sex characteristics are not able to make complaints of vilification to Anti-Discrimination NSW.

On the other hand, the new Crimes Act 1900 offence of ‘publicly threatening or inciting violence’ in section 93Z applies to all of:

  • Sexual orientation
  • Gender identity, and
  • Intersex status.

All three are defined in section 93Z(5) [xvi] using the broadly-inclusive definitions of the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984, and mean that bisexuals, non-binary people and people with innate variations of sex characteristics are protected in NSW anti-discrimination laws for the first time (although note that, once again, intersex advocates have called for intersex status to be replaced by the protected attribute of sex characteristics). [xvii]

The penalty for this offence is also relatively high: up to three years imprisonment for individuals, and up to 500 penalty units for corporations.

Summary: The 2018 anti-vilification reforms are welcome, both for bringing anti-LGBTI vilification provisions into closer alignment with other forms of vilification, and also for including bisexual, non-binary and intersex people for the first time. However, if anything, these changes have underscored just how out of date the other anti-vilification provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act itself are, given it still covers only lesbian, gay and some trans people. This remains an area in desperate need of reform.

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Other Issues

While the ‘What’s Wrong With’ series concentrates on the three main areas of protected attributes, religious exceptions and anti-vilification coverage, I will also raise other issues relating to LGBTI anti-discrimination laws where they are significant.

In the case of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, these include:

  • An incredibly broad exception allowing “the exclusion of a transgender person from participation in any sporting activity for members of the sex with which the transgender person identifies”[xviii]
  • An inappropriate exception allowing superannuation funds to “treat… the transgender person as being of the opposite sex to the sex with which the transgender person identifies”[xix] and
  • Perhaps most alarmingly, exceptions which allow employers to discriminate against lesbian, gay and transgender applicants and employees “if the number of persons employed by the employer… does not exceed 5”[xx].

In fact, a similar exception also permits discrimination in relation to the ground of sex[xxi] – but no such limitation applies to race[xxii].  Which means that the NSW Parliament has effectively determined that racial discrimination cannot be tolerated in employment in any circumstances – but discrimination against lesbians, gay men, transgender people and even women is acceptable in some circumstances. That message is unconscionable, and these provisions must be made uniform (by abolishing the exceptions applying to homosexual, transgender and sex discrimination in employment).

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In conclusion, it is clear that, while NSW once had the first gay anti-discrimination laws in Australia, it now has the nation’s worst LGBTI laws – with significant problems in terms of protected attributes and religious exceptions, and serious shortcomings where it does have anti-vilification coverage. These and other issues must be addressed by the Government, and Parliament more broadly, as a matter of priority.

NSW ADA homosexuality 1982

NSW was the first Australian jurisdiction to introduce anti-discrimination laws covering any part of the LGBTI community – but 41 years later still doesn’t protect bisexual, non-binary or intersex people.

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Footnotes:

[i] The other posts in the series can be found here: LGBTI Anti-Discrimination

[ii] Section 4 Definitions.

[iii] From section 4: “recognised transgender person means a person the record of whose sex is altered under Part 5A of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 or under the corresponding provisions of a law of another Australian jurisdiction.”

[iv] Potentially modelled on the definition adopted by the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984: “gender identity means the gender-related identity, appearance or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of a person (whether by way of medical intervention or not), with or without regard to the person’s designated sex at birth” [Although obviously exact wording should be agreed with NSW’s trans and gender diverse community.]

[v] Intersex Human Rights Australia, and other intersex activists from Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand, issued the Darlington Statement as a call for wide-ranging law and policy reforms, including ‘for effective legislative protection from discrimination and harmful practices on grounds of sex characteristics’ (paragraph 9, here).

This terminology (‘sex characteristics’) is intended to replace the previous protected attribute of ‘intersex status’, as included in section 4 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, and defined as: “intersex status means the status of having physical, hormonal or genetic features that are:

(a) neither wholly female nor wholly male; or

(b) a combination of female and male; or

(c) neither female nor male.”

[vi] Section 4 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 states ““sexual orientation” means a person’s sexual orientation towards:

(a) persons of the same sex; or

(b) persons of a different sex; or

(c) persons of the same sex and persons of a different sex.”

[vii] OV & OW v Members of the Board of the Wesley Council [2010] NSWCA 155 (6 July 2010).

[viii] OW & OV v Members of the Board of the Wesley Mission Council [2010] NSWADT 293 (10 December 2010).

[ix] Defined in section 4 as “private educational authority means a person or body administering a school, college, university or other institution at which education or training is provided, not being:

(a) a school, college, university or other institution established under the Education Reform Act 1990 (by the Minister administering that Act), the Technical and Further Education Commission Act 1990 or an Act of incorporation of a university, or

(b) an agricultural college administered by the Minister for Agriculture.”

[x] Section 38C prohibits discrimination against transgender applicants and employees, but subsection (3)(c) clarifies that this prohibition does not apply to discrimination by private educational authorities.

[xi] “Section 38K Education

(1) It is unlawful for an educational authority to discriminate against a person on transgender grounds:

(a) by refusing or failing to accept the person’s application for admission as a student, or

(b) in the terms on which it is prepared to admit the person as a student.

(2) It is unlawful for an educational authority to discriminate against a student on transgender grounds:

(a) by denying the student access, or limiting the student’s access, to any benefit provided by the educational authority, or

(b) by expelling the student or subjecting the student to any other detriment.

(3) Nothing in this section applies to or in respect of a private educational authority.”

[xii] Section 49ZH prohibits discrimination against lesbian and gay applicants and employees, but, just like for transgender people, subsection (3)(c) clarifies that this prohibition does not apply to discrimination by private educational authorities.

[xiii] “Section 49ZO Education

(1) It is unlawful for an educational authority to discriminate against a person on the ground of homosexuality:

(a) by refusing or failing to accept the person’s application for admission as a student, or

(b) in the terms on which it is prepared to admit the person as a student.

(2) It is unlawful for an educational authority to discriminate against a student on the ground of homosexuality:

(a) by denying the student access, or limiting the student’s access, to any benefit provided by the educational authority, or

(b) by expelling the student or subjecting the student to any other detriment.

(3) Nothing in this section applies to or in respect of a private educational authority.”

[xiv] Section 49ZT

[xv] Section 39S

[xvi] Gender identity means the gender related identity, appearances or mannerisms or other gender related characteristics of a person (whether by way of medical intervention or not), with or without regard to the person’s designated sex at birth.

Intersex status means the status of having physical, hormonal or genetic features that are:

  • neither wholly female nor wholly male,
  • a combination of female and male, or
  • neither female nor male.

Sexual orientation means a person’s orientation towards:

  • persons of the same sex, or
  • persons of a different sex, or
  • persons of the same sex and persons of a different sex.

[xvii] Interestingly, it also means heterosexual people are covered by the publicly threatening or inciting violence offence in the Crimes Act 1900, although they still don’t have any coverage under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 itself (for discrimination, or civil complaints of vilification).

[xviii] Section 38P. It is hoped that, given the work in recent years by transgender groups, the Australian Human Rights Commission and Australian sporting organisations, these provisions could be narrowed if not repealed entirely in future years.

[xix] Section 38Q.

[xx] Included in both sub-sections 38C(3)(b) and 49ZO(3)(b).

[xxi] Section 25(3)(b).

[xxii] Section 8, which covers Discrimination against applicants and employees on the ground of race, does not include any exception based on the number of employees that an employer has.

Submission to Victorian Greens Equal Opportunity Amendment (LGBTI Equality) Bill 2016

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The Greens Member for Prahran in the Victorian Parliament, Sam Hibbins, is currently undertaking consultation on his exposure draft Bill to amend the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010.

Full details of the consultation process can be found here. The following is my submission:

Mr Sam Hibbins MP

Member for Prahran

94 Chapel St

Windsor VIC 3181

sam.hibbins@parliament.vic.gov.au

Friday 12 February 2016

Dear Mr Hibbins

Consultation on Equal Opportunity Amendment (LGBTI Equality) Bill 2016

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a submission on your exposure draft Equal Opportunity Amendment Bill.

Thank you also for your commitment to improving the anti-discrimination protections that are provided to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and bisexual (LGBTI) Victorians.

I agree with your statement, made as part of this consultation, that “The [Equal Opportunity] Act needs updating so that it better protects same-sex and gender diverse Victorians from discrimination at school, at work and in the community” (although I note that the phrase ‘same-sex and gender diverse’ does not include intersex people).

I believe that your exposure draft Bill addresses two of three major deficiencies in the current Act (and that I have written about previously – What’s Wrong With the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010).

Specifically, the Bill would significantly improve the protected attributes that are included in the Act, by:

  • Introducing a new protected attribute of ‘intersex status’, consistent with the protections offered under the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984, and
  • Updating the definition of ‘gender identity’ to be broader, and to remove any requirement to identify as either male or female in order to attract anti-discrimination coverage (and again in line with the 2013 Federal Labor Government reforms to the Sex Discrimination Act).

Both of these changes are overdue, and are welcome.

I also support the proposed amendments to reduce the current excessive and unjustified ‘exceptions’ that are offered to religious organisations and individuals allowing them to discriminate against LGBT Victorians in circumstances where it would otherwise be unlawful to do so.

The balance which the Bill strikes – removing religious exceptions in schools and other services, in employment and by individuals, while retaining exceptions for ‘core religious functions’, such as the appointment of ministers of religion and the conduct of religious ceremonies[i] – appears to be a reasonable one.

However, there is one major deficiency of Victorian anti-discrimination and vilification law that your exposure draft Equal Opportunity Amendment (LGBTI Equality) Bill 2016 does not address – and that is the absence of anti-vilification protections covering LGBTI people.

As I have written previously:

“There are… protections against both racial and religious vilification under Victoria’s Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001.

“With homophobic, biphobic, transphobic and intersexphobic vilification just as serious, and just as detrimental, as racial and religious vilification, there is no reason why LGBTI people should not have equivalent protections under Victorian law.”[ii]

In this context, the major suggestion I would make for improvement to your exposure draft Bill is for you to consider amendments to introduce protections against vilification on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status, equivalent to the current prohibitions on racial and religious vilification contained in the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001.

Outside of these three main issues – protected attributes, religious exceptions and anti-vilification protections – the other reforms proposed by the exposure draft Bill, to “restore… the powers of the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission to conduct public inquiries, enter into enforceable undertakings and to issue compliance notices” and to “restore… the power for the Commission to order someone to provide information and documents, and to order a witness… to attend and answer question” also appear reasonable.

Overall, then, I support the provisions contained in the exposure draft Equal Opportunity Amendment (LGBTI Equality) Bill 2016, but encourage you to consider adding provisions to provide protections against vilification on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.

Beyond the content of the proposed Bill itself, however, I would like to make the additional point that, given the failure of the Victorian Legislative Council to support reforms in late 2015 to ensure that religious organisations could not discriminate against LGBTI people accessing adoption services, the passage of any of the above reforms would appear to be difficult, at least in the current term of Parliament.

In this context, I urge you and the Victorian Greens to work collaboratively with the state Labor Government, the Sex Party (who also supported last year’s reforms), and the Victorian LGBTI community, to persuade remaining cross-benchers, and indeed sympathetic Liberal and National MLCs, to support at least some of these reforms now – while retaining the option of passing the remainder following the 2018 election.

Thank you for taking this submission into consideration. If you would like any additional information, or to clarify any of the above, please contact me at the details provided below.

Sincerely

Alastair Lawrie

160212 Sam Hibbins

Member for Prahran, Sam Hibbins MP.

Update: 14 January 2017

The Greens introduced an amended version of this legislation into Victorian Parliament in mid-2016.

Renamed the Equal Opportunity Amendment (Equality for Students) Bill 2016, as the name suggests it focused specifically on ensuring religious schools could not discriminate against LGBT students.

Its major provision would have added the following new section to the Equal Opportunity Act 2010:

“84A Discrimination against school students not exempt

Sections 82(2), 83 and 84 do not permit discrimination by a person or body that establishes, directs, controls, administers or is an educational institution that is a school against a student on the basis of the student’s sex, sexual orientation, lawful sexual activity, marital status, parental status or gender identity.”

Unfortunately, despite the modest nature of this proposed reform, it was rejected by the Victorian Legislative Council on November 9 2016, by a margin of 32 to 6 (as reported by the Star Observer here).

Footnotes:

[i] The Bill would leave sub-section 82(1) of the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010 in tact:

“Nothing in Part 4 applies to-

  • the ordination or appointment of priests, ministers of religions or members of a religious order; or
  • the training or education of people seeking ordination or appointment as priests, ministers of religion or members of a religious order; or
  • the selection or appointment of people to perform functions in relation to, or otherwise participate in, any religious observance or practice.”

[ii] What’s Wrong With the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 2010 

2016-17 Pre-Budget Submission: Save $158.4 million – Scrap the Marriage Equality Plebiscite

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The Commonwealth Government has called for submissions[i] to assist it in developing the 2016-17 Budget, which, barring an early election, is due to be handed down on Tuesday 10 May.

This process is another opportunity to highlight to Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, Treasurer Scott Morrison and the Liberal-National Government generally just how ridiculous it is that they are proposing to waste (at least) $158.4 million on something that can be passed by the Parliament, in the usual way, for no cost.

Submissions are due by Friday 5 February 2016, with full details here. This is my submission:

 

Budget Policy Division

Department of the Treasury

Langton Crescent

PARKES ACT 2600

prebudgetsubs@treasury.gov.au

 

Tuesday 2 February 2016

 

To whom it may concern

2016-17 Pre-Budget Submission

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission regarding what I believe should be the priorities for the 2016-17 Budget.

In this short submission I would like to focus on just one issue that, as well as being the right policy approach, would also have significant Budget benefits, and that is to call on the Turnbull Government to scrap the proposed marriage equality plebiscite.

There are a variety of policy justifications for not proceeding with a plebiscite on this issue, including that holding a public vote is unnecessary because the High Court has already found that Commonwealth Parliament has the constitutional power to pass marriage equality, and that subjecting the human rights of a minority group to such a process is inappropriate.

I, and many other members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) community, also have serious concerns that the campaign leading up to a marriage equality plebiscite will be divisive, and expose LGBTI Australians, and the children of LGBTI families, to increased levels of homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and intersexphobia.

However, there are also strong budgetary reasons why the marriage equality plebiscite should not go ahead.

The Australian Electoral Commission has estimated that the cost of holding a stand-alone plebiscite on marriage equality would be at least $158.4 million.[ii]

Such a significant expenditure of public monies must be considered wasteful when the alternative approach – to pass (or at least to hold a free vote on) marriage equality legislation in Parliament – does not carry any additional cost.

Holding a marriage equality plebiscite could even be considered duplication, given, in the event of a ‘yes’ vote, a Bill introducing marriage equality would still need to be passed.

The two media releases, issued by the Assistant Minister to the Treasurer, the Hon Alex Hawke MP, calling for Pre-Budget Submissions, both reiterated the “Government’s commitment to restrain expenditure responsibly”.[iii]

It is difficult to think of a more perfect way to ‘restrain expenditure responsibly’ than by avoiding spending $158.4 million on something which is entirely unnecessary in the first place.

Of course, scrapping the marriage equality plebiscite also fits in with the Government’s broader fiscal policy, as outlined in the Mid-year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO), including the “Government’s commitment to returning the budget to a sustainable position and reducing debt over the medium term”[iv].

With an underlying cash deficit estimated at $33.7 billion (or 2% of GDP) in 2016-17 (when such a plebiscite may be held), and net debt now expected to peak at 18.5% of GDP in 2017-18, it is undeniably profligate to spend an extra $158.4 million on a public vote the outcome of which is not even binding on Government MPs. This money would instead be much better used to lower the cash deficit and therefore reduce net Government debt.

Other Budget Rules, contained in the MYEFO, are also relevant to the consideration of whether to allocate money in the 2016-17 Budget to holding a plebiscite on marriage equality.

For example, I note that the MYEFO states: “This strategy sets out that:

  • new spending measures will be more than offset by reductions in spending elsewhere within the budget.”[v]

Given the monies required to hold a marriage equality plebiscite have not been allocated in the Budget to date[vi], that means it would need to be included in the 2016-17 Budget as a ‘new spending measure’ and, according to the Government’s own rules, there must be at least an equivalent amount of reductions in spending elsewhere.

It seems absurd to me that the Government would need to cut $158.4 million in spending on justice, or health, or education, or any number of other areas, simply to hold a plebiscite on something that could be resolved by the Parliament in the ordinary course of business for no extra cost.

If the Government does decide to continue down this path, and makes such cuts in order to fund a marriage equality plebiscite, then in the interests of transparency I urge it to include the details of these cuts in the Budget, linking them to this ‘new spending measure’, thereby allowing Australians to make up their own minds whether these actions meet the stated ‘commitment to restrain expenditure responsibly’.

Of course, if the Government is interested in spending a similar amount of money on issues that affect lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) Australians, then I would suggest a variety of different ways in which it could do so that would bring much greater benefit, including:

  • Removing out-of-pocket medical costs for transgender people
  • Ending involuntary surgical procedures on and sterilisation of intersex children
  • Increasing refugee places for LGBTI people fleeing persecution in Syria, Iraq and other countries
  • Funding campaigns aimed at addressing homophobia, biphobia, transphobia and intersexphobia across society and
  • Expanding the ‘safe schools’ program to cover every school in the country.

Even if the Turnbull Government is not interested in funding these programs, it would nevertheless be preferable to use this $158.4 million to reduce overall Government deficit and debt, rather than to waste it on holding an unnecessary, inappropriate and divisive public vote.

Scrapping the marriage equality plebiscite, and holding a parliamentary vote instead, might be the easiest Budget saving any Government could ever hope to make.

Thank you for taking this submission into consideration.

 

Sincerely

Alastair Lawrie

 

160202 Scott Morrison

Treasurer Scott Morrison, tasked with ‘restrain[ing] expenditure responsibly’. Scrapping the marriage equality plebiscite would be a good place to start.

[i] Media Release “2016-17 Pre-Budget Submissions” 18 December 2015 and Media Release “Deadline for Lodging 2016-17 Pre-Budget Submissions”.

[ii] As quoted on page 22 of the Senate Committee Report: Matter of a popular vote, in the form of a plebiscite or referendum, on the matter of marriage in Australia, 15 September 2015.

[iii] See links to media releases above.

[iv] Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2015-16 Part 3: Fiscal Strategy and Outlook.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] “Labor sees a plebiscite-sized hole in the Budget”, Huffington Post, 18 December 2015.